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In an ideal world justice would be dispensed instantaneously and the incursion of any form of interlocutory loss, irreparable of not, would be avoided. In an imperfect world we need to learn to live with law’s complexity, human frailty, evidential uncertainty, limited resources, and the inevitable passage of time that passes when these are engaged. Law, like any other human construct that takes thought to digital page, simply takes time. Just as an infinite number of monkeys placed before typewriters takes time to recreate the works of Shakespeare, time also passes between an applicant’s assertion of a wrong, and establishing the legal framework upon which those claimed rights are to be determined. Uncertainty and delay can arise in the need to establish a claimed right, as in where the right is novel or only in nascent form. Delay can emerge from the gathering of evidence particularly where the action is going to be determined largely on an affidavit record. Similarly, because the evidence is written and not subject to cross examination, it is open to divergent interpretations. Even if the best counsel can over come the aforementioned difficulties, they face resource constraints in terms of judicial and court time. Unlike health care where there are now standards for wait times there are no similar standards for court hearings. Between the ideal and the real, interlocutory relief exists as a form of paradoxical justice. It is not perfect justice because it is decided under less than ideal trial circumstances, yet it purports to do justice by minimizing a loss for which the applicant will never be able to recover. While an applicant has a right to a civil judgment following proof of a legal cause of action and meeting the requisite level of evidence, there is no equivalent right, outside one conferred by statute to jump the queue or to obtain an interlocutory injunction. The real world is also a dynamic one in which a variety of contextual issues frame the need and desire for interlocutory relief. Even at inception of the American Cyanamid test, Hammond identified how the difference in dealing with affidavit evidence on both sides of the Atlantic, i.e. allowing for limited cross examination in Canada, would impact upon the potential credibility of the evidence and thus the veracity courts would give to it. Post 1975, transformations in civil procedure, particularly simplified proceeding, case management, and status reviews, have all increased the control exercised by courts to hasten litigation through the adjudicative process and indirectly lessen the need for interlocutory relief. Buttressed by these procedural changes, some courts are now more willing to deny or suspend granting interlocutory relief in return for an undertaking from the parties to expedite the trial process, or to keep records that will make it easier to quantify damages. The ebb and flow of interlocutory injunctions is greatly influenced by all these externalities.

In the US, rap is frequently on trial, even in death penalty cases. It also appears to be a growing trend in England. And so, I began to study the issue in Canada. I was able to document thirty-six cases of attempts by the Canadian criminal justice system to put rap on trial in a recently published article “R v. Campbell: Rethinking the Admissibility of Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases” (available on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730123). This Walrus piece provides a summary of some of the Canadian cases and explores how our criminal justice system should respond.

Ending the marital rape exemption in criminal law is a demand for legal equality and autonomy for women, rights that are enshrined in international human rights law. Drawing on international human rights law as a source of authority for challenging the marital rape exception in criminal law allows feminist and other social justice organizations, within their specific national and local contexts, to seek greater state action and accountability toward ending this form of violence against women and this violation of women’s human rights. In this reply, we challenge the arguments in the symposium that oppose or caution against criminalizing sexual violence in intimate relationships as a necessary legal strategy, and that refute our view that ending the marital rape exemption is required by international human rights law.

Racial profiling remains a serious and systemic problem in Canada. In 2004, I wrote this article addressing the naysayers - those who denied the systemic existence of the problem - as well as to identify a number of policy and law reform recommendations for addressing the problem. Even though the article is well over a decade old, the recommendations remain relevant today. They include mandatory data collection and anti-racial profiling legislation. I also set out a number of law reform recommendations including:

