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Class counsel fees and their relationship to class member compensation are among the most important—and most controversial—statistics used to evaluate the normative outcomes of the class action mechanism. The perception that class attorneys reap windfall rewards while the class ‘gets nothing’ is persistent among class action critics. The ratio of legal fees to settlement funds captures the critical trade-off between counsels’ entrepreneurial incentives to pursue lucrative claims and the agency challenges endemic to these proceedings. In the most comprehensive analysis of Canadian class actions to date, the authors use new data and novel econometric methods to explore the nature of class action fee ratios in Ontario for both economics and legal audiences. To start, we calculate “all-in” fee ratios—lawyer fees plus disbursements divided by settlement amounts in Ontario—of 25.0% on average and at the median. Next, we show that judges are sensitive to windfall gains and sweetheart deals, problems associated with large awards, and adjust fees based on settlement size. These data and estimates contribute to a better understanding of judicial economy and access to justice in practice, the principal arguments in favour of class proceedings.

Class counsel fees and their relationship to class member compensation are among the most important – and most controversial – statistics used to evaluate the normative outcomes of the class action mechanism. The perception that class attorneys reap windfall rewards while the class ‘gets nothing’ is persistent among class action critics. The ratio of legal fees to settlement funds captures the critical trade-off between counsels’ entrepreneurial incentives to pursue lucrative claims and the agency challenges endemic to these proceedings. The authors’ analysis uses new data and novel econometric methods to explore the nature of class action fee ratios in Ontario for both economics and legal audiences. To start, we calculate “all-in” fee ratios -- lawyer fees plus disbursements divided by settlement amounts in Ontario -- of 25.0% on average and at the median. Next, we show that judges are sensitive to windfall gains and sweetheart deals, problems associated with large awards, and adjust fees based on settlement size. These data and estimates contribute to a better understanding of judicial economy and access to justice in practice, the principal arguments in favour of class proceedings.

The most controversial of the recent amendments to Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act is the addition of two requirements to the certification test: to meet the preferable procedure criterion, s. 5(1.1) requires that common issues in the litigation must now “predominate” over individual issues, and a class action must be “superior” to all other forms of resolution. The importance of the interpretation of Ontario’s new certification test to the continued viability of class actions in the province merits a thorough and rigorous analysis of s. 5(1.1). The language of predominance and superiority is strikingly similar to requirements that have long applied to US class actions for monetary damages. As courts in Ontario begin to grapple with the new predominance and superiority requirements, however, the authors caution against turning to American jurisprudence for guidance. Several important structural differences between the Ontario and American class action regimes, as well as different constitutional considerations and a variety of approaches within US case law diminish its utility. Instead, the authors examine the history and language of the amendments to propose an interpretation of the predominance and superiority requirements that is informed by Canada’s own procedural and constitutional framework and that avoids the pitfalls of legal transplants.

This review essay considers the universality of dilemmas and tensions that arise in class action litigation, wherever practised. It does so by exploring the evolution of the Australian class action in its doctrinal, political and historical dimensions, as recounted in Michael Legg and James Metzger’s edited collection of papers, The Australian Class Action: A 30-Year Perspective. While the book is rooted in the Australian experience, it lays bare common themes across jurisdictions, such as the unique role of the judge in a class action, the challenges to effective representation, and concerns about the commodification of litigation.

This review essay considers the universality of dilemmas and tensions that arise in class action litigation, wherever practised. It does so by exploring the evolution of the Australian class action in its doctrinal, political and historical dimensions, as recounted in Michael Legg and James Metzger’s edited collection of papers, The Australian Class Action: A 30-Year Perspective. While the book is rooted in the Australian experience, it lays bare common themes across jurisdictions, such as the unique role of the judge in a class action, the challenges to effective representation, and concerns about the commodification of litigation.

In the absence of rules permitting lawyers to charge a contingency fee, complex, expensive litigation on behalf of litigants with small value claims requires external funding. Even where contingency fees are permitted, as is the case in all Canadian jurisdictions and in a handful of EU member states, the possibility of adverse costs and varying levels of risk tolerance and financial capacity among law firms still leave a gap for external funding. Legal expense insurance has had limited success. While the commercial Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF) industry continues to grow in many EU collective redress regimes, its not-for-profit cousin has received far less attention. Yet, the latest EU Directive envisions the possibility of public funding “to ensure that the costs of the proceedings related to representative actions do not prevent qualified entities from effectively exercising their right to seek [injunctive and redress] measures.” In this brief paper, I aim to contribute to discussions about TPLF in Europe by highlighting a viable alternative to commercial funding entities: not-for-profit litigation funders. In Canada, two such public funders have existed for decades. In the first part of this paper, I explain the purpose of Ontario's Class Proceedings Fund and its historical impetus. I then describe the structure and functioning of the Fund. In the third part of the paper, I explore some of the satellite litigation that has involved the Fund. Finally, I discuss both its successes and its limitations. In the end, the Fund serves both as inspiration and cautionary tale for potential not-for-profit funding entities in EU Member States.

Climate justice activists are increasingly looking to litigation to produce the policy changes that have eluded them in the political process. Without a codified right to a clean environment, litigants in jurisdictions like Canada must use a human rights framework to advance their cause. Recent successes in Charter class actions suggest that it is now possible to pursue constitutional damages for climate change harms. As Canadian advocates join with their international counterparts in deploying a litigation strategy, Canada’s robust class action procedure may be a useful addition in the pursuit of collective climate justice. This paper proceeds in four parts. First and by way of background, I summarize the types and extent of climate change litigation in Canada and internationally. Second, I discuss Canadian class actions advancing constitutional claims, which have recently surged after two decades of limited use. In part III, I argue that a climate change action founded on a breach of s. 7 of the Charter would meet the test for certification of a class action. Finally, in part IV I discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of using the class action mechanism to combat climate injustice.