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One consistent and disturbing trend since the birth of the Charter in 1982 is that race has been and continues to be, with a few notable exceptions, erased from the factual narratives presented to the Supreme Court of Canada and from the constitutional legal rules established by the Court in criminal procedure cases. Understanding the etiology of this erasing is not easy. In earlier pieces, the author has explored the role of trial and appellate lawyers. This paper focuses on principles of judicial review and the failure of the Supreme Court to consistently consider the impact of the constitutional rules it creates or interprets on Aboriginal and racialized communities. What makes the silence so problematic is that the Supreme Court gave itself the tool in 2001 to address part of the identified problem when it established an anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation in R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 369. This paper seeks to address a number of questions focused on the legacy of Golden. What is the origin and content of the Golden principle of judicial review? What is the evidence from subsequent cases and academic commentary that this is indeed an accepted principle of constitutional interpretation? What cases from the 2007 Supreme Court term would have benefited from a critical race analysis? And, in particular, how would factoring in Golden have impacted the Court's analysis in R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32? And finally, how should the Golden principle be applied in future cases?

This article examines the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on systemic racism in the criminal justice system in Canada. The article's thesis is that while there is reason to be optimistic about the possibilities of future reform, the Charter has, to date, had very little impact on racial injustice in Canada. We continue to incarcerate Aboriginals and African Canadians at alarming rates, racial profiling at our borders and in our streets continues to flourish, and the federal government continues to pass legislation that will further entrench the problem. Of course, some might say that it is simply naive to think that a constitutional document can make a difference and so Part II (Part I is the Introduction) briefly addresses this larger philosophical question. In Part III, the article explores why it is not the Charter that is the problem, but rather those who apply and interpret it. Racial justice has not had a chance to grow over the last 25 years because there has been a significant failure of trial and appellate lawyers to engage in race talk in the courts and a failure of the judiciary to adopt appropriate critical race standards when invited to do so.

The colour of justice in Canada is largely driven by stereotypical assumptions about crime and those who commit it. Over the last few years, the use of race, ethnicity, and religion as indicators of suspicion by the police and security officials has come under scrutiny. The focus, however, has largely been on the American experience. The Colour of Justice provides the first comprehensive look at racial profiling in Canada. Its aim is to foster understanding and reform. The book uses social science evidence, judicial decisions, commission findings, government and police documents, narratives, and media reports to provide the answers to the following questions: When should policing be characterized as racial profiling? Why does it occur? How pervasive is it? What damage does it cause? Is it ever reasonable? How do we stop it? David M. Tanovich is one of Canada's leading experts in the area of systemic racism and criminal justice. As a lawyer, he argued the first appellate case to address racial profiling (R. v. Richards). As a law professor at the University of Windsor, he has written extensively in the area of racial profiling and has been invited across Canada to present his research. His work has been cited by Canadian courts, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and academics in both Canada and the United States.

There is a growing disconnect and alienation between lawyers and the legal profession in Canada. The etiology of this discontent is complex. One cause, which is the focus of the paper is philosophical in nature. It concerns the role morality of the profession and what I posit is a disconnect between the role lawyers want to pursue (i.e. a facilitator of justice) and the role that they perceive the profession demands they play (i.e. a hired gun). In my opinion, this perception is a mistaken one. Given the paucity of Canadian research and reflection on ethics and professionalism, we have created an ethic of lawyering that finds expression in American stories, fears and academic criticisms. I argue in the paper that over the last 15 years, we have been engaged in a process of role morality reconstruction. Under this reconstructed institutional role, lawyers are problem-solvers whose mandate is to seek justice not only for their client but also for the broader legal, social and political system within which they operate. In other words, I contend that an ethic of client-centered zealous advocacy has slowly begun to be replaced with a justice-seeking ethic that seeks to give effect to law's ambition. Part II of this article provides the basic foundations of my reconstruction thesis. In the first section of Part II, I define role morality and defend it as the beacon of ethical reflection rather than jettisoning it in favour of an approach that relies on personal responsibility or morality. The next section attempts to trace the evolution of our understanding of the public interest. As the legal profession has always attempted to ground itself in the public interest, how the profession conceives of it will largely determine how it, and its members, should conduct themselves. The final section of Part II attempts to provide the evidence of this reconstructed role morality by exploring statements from leading members of the profession, recent ethics jurisprudence and by examining equality and harm prevention principles in our codes of conduct. Like any large bureaucratic institution, the profession will inevitably be slow to respond to its new identity and the changing set of norms and values that go with that identity. The required institutional changes are beyond the scope of the paper. However, Part III does address how lawyers can on an individual level give effect to this evolving role morality by adopting a pervasive justice-seeking ethic and by engaging in identity lawyering that is consistent with the interests of justice.

The issue of racial profiling has finally begun to attract the attention of the Canadian media; courts; human rights commission; the Canadian Bar Association; and, the academy. The focus has been on racial profiling defined as the use of racialized stereotypes of the usual suspect as the basis for suspect selection. Less attention,however, has been given to cases where race forms part of the description of a suspect provided by the victim or witness. Through the use of narrative, the article examines how race-based suspect descriptions have been misused by the police in Canada. The narratives also reveal the devastating collateral damage when the police use race in any manner in suspect selection. This damage includes widespread harassment, intimidation, false arrests, violence, death, stigmatization and an engendering of mistrust. Given the misuse, the article recommends including suspect descriptions in the racial profiling prohibition where race is used as the dominant characteristic. After considering whether there should be a complete prohibition on using race in suspect descriptions, the article examines current constitutional standards to protect against misuse and proposes a new dominant feature constitutional test.

This is one of the first articles written in Canada on racial profiling and policing. While dated, the piece set out standards that can be used to prove racial profiling and recommended enhanced Charter standards to facilitate adjudication. As noted in the Introduction: