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The public debate surrounding Bill C-63, the Online Harms Act, has focused primarily on Human Rights Act and Criminal Code reforms. The Human Rights Act changes include the return of Section 13 on hate speech, which was repealed by the Harper government after criticisms that it unduly chilled freedom of expression. To help understand the history of Section 13 and its latest iteration, this week Professor Richard Moon, Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Law at the University of Windsor joins the Law Bytes podcast. The Canadian Human Rights Commission asked Professor Moon to conduct a study on Section 13 in 2008 and his report is the leading source on its history and application. In this episode, we discuss that history and consider the benefits and risks of inserting it into Bill C-63.

"Constitutions are meant to endure, providing both stability and adaptability. Their public legitimacy depends on the ability of the courts and other interpreters to get this balance right. Why, then, has Canada’s constitution--only four decades old--produced so many surprises? Canada's Surprising Constitution investigates unexpected interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1982 by the courts. In this illuminating collection of essays, leading scholars reflect on these surprising interpretations, focusing on fundamental freedoms; equality, Aboriginal, and language rights; structural features of the Charter; as well as the courts’ approach to the interpretation of the Constitution. The public legitimacy of the Constitution requires that it be seen as both relevant, as circumstances change, but also true to the values it embodies. The responsibility for getting this balance right lies not only with judges but also with legislatures, executives, scholars, advocates, and public interest organizations. The thoughtful work of this volume is crucial in identifying, accounting for, and--looking ahead--anticipating potential surprises. Its thorough analysis also offers a view of the Constitution in action."-- Provided by publisher

"Constitutions are meant to endure, providing both stability and adaptability. Their public legitimacy depends on the ability of the courts and other interpreters to get this balance right. Why, then, has Canada’s constitution--only four decades old--produced so many surprises? Canada's Surprising Constitution investigates unexpected interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1982 by the courts. In this illuminating collection of essays, leading scholars reflect on these surprising interpretations, focusing on fundamental freedoms; equality, Aboriginal, and language rights; structural features of the Charter; as well as the courts’ approach to the interpretation of the Constitution. The public legitimacy of the Constitution requires that it be seen as both relevant, as circumstances change, but also true to the values it embodies. The responsibility for getting this balance right lies not only with judges but also with legislatures, executives, scholars, advocates, and public interest organizations. The thoughtful work of this volume is crucial in identifying, accounting for, and--looking ahead--anticipating potential surprises. Its thorough analysis also offers a view of the Constitution in action."-- Provided by publisher

"In The Life and Death of Freedom of Expression, Richard Moon argues that freedom of expression is valuable because human agency and identity emerge in discourse--in the joint activity of creating meaning. Moon recognizes that the social character of individual agency and identity is crucial to understanding not only the value of expression but also its potential for harm. The book considers a range of issues, including the regulation of advertising, hate speech, pornography, blasphemy, and public protest. The book also considers the shift to social media as the principal platform for public engagement, which has added to the ways in which speech can be harmful, while undermining the effectiveness of traditional legal responses to harmful speech. The Life and Death of Freedom of Expression makes the case that the principal threat to public discourse may no longer be censorship, but rather the spread of disinformation, which undermines public trust in traditional sources of information and makes engagement between different positions and groups increasingly difficult."-- Provided by publisher

While much of Canada’s early commitment to religious freedom was simply a pragmatic compromise to ensure social peace and political stability, the Supreme Court of Canada in a series of judgments that pre-dated the Charter sought to articulate a principled account of religious freedom as an “original freedom” that is an important “mode[] of self-expression” and “the primary condition[] of the community life”. This understanding of religious freedom shaped the Supreme Court of Canada’s initial reading of freedom of conscience and religion protected by s. 2 (a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, the story of religious freedom in Canada is not simply that of a linear progression from the pragmatic tolerance of religious minorities to the principled protection of the individual’s religious freedom. In its subsequent s 2 (a) decisions, the Court began to read freedom of religion as a form of equality right that requires the state to remain neutral in religious matters. The state must not prefer the practices of one religious group over those of another and it must not restrict the religious practices of a group unless it has a substantial public reason to do so. Underlying the Court’s commitment to religious freedom is a recognition of the deep connection between the individual and her/his spiritual commitments and religious community and a desire to avoid the marginalization of minority religious groups. Concerns about inclusion and social peace that lay behind the extension of religious tolerance in Canada’s early history continue to be important in the contemporary justification and interpretation of religious freedom. The Court’s commitment to state neutrality in religious matters requires it to distinguish between the private sphere of individual or group spiritual life and the sphere of public secular life. However, the line between these two spheres is contestable, moveable, and porous.

