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English Abstract: This bilingual volume of the Supreme Court Law Review dedicates itself to the legacy of the Honourable Justice Clément Gascon, who became a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2014 and retired in 2019. This introduction provides an overview of his career and a summary of the papers included in the collection, written by: Rt. Hon. Richard Wagner; Hon. Marie Michelle Lavigne; Hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella; Hon. Nicole Duval Hesler; Hon. Nicholas Kasirer; Catherine Le Guerrier; Prof. Janis Sarra; Sajeda Hedaraly & Éléna Sophie Drouin; Jérémy Boulanger-Bonnelly; Alex Bogach & Ben Lerer; Brodie Noga; Hon. Louis LeBel; Brandyn Rodgerson; and Prof. Joshua Sealy-Harrington.French Abstract: Ce volume bilingue de la Supreme Court Law Review se dédie à l’héritage juridique de l’honorable Clément Gascon, lequel est devenu juge à la Cour suprême du Canada en 2014 et a pris sa retraite en 2019. Cette introduction fournit un aperçu de sa carrière et un résumé des essais inclus dans la collection, lesquels ont été rédigés par: le très hon. Richard Wagner; l'hon. Marie Michelle Lavigne; l'hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella; l'hon. Nicole Duval Hesler; l'hon. Nicholas Kasirer; Catherine Le Guerrier; Prof. Janis Sarra; Sajeda Hedaraly & Éléna Sophie Drouin; Jérémy Boulanger-Bonnelly; Alex Bogach & Ben Lerer; Brodie Noga; l'hon. Louis LeBel; Brandyn Rodgerson; et Prof. Joshua Sealy-Harrington.

This article explores two disability justice legacies of Justice Clément Gascon. One legacy is embodied in his personal narrative of disability. Another legacy is jurisprudential and seen in his legal reasoning. On his embodied legacy, the article juxtaposes Justice Gascon’s widely publicized anxiety attack with Justice Le Dain’s private forced resignation following his hospitalization for depression thirty years earlier. This comparison reveals how, in many ways, attitudes around disability have not progressed, but rather reconfigured into more palatable forms. And on his jurisprudential legacy, this article conducts a critical disability theory analysis of Justice Gascon’s dissent in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. In so doing, it highlights the ideological undercurrents that shape Canadian law, the link between ableism in society and ableism on the Court, and the importance of incorporating disability in contemporary discourse around judicial diversity.

English Abstract: Ottawa police sergeant Steven Desjourdy was the first officer in Canada to be prosecuted for sexual assault based upon an illegal strip search of a woman, arguably a “sexual assault by the state.”1 Sexual assault prosecutions present innumerable hurdles for all complainants, but when the accused is a police officer engaged in his duties, those hurdles are almost insurmountable. The prospect of racism loomed large in this case, given that Desjourdy was white and SB was a Black Canadian woman portrayed as volatile and dangerous. Using the transcripts of Desjourdy’s trial and drawing upon sexual assault and critical race literatures, this article explores the systemic biases that favour police officers on trial and facilitate the construction of white innocence and racialized danger.French Abstract: Le sergent Steven Desjourdy, de la police d’Ottawa, a été le premier policier au Canada à être poursuivi en justice pour agression sexuelle à la suite d’une fouille à nu illégale d’une femme, ce qui constitue sans doute une « agression sexuelle par l’État ». Les poursuites pour agression sexuelle présentent d’innombrables obstacles pour tous les plaignants, mais lorsque l’accusé est un policier dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, ces obstacles sont presque insurmontables. La perspective du racisme était très présente dans cette affaire, étant donné que Steven Desjourdy était blanc et que SB était une femme noire canadienne décrite comme volatile et dangereuse. À l’aide des transcriptions du procès de Steven Desjourdy et en s’appuyant sur les écrits en matière d’agressions sexuelles et de critiques de la race, les auteurs explorent les préjugés systémiques qui favorisent les policiers en instance de procès et facilitent la fabrication de la chimère d’une innocence blanche et d’un danger racialisé.* Assistant Professor, University of Windsor Faculty of Law; PhD candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School.**Professor Emerita, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law.1 Amanda George, “Strip searches: Sexual Assault by the State” (1993) 18:1 Alternative LJ 31.