In R v Borde (2003), 8 Criminal Reports (6th) 203 (Ont CA), the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that anti-Black racism could be taken into account in sentencing in applying section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, otherwise known as the Gladue provision for sentencing Aboriginal offenders.In R v Hamilton (2004) 22 Criminal Reports (6th) 1 (Ont CA), the same court restricted Borde to cases where there is evidence of a casual link between racism and the commission of the offence.This comment is critical of the decision and its failure to recognize the relevance of anti-Black racism in the "war on drugs" and the relevance of race and general deterrence in thinking about sentencing. These are arguments that are relevant today and could be used to distinguish Hamilton if an appropriate case ever got to the Supreme Court of Canada. In this case, the trial judge raised the issue of gender and racial bias and gave the parties an opportunity to address their relevance to the sentencing of the two Black female accused. The Court of Appeal was critical of the trial judge's intervention. This too was unfortunate given the general reluctance of lawyers to raise these issues.

It is not uncommon in drug importation trials or other cases involving financial gain for the Crown to introduce evidence of the accused's general financial circumstances and then ask the jury to engage in inductive reasoning - to use their common sense to draw the inference that the accused had a motive to commit the offence because he or she was poor. This is what occurred in R v Mensah (2003) 9 Criminal Reports (6th) 339.This case comment explores the dangers of using common sense and experience to guide relevance assessments and why social context evidence is necessary in order to increase the likelihood that informed and reasonable inferences will be drawn from the evidence.

Recently in Canada, there have been a number of high profile wrongful convictions involving individuals who plead guilty. These cases raise the thorny issue of the ethics of pleading guilty a client who maintains their innocence. There is very little guidance from the case law or rules of professional conduct.This is an issue that needs attention. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada released a decision (R v Taillefer) regarding an accused's common law right to disclosure and setting out the essential elements of a valid guilty plea. Although not directly raised, the case was also about a co-accused who pleaded guilty despite maintaining his innocence to his lawyer. This short case comment identifies some of the relevant Canadian sources on this ethical issue which all seem to suggest that it is, in fact, unethical to plead guilty a client in these circumstances.

In R v Mann 2004 SCC 52, the Supreme Court of Canada set out an approach to investigative detentions under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter. The Court held that the police can conduct an investigative detention where they have reasonable suspicion to connect the individual to a recent or ongoing crime. The Court also held that the police can conduct a pat-down where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person is armed. The Court's attempt to regulate these low-visibility encounters was important. However, it missed a critical piece of the story. Like so many of those subjected to investigative detentions in Canada, Mann was Aboriginal. The case provided the Court with an opportunity to explore the relationship between race and race-based suspect descriptions and race and detention under the Charter. This piece attempts to fill in for what is missing from the Supreme Court's analysis and also highlights why it is essential for race and systemic racism to be factored in when thinking about the reasonable suspicion threshold that justifies investigative detentions.

Despite a very sophisticated and rich jurisprudence on racial profiling, there are very few criminal cases in Canada where the issue has been litigated. This is as true today in 2016 as it was in 2006 when I wrote this article examining cases from 2003-2006. This piece from 2006 explores why there is such litigation silence. It also develops arguments about how race and systemic racism are relevant in thinking about the meaning of detention under section 9 of the Charter and in the interpretation of behaviour that the police often believe gives rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention. Finally, the piece identifies the relevance of the failure of the police to collect race data on street interactions in thinking about admissibility under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The issue of police carding has received very little judicial attention in Canadian cases. In this case, the trial judge found that the carding of the accused was unconstitutional and constituted racial profiling. The trial judge also found that the police officer's testimony involved "several fabrications ... fed to the court..." It is yet another recent judicial finding of police perjury involving the Toronto Police Service.

Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of global value chains to economic forces, treating law as an exogenous factor, if at all. By contrast, we assert the centrality of legal regimes and private ordering mechanisms to the creation, structure, geography, distributive effects and governance of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and thereby seek to establish the study of law and GVCs as rich and important terrain for research in its own right.

R v J(TR) once again raises the question of whether any inferences can be drawn from how a witness satisfies the moral competency requirement to testify and whether it is time to remove religion from the oath. This short comment critically assesses the cases where negative inferences have been drawn and recommends that the religious oath should be abolished.

The Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Brown is an important precedent on the issue of privacy, dog sniffers and the role of the courts in creating new police powers. This comment explores the Court's scrutiny of using drug courier profiles to screen individuals in the "war on drugs." This is significant part of the judgment because of the historical lack of judicial scrutiny of criminal profiling evidence with a few notable exceptions, its widespread use across Canada, its unreliability and the disproportionate impact of the drug courier profile on racialized communities in Canada.

R v Campbell is one of the few cases in North America to exclude rap lyrics as evidence of guilt in criminal cases. Unlike in Canada, the issue of criminalizing rap has received considerable attention in the United States. This article begins by documenting the Canadian experience. It is a response to the call for research by two leading American scholars on the phenomenon of putting rap on trial, Professors Charis Kubrin and Erik Nielson. After documenting and discussing 36 Canadian cases, the article examines the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Simard and the two leading trial decisions R v Campbell and R v Williams. Generally speaking, the Canadian cases have failed to apply a culturally competent lens when assessing probative value and, to address the relevance of race and bias, when assessing prejudicial effect. The article urges our courts to put the rap back in rap by taking a culturally competent and critical race approach to admissibility.

Despite the growing reliance on the internet, electronic communications and social media evidence in adjudicative proceedings, there have been very few cases in Canada that have addressed a fundamental aspect of admissibility - authentication. This article explores the issue in the context of a case involving a photograph showing the offence and anonymously uploaded to the internet.

Until the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v. Hart 2014 SCC 52, there was very little, if any, judicial regulation of the Mr. Big undercover investigative strategy. The Supreme Court approached the issue of admissibility using first principles to create a new exclusionary rule. By giving prominence to reliability as part of the probative value/prejudical effect analysis, the Court opened the door for assessing afresh the admissibility of other putatively unreliable evidence such as identification evidence.

Until recently, the issue of police deception in testifying has received very little attention in Canada. The issue has received significantly more attention over the last few years in light of a number of cases, almost all involving Black or racialized accused, where judges have concluded that the evidence of the police was either an outright lie, deliberately misleading or was tailored. This article chronicles the cases from 2011-2013 and offers a number of suggestions for greater judicial and prosecutorial regulation.

This paper tests the assumptions upon which the Federal Court of Appeal based its decision in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc. Specifically, the author challenges the argument raised by the court that Article 1705 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, dealing with copyright protection for compilations of data, obliged Canada to adopt a "creativity" standard of originality for copyright works akin to the U.S. position in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service. Finally, the author canvasses the relevant copyright decisions rendered subsequent to Tele-Direct, including the controversial Federal Court trial decision in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, in order to demonstrate the distortions created by the application of this tenuous NAFTA argument to the question of the appropriate standard of "originality" for factual compilations.

The recent DRAM settlement in Canada reveals that normative confusion remains about the role of the class action lawyer, the identity of her clients, and the duties owed to them. In this paper, I describe the settlement and in particular, the distribution protocol that gave rise to a legal challenge by five objecting class members. I critique the September 2015 judgment of the court that held human rights legislation is not applicable to class action settlements, and highlight the procedural idiosyncrasies of class actions made evident by the DRAM case, and that have important ramifications for legal ethics. The settlement illustrates the challenges in identifying the content of class counsel's role morality, and may well necessitate a shift in our thinking of what constitutes ethical conduct in the class action context.

Criminalization of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships must form a central part of the human rights agenda for achieving gender equality. Failure to criminalize sexual violence perpetrated by a husband (or intimate partner) effectively facilitates and condones a private legal space within spousal relationships where sexual assault and coercion are permissible. This legal abandonment of married women’s rights to liberty, autonomy, self-determination, and bodily security creates a class of women with lesser legal rights. The state’s insulation of marital rape from criminal sanction is also incommensurate with women’s equal citizenship and equal enjoyment of all other human rights.