"This book examines law and religion from the perspective of its case law. Each chapter focuses on a specific case from a Commonwealth jurisdiction, examining the history and impact of the case, both within the originating jurisdiction and its wider global context. The book contains chapters from leading and emerging scholars from across the Commonwealth, including from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, India and Nigeria. The cases are divided into four sections covering: - Foundational Questions in Law and Religion - Freedom of Religion around the Commonwealth - Religion and state relations around the Commonwealth - Rights, Relationships and Religion around the Commonwealth. Like religion itself, the case law covers a wide spectrum of life. This diversity is reflected in the cases covered in this book, which include: - Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Home Minister on the use of the Muslim name for God by non-Muslims in Malaysia - The Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) which determined the meaning of religion in Australia - Eweida v UK which clarified the application of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights - R v Big M Drug Mart on the individual protections of religious freedom under the Canadian Charter of Rights. The book examines how legal disputes involving religion are among the most contested in the courts and shows that in these cases, passions run high and the outcomes can have significant consequences for all involved"--

Will recent acts of violence against Muslims in Canada lead us to see what we should have seen earlier — that anti-Muslim works are hate speech that encourage violence against Muslims?

A number of doctors in Ontario have challenged the policy of the provincial College of Physicians and Surgeons that requires its members to provide a patient with an “effective referral” to another doctor if they were unwilling or unable on moral grounds to offer a particular medical service, such as an abortion or medical assistance in dying. The doctors argue that if they were to give an effective referral, they would be complicit in acts that in their view were immoral. I will argue that the significant issue in this case and other conscientious objection cases, is not, as the courts have said, the reasonable balance between the individual’s religious interests or commitments and the interests or rights of others in the community, but is instead whether the individual’s religiously-based objection should be viewed as an expression of personal religious conscience that should be accommodated, provided this can be done without noticeable harm to others, or as a religiously-grounded civic position or action that falls outside the scope of religious freedom and may be subject to legal regulation. The commitment to religious freedom requires that a distinction be made — a line drawn — between civic and spiritual beliefs or actions. An individual’s spiritual practices are both excluded and insulated from political decision-making. However, their beliefs concerning civic issues, such as the rights and interests of others and the just arrangement of social relations, even if grounded in a religious system, must be subject to the give-and-take of ordinary politics. In determining whether a particular (conscientious) objection should be viewed as a personal or spiritual matter or instead as a civic or political position, two factors may be relevant. The first is whether the individual is being required to perform the particular act to which they object only because they hold a special position not held by others, notably some form of public appointment. The other factor is the relative remoteness-proximity of the act that the objector is required to perform from the act that they consider to be inherently immoral. The more remote the legally required action, the more likely we are to regard the refusal to perform it as a position about how others should behave or about the correctness of the law, rather than as an expression of personal conscience.

Pierre Trudeau’s deep personal commitment to Catholicism was largely unknown to Canadians during his tenure as Prime Minister. Indeed, his religious commitment did not play an obvious role in his political life. Trudeau’s version of Catholicism, ‘personalism’, emphasized the personal – interior – spiritual commitment of the individual and the necessity of the separation of religion and politics. He stressed the importance of individual liberty in matters of faith but also the personal responsibility of the individual to serve others and work towards a more just society. Trudeau was opposed to the recognition of an official religion, and indeed to any form of state promotion of a particular religious belief system. He rejected the assumption that political community or social solidarity required a shared (and public) commitment to a particular faith or culture. His promotion of multiculturalism stemmed from his belief that national identity or political membership should not be based on a shared ethnicity that would necessarily include some and exclude others. His championing of the Charter of Rights rested on the view that citizenship should be grounded instead on a shared commitment to the protection of individual and democratic rights. Trudeau was a committed believer and a secular politician, who sought to separate his public action and private conscience. In a sense then he embodied the separation of religion and politics – of church and state – that is central to the contemporary conception of religious freedom. In this chapter, I want to explore the challenge of separating personal or communal spiritual life from civic life which Trudeau had to navigate, throughout his political career.