We write as a group of experts in the legal regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), technology-facilitated violence, equality, and the use of AI systems by law enforcement in Canada. We have experience working within academia and legal practice, and are affiliated with LEAF and the Citizen Lab who support this letter. We reviewed the Toronto Police Services Board Use of New Artificial Intelligence Technologies Policy and provide comments and recommendations focused on the following key observations: 1. Police use of AI technologies must not be seen as inevitable2. A commitment to protecting equality and human rights must be integrated more thoroughly throughout the TPSB policy and its AI analysis procedures3. Inequality is embedded in AI as a system in ways that cannot be mitigated through a policy only dealing with use 4. Having more accurate AI systems does not mitigate inequality5. The TPS must not engage in unnecessary or disproportionate mass collection and analysis of data6. TPSB’s AI policy should provide concrete guidance on the proactive identification and classification of risk7. TPSB’s AI policy must ensure expertise in independent vetting, risk analysis, and human rights impact analysis8. The TPSB should be aware of assessment challenges that can arise when an AI system is developed by a private enterprise9. The TPSB must apply the draft policy to all existing AI technologies that are used by, or presently accessible to, the Toronto Police ServiceIn light of these key observations, we have made 33 specific recommendations for amendments to the draft policy.

This in an introduction to the special Issue "Media and Communication Theory and the Regulation of the Networked Society" published by the international peer-review journal LAWS. The collection of articles builds on the interdisciplinary dialogue that took place at the University of Windsor (Canada) symposium on the regulation of digital platforms, new media and technologies in the fall of 2019. The articles of the collection explore the various effects of media and borders, networks, amidst pandemics and environmental crises, different understandings of regulation, and the particular challenges of interdisciplinarity as it connects to law and regulation. The collection gathers the works of several academics worldwide who reflect on some of the biggest questions and challenges of our time: how do transnational digital media platforms, algorithms and big data shape commerce, politics, speech and mobilization or resistance on pressing issues such as climate change, the pandemic, elections, racial discrimination or social justice? How do transnational digital platforms redefine the role of our governments, our everyday lives, the citizenry? How do governments, private undertakings, institutions and citizens resort to, or respond to, this ultra-mediatized networked environment? To what extent have national borders become obsolete in this networked global village? Building on the scholarship of Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan and others, as a point of departure to explore the regulation of new media, this Special Issue tackles several of these pressing questions in a post-colonialist, posttruth environment. Various theories about media, networks and borders at the intersection of law and regulation may better inform the goals that law and policy makers should pursue (or not). This is particularly timely as governments, private corporations and citizens around the world face unprecedented challenges with flows of (dis)information about the global pandemic, hate speech and environmental crises.

In response to the Canadian government consultation process on the modernization of the copyright framework launched in the summer 2021, we hereby present our analysis and recommendations concerning the interaction between copyright and the Internet of Things (IoT). The recommendations herein reflect the shared opinion of the intellectual property scholars who are signatories to this brief. They are informed by many combined decades of study, teaching, and practice in Canadian, US, and international intellectual property law.In what follows, we explain:•The importance of approaching the questions raised in the consultation with a firm commitment to maintaining the appropriate balance of rights and interests in Canada’s copyright system, within the broader framework of the Constitution;•That the modernization of the Copyright Act requires a careful examination of the copyright framework within larger observable trends of dominant positions in the marketplace and anti-competitive practices, of the extraction of big (personal) data, and of market and legal infrastructures’ heavy reliance on non-negotiated standard form contracts;-That the growing prevalence of the IoT shows more clearly than ever before why Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) need to be recalibrated in keeping with the objectives of copyright, the Constitution, property rights, and of promoting competitive markets.As such, we recommend: -To narrow the scope of the TPM prohibitions under the Copyright Act, whereby the circumvention of access controls or copy controls for non-copyright-infringing purposes would be lawful, with a non-exhaustive list of such purposes to provide greater legal certainty. The same treatment would apply to the dealing in TPM circumvention technology enabling the exercise of non-copyright-infringing purposes.In the alternative, the Copyright Act should be amended to:-Introduce a new exception that would confirm that the TPM provisions (and other relevant exclusive rights in the Copyright Act) do not apply to the right to repair, including for maintenance and diagnostics purposes. -Introduce a new exception to encourage follow-on innovation. -Additionally, just as copyright holders should not be allowed to contract out of exceptions to copyright infringement through non-negotiated standard form agreements, neither should they be allowed to opt out of exceptions to TPM prohibitions by contract.

