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Article 24(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides a commitment to the full development of human potential and of the student’s sense of dignity and self-worth, as well as a commitment to develop the student’s personality, talents, and creativity, along with their mental and physical abilities, to their fullest potential. Article 24(5) builds on this commitment by guaranteeing persons with disabilities access to general tertiary (or post-secondary) education, vocational training, adult education and lifelong learning without discrimination and on an equal basis with others. Yet, on the ground, within educational institutions, disabled post-secondary students continue to face barriers to education every day.In Canada, the right to post-secondary education for persons with disabilities is protected through various domestic human rights instruments and supplemented by the CRPD. At the same time, obstacles for disabled students exist at different stages of the experience of post-secondary education. This article uses a case study to identify the barriers experienced by students with disabilities on the ground despite the long-standing legal frameworks that ensure post-secondary education for persons with disabilities in Canada. It further examines how law and policy may be improved to ensure access to post-secondary education for students with disabilities. This article begins with a discussion of the legal frameworks that exist in Canada to protect the right to post-secondary education. Part II provides an overview of the types of barriers that students with a variety of disabilities have faced during the course of completing post-secondary studies. The barriers are identified through an analysis of decisions of Canadian human rights tribunals and courts rendered between 2014 and 2021.These barriers to pursuing post-secondary education are identified in relation to the admissions process, in-program learning, and the pursuit of remedies. In Part III, I draw from an analysis of these contemporary decisions to argue that the right to post-secondary education for disabled students in Canada would be strengthened if more inspiration were drawn from Article 24 of the CRPD and instituted a human capabilities approach.

In the absence of rules permitting lawyers to charge a contingency fee, complex, expensive litigation on behalf of litigants with small value claims requires external funding. Even where contingency fees are permitted, as is the case in all Canadian jurisdictions and in a handful of EU member states, the possibility of adverse costs and varying levels of risk tolerance and financial capacity among law firms still leave a gap for external funding. Legal expense insurance has had limited success. While the commercial Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF) industry continues to grow in many EU collective redress regimes, its not-for-profit cousin has received far less attention. Yet, the latest EU Directive envisions the possibility of public funding “to ensure that the costs of the proceedings related to representative actions do not prevent qualified entities from effectively exercising their right to seek [injunctive and redress] measures.” In this brief paper, I aim to contribute to discussions about TPLF in Europe by highlighting a viable alternative to commercial funding entities: not-for-profit litigation funders. In Canada, two such public funders have existed for decades. In the first part of this paper, I explain the purpose of Ontario's Class Proceedings Fund and its historical impetus. I then describe the structure and functioning of the Fund. In the third part of the paper, I explore some of the satellite litigation that has involved the Fund. Finally, I discuss both its successes and its limitations. In the end, the Fund serves both as inspiration and cautionary tale for potential not-for-profit funding entities in EU Member States.

Through the Scarborough Charter, many Canadian universities committed to fostering alternative ways of knowing. But more must be done to realize that commitment.

Which individuals should count in a welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy? Some answers to this question are parochial, and others are more inclusive. The most inclusive possible answer is ‘everybody to count for one.’ In other words, all individuals who are capable of having welfare – including foreigners, the unborn, and non-human animals – should be weighed equally. This article argues that ‘who should count’ is a question that requires a two-level answer. On the first level, a specification of welfare-consequentialism serves as an ethical ideal, a claim about the attributes that the ideal policy would have. ‘Everybody to count for one’ might succeed on this level. However, on the second level is the welfare-consequentialist analysis procedure used by human analysts to give advice on real policy questions. For epistemic reasons, the analysis procedure should be more parochial than ‘everybody to count for one.’

Governments have implemented different interventions and response models to combat the spread of COVID-19. The necessary intensity and frequency of control measures require us to project the number of infected cases. Three short-term forecasting models were proposed to predict the total number of infected cases in Canada for a number of days ahead. The proposed models were evaluated on how their performance degrades with increased forecast horizon, and improves with increased historical data by which to estimate them. For the data analyzed, our results show that 7 to 10 weeks of historical data points are enough to produce good fits for a two-weeks predictive model of infected case numbers with a NRMSE of 1% to 2%. The preferred model is an important quick-deployment tool to support data-informed short-term pandemic related decision-making at all levels of governance.