Religious beliefs/practices are excluded and insulated from political contest not because they are intrinsically valuable but instead because they are aspects of a collective or cultural identity and markers of membership in the collective. If the state’s duty to accommodate religious practices is about the status of religious groups rather than the liberty of individuals (a matter of equality rather than liberty) then it may not extend to practices that are idiosyncratic and have no link to a religious or cultural group/tradition. The requirement that the state should accommodate religious beliefs or practices (and sometimes compromise its policies) is most often justified as necessary to ensure that the individual’s deepest values and commitments and more generally his/her autonomy in decision- making are respected. I argue, however, that reasonable accommodation is better understood as a form of equality right that is based on the importance of community or group membership to the individual. Understood in this way, the accommodation requirement may not extend to an individual’s deeply held non-religious practices, if they are not part of a shared belief system. The willingness of the courts to protect certain non- religious practices (to require their accommodation by the state) may rest simply on their formal similarity to familiar religious practices such as pacifism or vegetarianism – that are specific in content, peremptory in force and that diverge from mainstream practices. Yet, as a practical matter, practices of this kind are seldom sustained outside a religious or cultural community. It is not an accident then that the very few instances of non-religious, ‘conscientious’, practices that have been accommodated are similar in content and structure to familiar religious practices, and indeed may have arisen from these religious practices.

The most frequently made criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ktuxana v. BC echoes a familiar and more general criticism of the Anglo-American understanding of religious freedom. The Court’s narrow or ‘protestant’ conception of religious freedom, which is focused on the individual – on his/her belief or commitment and his/her personal relationship with a transcendent God – is said to have the effect of denying meaningful protection to Indigenous and other spiritual systems that emphasize ritual and community life, and that recognize a spiritual presence in the natural world. I will argue that in a religiously/culturally diverse society such as Canada, the protection granted by s. 2(a) (the Charter’s religious freedom right) must be limited to those practices that can be viewed, at least substantially, as personal to the individual or internal to the religious group. The failure of the courts to give religious freedom protection to important Indigenous practices may stem not from a narrow conception of religion but rather from a recognition of the limits of religious freedom in a democratic political community. However, I will argue that the majority of the Court in Ktunaxa went further than this and introduced a limit on the scope of religious freedom that unnecessarily and artificially limits the freedom’s protection based on a Christian understanding of religion, as concerned centrally with the worship of a divine power. In earlier cases, the Court has limited the protection of s.2(a) by defining the concept of religion narrowly or interpreting the practices of a particular religion narrowly so that they did not include communal connections and practices.

A commitment to free speech means protecting speech for reasons that are independent of the truth or merit of its content. This commitment, though, depends on certain assumptions or conditions – most notably that individuals are capable of making reasoned and independent judgments and have access to different opinions and reliable factual information. These conditions, of course, never hold perfectly, but they now seem to be eroding at a rapid pace.The character of public speech has changed in the internet era: how we speak to one another and how we experience that speech. Audiences have become more fragmented. Disinformation and conspiracy theories seem to spread easily and widely, so that distortion and deceit rather than direct censorship may now be the most significant threat to public discourse. There is little common ground in the community on factual matters or the reliability of different sources of information, which has made it difficult, even impossible, to discuss issues and to agree or compromise on public policy. Those who hold competing positions seem rarely to engage with one another and, when they do, their engagement is often combative. A growing number of people feel they should not be expected to hear speech with which they disagree, or which is critical of their views. The spaces or platforms in which public speech occurs have become increasingly privatized and therefore outside the scope of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. What future does the right to free speech have in this changing communication environment?

This paper examines the recent Supreme Court of Canada judgment in LSBC v. TWU, in which the court upheld the decision of the BC law society not to accredit a law program proposed by an Evangelical Christian university. The paper argues that the task for the courts in this and other religious freedom cases is not to balance competing civic and religious interests but is instead to mark the boundary between the spheres of civic and spiritual life. More particularly, in this case, the issue was whether TWU (in applying to operate an accredited law program) should be viewed as a private religious institution that is free to govern itself according to its own norms, or whether, because its actions directly impact outsiders to the religious group, it should be viewed as performing a public role and therefore subject to non-discrimination and other civic norms. The different judgments in the case begin with different assumptions about the public/private character of TWU (or at least its proposed law program) and so never really address the key issue and never really engage with each other. The paper argues that because admission to law school continues to be a significant barrier to entry into the legal profession in Canada, TWU’s admission decisions will have an impact on non-members. The law society, therefore, was justified in requiring TWU to conform to non-discrimination norms as a condition of accreditation.