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Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada seeks to elucidate the complex and often uneasy relationship between law and religion in democracies committed both to equal citizenship and religious pluralism. Leading socio-legal scholars consider the role of religious values in public decision making, government support for religious practices, and the restriction and accommodation by government of minority religious practices. They examine such current issues as the legal recognition of sharia arbitration, the re-definition of civil marriage, and the accommodation of religious practice in the public sphere.

Freedom of expression protects the individual's freedom to communicate with others. The right of the individual is to participate in an activity that is deeply social in character. The value of freedom of expression rests on the social nature of individuals and the constitutive character of public discourse. This understanding of the freedom, however, has been inhibited by the individualism that dominates contemporary thinking about rights its assumptions about the pre-social individual and the instrumental value of community life. While the social character of human agency is seldom mentioned in the different accounts of the freedom value, it is the unstated premise of each. Once we recognize that individual agency and identity emerge in the social relationship of communication, the traditional split between intrinsic and instrumental accounts (and between speaker and listener -based accounts) of the value of freedom of expression dissolves.

In June of this year I was asked by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) to consider, and to make recommendations concerning, “the most appropriate mechanisms to address hate messages and more particularly those on the Internet, with specific emphasis on the role of section 13 of the CHRA [Canadian Human Rights Act] and the role of the Commission.”I was asked to “take into consideration: existing statutory/regulatory mechanisms; whether they are appropriate and/or in any manner, require further precision; the mandates of human rights commissions and tribunals, as well as other government institutions presently engaged in addressing hate messages on the Internet; whether other governmental or non-governmental organizations might have a role to play and if so, what that role might be; Canadian human rights principles, including but not limited to, those contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Canada’s international human rights obligations; and comparable international mechanisms.” I was asked to provide a final report to the Commission on or before October 17, 2008.

At the time of their civil divorce, Mr. Marcovitz and Ms. Bruker entered into an agreement concerning custody, access, division of property and support. Their agreement also included an undertaking by each to appear before the Beth Din (rabbinical court) for the purpose of obtaining a get, or divorce, under Jewish law. For their marriage to be dissolved under Jewish law, it was necessary for Mr. Marcovitz to provide, and Ms. Bruker to accept, a “bill of divorce”, or get. Without a get neither party could remarry in the faith, and any subsequent intimate relationship entered into by either of them would be considered adulterous and any children born of that relationship would be viewed a illegitimate.

Freedom of conscience or religion is no longer protected as the most effective way for the individual to discover spiritual truth, or as necessary to his meaningful commitment to that truth, or because human conscience, the capacity to recognize truth and right, is a divine endowment. The public justification for religious freedom is now framed in more secular terms. In the contemporary context of spiritually diverse community, the protection of religious belief or commitment is most often said to be based on the value of individual judgment or autonomy. What the individual chooses, what she judges to be right or true, is deserving of respect because it has been chosen, because it is an expression of her autonomy or the outcome of her independent judgment.

The connections between law and religion are many. State laws support some religious values and practices and interfere with others. And, from the other side, religious beliefs often inform or shape state laws. Even if Canadian law does not directly compel citizens to engage in religious practices, to attend church or pray, for example, it sometimes favors or advances the religious practices or values of some members of the community over those of others. And even if it does not directly restrict religious practices on the ground that they are erroneous, Canadian law, when advancing otherwise legitimate public purposes, sometimes impedes minority religious practices.

The Charter at 25: The Complaint of Judicial Activism.

In the recent case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a condominium association’s refusal to permit Orthodox Jewish unit-owners (the appellants) to construct succahs on their balconies, as part of the Jewish festival of Succot, breached their freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Because the restriction of religious practice was imposed by a non-state actor, the Canadian Charter of Rights was not applicable. However, the majority judgment of Iaccobucci J. was clear that “the principles … applicable in cases where an individual alleges that his or her freedom of religion is infringed under the Quebec Charter” are also applicable to a claim under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees to all persons “freedom of conscience and religion.” The Charter, however, does not include any obvious equivalent to the Established Clause of the First amendment of the United States Bill of Rights. According to the Canadian courts, s. 2(a), the freedom of religion provision in the Charter, protects the individual from “coercion in matters of conscience.” It prohibits the state from either restricting or compelling religious practise. But it does not necessarily preclude state support for religion. State support for the practises of institutions of a particular religion will breach s.2(a) only if it coerces some members of the community, and interferes with their ability to practise their faith or compels them to practice the favoured religion.

The author argues that the apparent collapse or erosion of the Oakes test reflects the problem of fitting a right such as freedom of expression, which is social and relational in character, into a structure of constitutional adjudication, which is built on an individualist conception of rights. In the leading Canadian freedom of expression cases, the task for the courts under section 1 is not simply to strike the proper balance between competing interests, but rather to resolve the single but complex question of whether the expression contributes to, or undermines, human agency or autonomous judgment. In these cases, the “value” of expression and the “harm” of expression are not distinct issues, but rather two sides of the same basic issue. Whether expression is more likely to contribute to insight and judgment or to manipulate and lead to an unreflective response is a relative judgment that will depend significantly on the social and economic circumstances in which it occurs. This issue fits awkwardly within an adjudicative structure that is based on an individual liberty model of rights. The author argues that this awkwardness accounts for the “erosion” of the Oakes test in freedom of expression cases and more specifically for the court's increasing, and inadequately justified, deference to legislative judgment under section 1.

When poverty activist resort to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, things cannot be going very well. The Charter of Rights will not eliminate poverty or gross disparities in wealth. It will not ensure that affordable housing is provided to those in need. All it may be able to do is to protect the individual’s right to ask others for help, to beg in the streets.