Newmarket’s draconian use of bylaws and licensing to target and displace Asian massage workers risks taking us back to a racist past in Canadian history, where Asians were seen as moral threats.

Editors' Note: Inaugural Issue

When can a trier of fact take into account the absence of a complainant's motive to lie in assessing credibility in sexual assault cases. How much weight can be attributed to that absence? Resolution of these questions has led to a surprisingly sizable number of appellate cases. R v Gerrard 2022 SCC 13 is now the leading case on the issue. It confirms somewhat cryptically that the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate can be considered in assessing credibility. Clarity on the issue is still needed. In particular, what consitutes "proved absence" and/or evidence of an absence of motive. This piece argues that courts need to start afresh. If we better understand what courts are trying to get at by referencing the issue of motive as being "proved"and, we apply the everyday rules of evidence, we can escape from this confusing trap of trying to fit the issue into a particular box. When the cases talk about proved absence (or presence) of motive, the phrase should be interpreted to mean that there is a sufficient and compelling evidentiary basis or foundation to allow for the conclusion or inference to be drawn. After setting out how the ordinary rules of evidence and policy support this principled approach to the issue, the article offers some model instructions on the issue.

This paper brings forward Justice Pal's dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Tribunal to add to Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) literature on international criminal law and the rules of evidence and procedure. It is part of a TWAIL effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through procedural and evidentiary rules. By locating and situating Justice Pal's reasoning within the broader academic literature on dissents in international criminal law, it is possible to illustrate how and why Justice Pal's views were obscured as a relevant dissent. From this vantage point, this paper pursues Justice Pal's legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and procedure in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend these rules, and examines the impact of these decisions on the everyday functions of the tribunals and how truth is determined.

Feminist law and policymakers have been inspired by collectively generated experiences of emotion that help to shape what counts as justice and injustice in campus sexual violence cases. Focusing on events surrounding the Dalhousie University Faculty of Dentistry in 2014–2015, this article explains how emotional incitements in the case contributed to an infrastructure that supported formal and specifically carceral responses to campus sexual violence. Correspondingly, this article explains why alternative modes of legal and political formation that challenged the premises of the formal law, including restorative justice, were misread by some commentators as a form of “weak justice” and therefore outside the bounds of feminist action. The central claim of the article is not that particular emotional reactions are right or wrong, but that feminist law and policymakers should reflect on and assess their political force. Considering the ways that emotions are mobilized reveals the benefits and drawbacks of engaging with law in ways that feel emotionally gratifying and therefore politically necessary, but which can lead to harmful consequences that contradict feminist goals.

This article examines the relationship between colonialism, capitalism, and violence in Sri Lanka through the combined lenses of international economic law (IEL) and transitional justice. We argue that colonialism instantiates vicious cycles in the histories of violence of ethno-racial capitalism through the creation of states with debts that can never be repaid. This system of ‘indebted impunity’ persists even under ‘new’ Southern sovereigns. We illustrate how IEL and transitional justice are co-constitutive in maintaining international law’s racial hierarchies, while pursuing the construction of racial hierarchies that precipitate ethno-racial capitalist formations, and violence, in Sri Lanka. We first attend to the emergence of international law with racial capitalism as a story of sustained violence, where offshoots like IEL and transitional justice remain tied to the foundational violence in ways that cannot be reformed away. The final section examines the colonial transformation of Sri Lanka, focusing on the British Empire’s role in configuring ethno-racial communities, to consider how IEL and transitional justice work together to maintain this cycle. We observe that indebted impunity persists as a structural condition even when the ‘white’ colonial masters have formally departed, and ‘brown’ differentially racialized compatriots become the ones in charge.