In response to the Canadian government consultation process on the modernization of the copyright framework launched in the summer 2021, we hereby present our analysis and recommendations concerning the interaction between copyright and artificial intelligence (AI). The recommendations herein reflect the shared opinion of the intellectual property scholars who are signatories to this brief. They are informed by many combined decades of study, teaching, and practice in Canadian and international intellectual property law. In what follows, we explain:- The importance of approaching the questions raised in the consultation with a firm commitment to maintaining the appropriate balance of rights and interests in Canada’s copyright system, consistent with a robust principle of technological neutrality.- The importance of ensuring that text and data mining (TDM) activity can be undertaken in Canada without the threat of potential copyright liability. We therefore propose both an opening up of Canada’s fair dealing doctrine to better accommodate TDM activities, and the enactment of a specific statutory provision to confirm that uses of copyright works and other subject matter for TDM (whether commercial or non-commercial) do not infringe copyright. - The importance of resisting calls to extend copyright protection to AI-generated outputs. We therefore propose maintaining and confirming the existing principled requirements of human authorship and original expression as preconditions of copyright protection, and we caution against any move to establish new neighbouring or sui generis rights in respect of AI outputs. Works generated by AI should remain in the public domain. As such, we recommend:- Enacting a broad statutory provision confirming that use of a work or other subject matter for TDM does not infringe copyright. This specific exception should be available to all users, apply to commercial and noncommercial uses, permit the retention and sharing of copies, and be protected from contractual override. - Amending section 29 of the Copyright Act to make the list of purposes an illustrative list (“for purposes such as”) and adding TDM or data/informational analysis as an enumerated purpose therein.- Confirming in section 2 of the Copyright Act that “author” means a human being/natural person; and confirming in section 5 of the Copyright Act that copyright shall not subsist in a work created without a human author.

When proposals are made to reform legal procedure, improving access to justice is often identified as the goal. What does access to justice mean in this context? This article proposes that “better access” and “better justice” should be understood as two distinct goals. Access improves when procedural costs confronting litigants (and potential litigants) are reduced. Justice has three qualities – substantive justice, procedural justice, and public justice – which legal procedure can produce to a greater or lesser degree. Although access and justice are sometimes in tension as goals for procedural reform, they are also harmonious. Better access to better justice is a worthy goal for procedural reformers. Welfare-consequentialism is introduced in the final part of the article, as a way to focus access to justice reforms and make the necessary tradeoffs. This article’s argument is illustrated throughout by three procedural reform trends – mandatory mediation, small-dollar procedure, and inquisitoriality.

This article examines the legal and normative foundations of media content regulation in the borderless networked society. We explore the extent to which internet undertakings should be subject to state regulation, in light of Canada’s ongoing debates and legislative reform. We bring a cross-disciplinary perspective (from the subject fields of law; communications studies, in particular McLuhan’s now classic probes; international relations; and technology studies) to enable both policy and language analysis. We apply the concept of sovereignty to states (national cultural and digital sovereignty), media platforms (transnational sovereignty), and citizens (autonomy and personal data sovereignty) to examine the competing dynamics and interests that need to be considered and mediated. While there is growing awareness of the tensions between state and transnational media platform powers, the relationship between media content regulation and the collection of viewers’ personal data is relatively less explored. We analyse how future media content regulation needs to fully account for personal data extraction practices by transnational platforms and other media content undertakings. We posit national cultural sovereignty—a constant unfinished process and framework connecting the local to the global—as the enduring force and justification of media content regulation in Canada. The exercise of state sovereignty may be applied not so much to secure strict territorial borders and centralized power over citizens but to act as a mediating power to promote and protect citizens’ individual and collective interests, locally and globally.

Perpetrators of Technology-Facilitated gender-based violence are taking advantage of increasingly automated and sophisticated privacy-invasive tools to carry out their abuse. Whether this be monitoring movements through stalker-ware, using drones to non-consensually film or harass, or manipulating and distributing intimate images online such as deep-fakes and creepshots, invasions of privacy have become a significant form of gender-based violence. Accordingly, our normative and legal concepts of privacy must evolve to counter the harms arising from this misuse of new technology. Canada’s Supreme Court recently addressed Technology-Facilitated violations of privacy in the context of voyeurism in R v Jarvis (2019). The discussion of privacy in this decision appears to be a good first step toward a more equitable conceptualization of privacy protection. Building on existing privacy theories, this chapter examines what the reasoning in Jarvis might mean for “reasonable expectations of privacy” in other areas of law, and how this concept might be interpreted in response to gender-based Technology-Facilitated violence. The authors argue the courts in Canada and elsewhere must take the analysis in Jarvis further to fully realize a notion of privacy that protects the autonomy, dignity, and liberty of all.

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.” Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics.

This draft chapter is part of a larger research project exploring the question of patent quality from a human agency perspective. This chapter explores the changing relationship between agency, and specifically, 'professionalized' agency, and patent quality.

This paper explores from a Canadian perspective the awarding of damages for non-pecuniary losses that arise in commercial settings and asks the question whether there is any useful function performed by such awards. It is difficult to find cases that support such awards and thus if they are to be awarded, it will be advancing damages for non-pecuniary losses in a new direction. To justify such a movement, I suggest that the any development should be measured by two concepts: legitimacy - what is it that courts can legitimately do, and coherence - how does the award fit into a coherent and predictable legal system.I argue that from a purely compensation point of view, awarding compensation for a loss that is incommensurable does not make much sense. Only if the justification is vindication, deterrence or punishment is there merit in awarding more than compensation, but then, courts or legislatures should develop separate criteria to add quantification and to meet the standards of legitimacy and coherence.

