Your search

The first volume of the Canadian Bar Review (CBR) was published in 1923. In commemoration of the centenary of the CBR, this article briefly reflects on the journal’s history. In doing so, we highlight the CBR’s seminal role as a meeting place for scholarship, practice and legal traditions in Canada.

Sri Lanka’s recent tumultuous economic crisis has generated grave uncertainty in the global financial ecosystem. Sri Lanka’s fiscal demise, described as the “canary in the coalmine”, has served as a glaring cautionary tale for financial regulators. The International Financial Institutions continue to warn of subsequent economic fallouts as global debt issues simmer to the surface. Sri Lanka’s economic fallout serves as a story besieged by colonial, political and current geopolitical conditions, which are further compounded by the end of the brutal civil war, foreign debt and post Covid-19 consequences. This paper, however, explores the cracks in the economic foundation using historical moments that paved the legal framework for the emergence of a centralized banking institution. This historical inquiry includes the origins of the financial inclusion discourse in Sri Lanka, which encompasses both colonial and post-colonial temporalities. As a result of Sri Lanka’s fiscal collapse, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s role has been under scrutiny. The economic crisis began in 2019, yet the financial regulator’s failure to engage in mitigating tactics to combat the rapid decrease in foreign reserves, rise in sovereign debt, financial mismanagement and political interference is underexplored. In order to further understand how the CBSL, the country’s first financial steward and custodian of fiscal stability, became ineffective, a closer examination of its genesis is made. This paper serves to examine the formation of centralized banking through a particular conceptual goal of ‘financial inclusion’, which catalyzed the establishment of the current central bank structure in Sri Lanka. As such, the financial policies designed and developed crafted by the financial regulator are explored through the lens of financial inclusion.

This article centers on the profound discrepancy between efforts by First Nations to obtain injunctions against industry and the state versus the far more successful record of corporations and governments seeking to obtain injunctions against First Nations. We examine how the common law test for injunctions in struggles over lands and resources leads to these results. We begin by tracking the history of injunctions in the Aboriginal law context, especially the development of s 35(1) jurisprudence, which ironically deprived First Nations of access to injunctions, despite an earlier period of successful defence of Indigenous land rights using this legal tool. We then focus on the doctrinal and political function of the “public interest” consideration in injunction cases, positioning this concept within a broader political economy framework. Finally, we turn to the origins of the injunction as an equitable remedy and argue that the current imbalance in injunction success rates ought to be understood through a re-examination of equity within a broader historical trajectory of settler-colonial legality. We conclude that the heavy lifting done by notions of ‘public interest’ both relies on and obscures the circumvention and exclusion of Aboriginal treaty and constitutional rights from the law of injunctions and constitutes a de facto resolution of Aboriginal land rights in Canada. Finally, we ask what place, if any, exists in injunction jurisprudence for Indigenous law and governance.

In Canada, access to post-secondary education is guaranteed by a number of domestic instruments. These instruments are: statutory human rights legislation, constitutional law, and accessibility legislation. These guarantees are further bolstered by Article 24 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Statutory human rights legislation (or anti-discrimination law) plays the most extensive role in controlling the discretionary power that colleges and universities exercise with respect to the admission of prospective students and the reasonable accommodation of matriculated students with disabilities. This article presents the findings of a review of decisions by human rights tribunals in Canada over the 7-year period of 2014–2021. With respect to both admissions cases and in-program reasonable accommodations cases, it identifies the main types of barriers experienced by persons with disabilities. It also examines the ways in which accessibility legislation, a proactive standard-setting form of legislation in Canada, has sought to improve access to post-secondary students with disabilities, focusing on Ontario’s post-secondary education accessibility standards as an example. Finally, it argues that changes to policies and practices on the ground that draw more inspiration from Article 24 of the CRPD will help to ensure that the equality right to post-secondary education for students with disabilities is fulfilled in letter and spirit.

This review essay considers the universality of dilemmas and tensions that arise in class action litigation, wherever practised. It does so by exploring the evolution of the Australian class action in its doctrinal, political and historical dimensions, as recounted in Michael Legg and James Metzger’s edited collection of papers, The Australian Class Action: A 30-Year Perspective. While the book is rooted in the Australian experience, it lays bare common themes across jurisdictions, such as the unique role of the judge in a class action, the challenges to effective representation, and concerns about the commodification of litigation.

While much of Canada’s early commitment to religious freedom was simply a pragmatic compromise to ensure social peace and political stability, the Supreme Court of Canada in a series of judgments that pre-dated the Charter sought to articulate a principled account of religious freedom as an “original freedom” that is an important “mode[] of self-expression” and “the primary condition[] of the community life”. This understanding of religious freedom shaped the Supreme Court of Canada’s initial reading of freedom of conscience and religion protected by s. 2 (a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, the story of religious freedom in Canada is not simply that of a linear progression from the pragmatic tolerance of religious minorities to the principled protection of the individual’s religious freedom. In its subsequent s 2 (a) decisions, the Court began to read freedom of religion as a form of equality right that requires the state to remain neutral in religious matters. The state must not prefer the practices of one religious group over those of another and it must not restrict the religious practices of a group unless it has a substantial public reason to do so. Underlying the Court’s commitment to religious freedom is a recognition of the deep connection between the individual and her/his spiritual commitments and religious community and a desire to avoid the marginalization of minority religious groups. Concerns about inclusion and social peace that lay behind the extension of religious tolerance in Canada’s early history continue to be important in the contemporary justification and interpretation of religious freedom. The Court’s commitment to state neutrality in religious matters requires it to distinguish between the private sphere of individual or group spiritual life and the sphere of public secular life. However, the line between these two spheres is contestable, moveable, and porous.

An article from Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice / Recueil annuel de Windsor d'accès à la justice, on Érudit.