Your search

The Online Harms Bill (Bill C-63) imposed on larger social media platforms a “duty to act responsibly,” which rested on a recognition that traditional legal responses were no longer effective in addressing hate speech and other forms of unlawful expression when they occur online. This recognition, however, made it all the more surprising that the Bill also included an amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), adding a prohibition on online hate speech. This ban was a slightly revised version of a provision — section 13 of the CHRA — that had been repealed by the federal government in 2014. The proposed revisions to the earlier CHRA ban on hate speech addressed some of the concerns raised about the earlier version of the section and that led to its repeal, but fail to account for the fact that the communication landscape has changed dramatically since 2014. In this new landscape, traditional legal responses, including human rights code restrictions, are simply too slow and cumbersome to respond effectively to the problem of online hate speech.

This article explores the relationship between legal ethics and restorative justice. It argues that the legal profession should be reoriented around restorative justice as the moral foundation of a more progressive approach to legal ethics and professional responsibility. It translates concepts from restorative justice into ethical terms, grounding ideas about interdependence, community involvement, and public accountability into a list of restorative principles that can be readily applied in the practice of law, and recommending a series of practices and regulatory measures that are consistent with a restorative principles-based approach. Ultimately, the article shows that such an approach has the potential to raise the moral consciousness of lawyers, facilitate collaboration within communities and across systems, and redefine the role of lawyers in the administration of justice, transforming conditions of law and society in a more equitable direction.

This article examines the reasonable suspicion requirement in the entrapment defence as applied in Canadian terrorism prosecutions. Although designed as an objective safeguard against state overreach, reasonable suspicion has proven highly malleable in practice, often shaped less by concrete conduct than by institutional narratives of threat, vulnerability, and deviance. Drawing on all five terrorism-related entrapment cases in Canada to date, the article demonstrates how courts have permitted markers of ideology, religion, and identity to serve as proxies for criminal intent. While Canadian jurisprudence has formally rejected the American subjective predisposition test, the case law reveals a troubling drift toward a distinct form of subjectivity: one grounded in perceived ideology or motive. In this way, suspicion attaches to who a defendant is imagined to be--because of their beliefs--rather than to what they have done.

The Supreme Court of Canada is set to decide whether methods of medical treatment constitute patentable subject matter. The concerns surrounding extension of patent protection to methods of medical treatment, argued almost entirely on the grounds of patentable subject matter, assumes that a physician carrying out such treatment is patent infringer. Canadian jurisprudence has largely taken this assumption to be true. Interrogating the historical jurisprudence supporting the prohibition on patentability of methods of medical treatment, this article demonstrates that this jurisprudence is far from clear as to whether the issue is, or should be, approached as a question of patentability or infringement. An analysis of the case law on both patentability of methods of medical treatment, and what constitutes infringing ‘use’ of an invention, demonstrates that both lines of jurisprudence share similar concepts and underlying concerns. This has generated uncertainty as to whether the issue of extending patent protection to methods of medical treatment has ever clearly been a question of patentability. Rather, examining both lines of jurisprudence side-by-side, this piece demonstrates that concerns underlying extension of patent protection to cover methods of medical treatment have historically been categorized as scope of protection concerns, rather than patentability concerns. As such, the debate surrounding patent protection and methods of medical treatment is best characterized as an infringement issue.

The Bank of Canada is an independent Crown corporation that sees its primary responsibility to be promoting Canada’s economic welfare by maintaining low and stable inflation. When it was first created in 1934, however, the Bank was a radically different institution—a privately owned corporation primarily meant to anchor Canada’s economy globally and manage foreign exchange. Not only was the Bank not tasked with managing inflation, but key policymakers behind its founding thought doing so would be a severe mistake. This article offers the first legal history of the Bank’s founding. It maps the enormous public debate that accompanied the creation of the Bank and the various, often contradictory visions expressed for it. The article labels these five visions: a Bankers’ Bank, a Government Bank, an Imperial Bank, an Economists’ Bank, and a Bank of the People. The article then looks at the original legal design of the Bank and argues that it largely fit the Imperial Bank model. Charting this history helps us better understand this vital organ of Canadian government, and has the potential to upset many of our accepted, contemporary notions of central banking.