In York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (2020), the Federal Court of Appeal was confronted with two issues at the heart of ongoing debates in Canadian copyright law. First, whether tariffs of copyright collective societies are mandatory. Second, and the main focus of this case comment, how should the fair dealing doctrine be interpreted with respect to the purpose of education. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Federal Court decision that York University Fair dealing Guidelines did not meet the fair dealing requirements in copyright law. This case comment highlights how the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal failed to consider important contextual elements of York University Guidelines that might have led to different conclusions. It provides some guidance on how fair dealing for the purpose of education should be interpreted. While fair dealing has been characterized as a “user right” by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (2004) and subsequent decisions, this case comment points to some of the shortcomings of fair dealing as a vehicle to promote greater access to educational materials. It concludes by highlighting the challenges that lie ahead on the application of fair dealing to educational institutions, and by broadening the debate of access to educational materials beyond the fair dealing doctrine.

Tort law allows parties to seek remedies (typically in the form of monetary damages) for losses caused by a wrongdoer’s intentional conduct, failure to exercise reasonable care, and/or introduction of a specific risk into society. The scope of tort law makes it especially relevant for individuals who are harmed as a result of an artificial intelligence (AI)-system operated by another person, company, or government agent with whom the injured person has no pre-existing legal relationship (e.g. no contract or commercial relationship). This chapter examines the application of three primary areas of tort law to AI-systems. Plaintiffs might pursue intentional tort actions when an AI-system is used to intentionally carry out harmful conduct. While this is not likely to be the main source of litigation, intentional torts can provide remedies for harms that might not be available through other areas of law. Negligence and strict liability claims are likely to be more common legal mechanisms in the AI context. A plaintiff might have a more straightforward case in a strict liability claim against a wrongdoer, but these claims are only available in specific situations in Canada. A negligence claim will be the likely mechanism for most plaintiffs suffering losses from a defendant’s use of an AI-system. Negligence actions for AI-related injuries will present a number of complexities and challenges for plaintiffs. Even seemingly straightforward preliminary issues like identifying who to name as a defendant might raise barriers to accessing remedies through tort law. These challenges, and some potential opportunities, are outlined below.

Based on an empirical review of post-RDS caselaw, I argue that there is a demonstrable colour blindness within the existing jurisprudence on judicial impartiality. I illustrate this colour blind approach through two arguments. The first argument is based on the evidence needed to pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. A large number of the cases surveyed illustrate the propensity of decision makers to deny recusal arguments based on the cogency of the evidence. In these cases of colour blind decision making, the presented evidence was deemed insufficient to warrant piercing the veil of judicial impartiality. The second argument focuses on judges that adopt an antiracist perspective. When judges have relied on social science evidence to engage in contextual and antiracist judging, they have been policed and their decisions overturned by supervisory and appellate courts.

This article traces the evolution of the feminist “sex wars” in contemporary debates about campus sexual violence reform in Canada and the United States – what Emily Bazelon calls the “return of the sex wars” at American colleges and universities. The "return of the sex wars" has been characterized by many of the same unproductive hostilities and painful acrimony as the original fight between feminist sex radicals and anti-pornography feminists over three decades ago. This article focuses on a particularly controversial issue in these debates: the role of consensual dispute resolution (i.e., negotiation, mediation, and restorative justice) in addressing campus sexual violence. Employing a two-person counter conversational methodology, the article stages a negotiation between two feminists with competing and representative views on this issue. Feminist concerns about consensual dispute resolution raise challenging questions about the rise of informal justice and its implications for the rule of law in campus sexual violence cases. The article concludes by arguing that the intense polarization and politicization of the "return of the sex wars" has led to a hollowing out of the feminist critical discourse in this area, which has prevented some feminists from engaging with consensual dispute resolution as a potentially viable and redemptive means of sexual regulation on campus.

Climate justice activists are increasingly looking to litigation to produce the policy changes that have eluded them in the political process. Without a codified right to a clean environment, litigants in jurisdictions like Canada must use a human rights framework to advance their cause. Recent successes in Charter class actions suggest that it is now possible to pursue constitutional damages for climate change harms. As Canadian advocates join with their international counterparts in deploying a litigation strategy, Canada’s robust class action procedure may be a useful addition in the pursuit of collective climate justice. This paper proceeds in four parts. First and by way of background, I summarize the types and extent of climate change litigation in Canada and internationally. Second, I discuss Canadian class actions advancing constitutional claims, which have recently surged after two decades of limited use. In part III, I argue that a climate change action founded on a breach of s. 7 of the Charter would meet the test for certification of a class action. Finally, in part IV I discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of using the class action mechanism to combat climate injustice.