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More Canadians are riding bicycles than ever before, but misinformation about cycling and the law is common.   Whether you are a cycling commuter, the parent of a child with their first two-wheeler, a recreational rider, or a racer, the chances are you will need this book. In this second edition of Every Cyclist’s Guide to Canadian Law, Christopher Waters, a law … Every Cyclist’s Guide to Canadian Law Read More »

Cities’ international relations are under a spotlight following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Scholars and practitioners have long called for a sentencing methodology that incorporates the social realities of Black Canadians and thereby takes seriously the ameliorative impacts that judicial recognition of systemic anti-Black racism could have on sentencing outcomes — including quantitative impacts on the length of individual criminal sentences and qualitative impacts on the mode of criminal sentence. In Ontario, the criminal jurisprudence around the sentencing of Black offenders has dramatically increased in the past few years, culminating in the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s (”the ONCA”) decision in R. v. Morris. However, while the ONCA has long acknowledged the plights of Black Canadians at the hands of the criminal justice system, until Morris, the ONCA has not explicitly discussed what, if any, role that acknowledgement should play in crafting a proportionate sentence for a Black offender. Through its sustained analysis of this urgent question, Morris may represent a watershed moment in the criminal jurisprudence relating to the sentencing of Black offenders.

In Actavis v Eli Lilly, the UK Supreme Court overturned its previous Kirin-Amgen decision, ushered in a new U.K. doctrine of ‘extended protection’, and in so doing, proclaimed that it had finally brought U.K. patent jurisprudence in line with the objectives of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention [EPC]. A considerable amount of commentary leading up to Actavis, as well as the Actavis judgment itself, highlighted how U.K. patent jurisprudence of the post-Article 69 era suffered from a flawed, U.K.-centric tunnel vision, instinctively presuming that Article 69 was simply a reflection of existing U.K. patent practice and, as such, U.K. patent law was already in compliance with EPC obligations. The weight of opinion was that Article 69 was meant to stake out a middle ground of claim scope, between literalistic, peripheral-style claiming, exemplified by traditional U.K. patent jurisprudence, and the non-literalistic, central-style claiming, exemplified by traditional German patent jurisprudence. In extending protection beyond literal claim infringement to cover non-literal equivalents, the UKSC declared that it had finally moved U.K. patent doctrine to the desired middle ground of the Article 69. However, what these commentaries overlook is that movement away from literalism was not the only shift in U.K. patent practice that Article 69 intended to achieve. Rather, a historical and comparative analysis demonstrates that in the lead-up to Article 69, commentators and EPC negotiators held similar apprehensions regarding the U.K. ‘colourable evasion’ doctrine. To these commentators, ‘colourable evasion’ embodied many of the concerns surrounding both literalistic, peripheral claiming and non-literal, central claiming. Similarly to literalism, ‘colourable evasion’ relied almost entirely on judicial interpretation, as opposed to the more fact-based and infringement-focused claim scope doctrines of Continental patent practice. Furthermore, like the non-literalistic approach of central claiming, such as the German ‘general inventive concept’, ‘colourable evasion’ could undermine the notice function of claims by permitting the judicial vitiation of claim elements based entirely on a generalized ‘inventive concept’. Post-Actavis jurisprudence demonstrates that the Actavis test, with its reliance on the inventive concept as the point of departure for non-literal infringement, has re-introduced many of the same concerns associated with both the U.K. ‘colourable evasion’ doctrine and the German ‘general inventive concept’. Accordingly, the Actavis test, in many ways, may be a return of ‘colourable evasion’ and the ‘general inventive concept’ rather than the doctrine of ‘pith and marrow’. The irony is that in pursuit of harmonization, German patent practice abandoned the ‘general inventive concept’ only now to see its return in the form of the U.K.’s Actavis test. In this sense, while Actavis took a critical view of preceding jurisprudence’s narrow, U.K.-centric reluctance to embrace the trans-European harmonization goals of Article 69, Actavis may end up undermining its own objectives of finally breaking free from the cycle of U.K.-centric patent practice.