In the era of rapid information exchange, engineers and computer scientists are not merely creators of technology but vital players in the shaping of public discourse, including in the context of serious health threats like the COVID-19 pandemic. Focusing on the dis/misinformation surrounding public health risks, this work will dissect the mechanisms that enable disinformation and explore how design decisions, algorithmic biases, and lack of regulation contribute to the spread of false information. Design decisions that include simplified sharing mechanisms, limited word counts, and basing the platforms in the sharing of emotional stories drive confirmation biases and discourage fact-checking. Users are further trapped by their past behaviors in algorithm-based echo chambers that repeat false information. These effects are solidified by failed regulation attempts and backfire effects, as well as barriers to regulation from organizations. Thus, the built infrastructure and embedded algorithms of these digital platforms create breeding grounds for disinformation. By indirectly governing social listening, engineers and computer scientists can actively influence the distribution and credibility of information, thus impacting public trust and health decisions. This work will further analyze the professional, ethical, and human rights responsibilities of the engineering profession as architects of social media and other digital platforms. In Ontario, Canada, the engineering profession’s specific responsibilities include statutory duties to serve the public interest, ethical obligations that are both statutory and normative, and compliance with laws related to privacy, human rights, and communication. This work contends that as a player in infodemics, engineering ethics education must shift away from a rules-based approach to instead prioritize social responsibility and foster engagement with societal and political dimensions of technology and its consequences.

The goal of this article is to better understand the potential of tribunals to improve access to justice in Canada. It begins by defining “tribunals” and “access to justice”, the key concepts of this article. Because tribunals and trial courts are functional alternatives for the resolution of many legal disputes, the article first reviews the merits of trial-level courts in this regard. It then turns to tribunals, reviewing some objective evidence of tribunal excellence in creating access to justice. Four key attributes of tribunals make them advantageous alternatives to trial-level courts for the accessible and just resolution of many types of legal dispute. First, tribunals are specialized instead of having general jurisdiction. Second, tribunals apply teamwork to dispute-resolution, instead of assigning all responsibility to individual adjudicators. Third, healthy forms of accountability are easier to establish in tribunals than they are in courts. This includes accountability of individual members to the tribunal and accountability of the tribunal to the legislature that created it. Finally, tribunals can be designed for maximal performance in creating access to justice, by contrast to courts which, for good reasons, resist design or reform efforts coming from outside themselves. The final Part of the article argues that tribunals can advance access to justice not only by taking on dispute-resolution work that courts would otherwise do, but also by offering authoritative legal vindication of rights that would otherwise be abandoned, or resolved in a completely privatized way. The tribunal promise of accessible adjudication can also be expected to improve the quality of settlements, in terms of upholding parties’ substantive legal rights.

Feminist judgment projects have proliferated in recent years, with contributors in over twelve countries rewriting judgments to bring the relationship between law, gender, and equality to light. The requirements of feminist judgments vary between projects, but many of them require contributors to replicate the generic conventions of judgments and limit their reference to legal precedents and other materials available at the time of the original decision. This article reflects on the politics of feminist judgments, challenging the premises of the conventional methodology in contexts where the law cannot be redeemed through liberal legal methods. One such area is HIV non-disclosure. Canadian courts have repeatedly found that the criminal law has jurisdiction over a person’s failure to disclose their HIV-positive status in sexual relations. The article argues that the law in this area should not be rewritten using the conventional methodology because the law should be abolished. In contexts like this, feminists should have recourse to an expanded referential universe, including creative tools, strategies, and forms of literary and artistic expression to represent gender and sexuality differently. The article concludes by constructing a “found poem” from the words of R. v Aziga, a 2023 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, to suggest a more progressive path forward in HIV non-disclosure cases.