Your search

Freedom of conscience or religion is no longer protected as the most effective way for the individual to discover spiritual truth, or as necessary to his meaningful commitment to that truth, or because human conscience, the capacity to recognize truth and right, is a divine endowment. The public justification for religious freedom is now framed in more secular terms. In the contemporary context of spiritually diverse community, the protection of religious belief or commitment is most often said to be based on the value of individual judgment or autonomy. What the individual chooses, what she judges to be right or true, is deserving of respect because it has been chosen, because it is an expression of her autonomy or the outcome of her independent judgment.

The connections between law and religion are many. State laws support some religious values and practices and interfere with others. And, from the other side, religious beliefs often inform or shape state laws. Even if Canadian law does not directly compel citizens to engage in religious practices, to attend church or pray, for example, it sometimes favors or advances the religious practices or values of some members of the community over those of others. And even if it does not directly restrict religious practices on the ground that they are erroneous, Canadian law, when advancing otherwise legitimate public purposes, sometimes impedes minority religious practices.

The servers and data streams which make up the internet in Canada are owned and controlled by corporations like Rogers and Bell. These businesses have potentially enormous power to control how the internet works, and how much it costs you to use it. Should the government regulate the ways they use this power? The answer, as I argue here, is both yes and no. (Winner of the IT.Can 2007 Student Essay Competition.)

Judicial Review' means a court reviewing a decision made by an administrative tribunal. When judicial review occurs, should the tribunal be allowed to send a lawyer to court to defend its decision? I think it generally should, and this article explains why.

The 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 terms produced several noteworthy decisions in the area of administrative law, furthering administrative law jurisprudence in three key areas: the relationship between constitutional and administrative law, especially with respect to judicial review of exercises of administrative discretion that affect Charter rights and freedoms (Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys); exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction (Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) and Bisaillon v. Concordia University) and standard of review (Livis (City) v. Fraternite des policiers de Livis Inc. and Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.). Overall, there was a strong synergy between administrative law and human rights matters over the past two terms, with human rights issues driving many of the recent developments in the field.

The first part of this article provides an overview of the most dominant private and public law approaches that have been attempted in the courts by plaintiffs seeking redress for historical wrongs and outlines why these approaches have been unsuccessful. It also defines the notion of historical wrongs and provides background on the two historical wrongs used as a case study in this paper – Aboriginal residential schools and sexual sterilization in Alberta. In the second part, I turn to discuss the phenomenon of creating compensation schemes as an alternative to traditional court action. Two illustrative examples are the outcry surrounding the introduction of a statute to compensate the victims of sterilization in Alberta and the continuing challenges related to the Aboriginal school resolution process established by the federal government. An examination of the compensation schemes that emerged in these two contexts as well as the process of their emergence provide valuable insight into some of the tensions that can occur when systems of compensation for victims of historical wrongs are designed. I argue that these tensions may be addressed by fostering continuous dialogue between the government and the victims and through independent oversight. Finally, I offer some observations on the ways in which compensatory schemes for historical wrongs expand our traditional conceptions of administrative justice.

Access to justice scholars have moved from a uni-dimensional focus on the procedural and cost barriers that prevent individuals from bringing their claims to court, to a more holistic assessment of all aspects of the legal system. Focus has widened from simply an emphasis on "access" to an examination of "justice" as well. The trend is towards thinking of access to justice as three distinct yet interdependent components: substantive justice which concerns itself with an assessment of the rights claims that are available to those who seek a remedy; procedural aspects which focus on the opportunities and barriers to getting one’s claim into court (or other dispute resolution forum); and, the symbolic component of access to justice which steps outside of doctrinal law and asks to what extent a particular legal regime promotes citizens’ belonging and empowerment.

If I emit greenhouse gases, and as a result the climate changes and you consequently suffer damage to your property or person, the law should allow you to sue me in tort. This article explains why this is so, and how we could reform Ontario law to make it a reality. (Winner of the 2007 CBA NEERLS Student Essay Competition.)

This study explores four postwar attempts to re-imagine the role of workers within the corporation and especially their relation to the processes of corporate governance. Employees have been variously conceptualized as “citizens at work,” whose rights of association, speech, assembly, and due process can be secured through collective bargaining; as “stakeholders,” whose interests are entitled to consideration analogous to those of corporate shareholders; as “human capital,” worth preserving and enhancing through enlightened employment policies and practices; and as “investors” — actual holders of corporate equity through pension funds and other vehicles. Despite the descriptive power and normative appeal of these approaches, each ultimately failed. Nonetheless, they provide important insights into the political economy of the corporation, revealing it not only as it is usually imagined — as a site of orderly governance, rational decision making, and purposeful coordination — but also as a site of conflict. This insight may help to explain and predict how the political economy of corporations — rather than their governance structure — determines the fate not just of workers but also of shareholders, debt-holders, and creditors; of corporate managers and professional advisors; of participants in corporate supply and distribution chains, of consumers of corporate goods and services; and of inhabitants of communities and environments which come within the corporate force field.

Because of the historical restrictions in the Indian Act, when couples who are separating or divorcing and agree on how to deal with their matrimonial real property, they do not have a comprehensive legal framework within which they can give effect to their intentions. Where couples do not agree, there is no mechanism for resolving their disputes. Many of these couples are attending provincial courts to obtain court orders for an equal division of their assets and find out that the courts will not and cannot address the situation of the property on reserve because of jurisdictional squabbling. That's the issue that NWAC is trying to find solutions to the fact that many women and their children are suffering because it is the women and children who are forced out of their family homes. It is the women and children who are the most affected because of the housing crises on reserve. It is the women and children who have to try to find places to stay, whether it's with their own families, in shelters (of which there are only 36 shelters on reserve) or have to move to an urban centre mostly with no financial resources. This is where the cycle again occurs because most of these women live in poverty and end up in the most poverty-stricken areas of urban centres causing even more risk to their families.

It is time to set the record straight on the Native Women's Association of Canada's position on matrimonial real property (MRP). I am frustrated when the media are blindly led to write clearly biased reports without getting all of the facts ("Proposed changes would boost women's property rights", Leader Post, April 24). Beginning in October 2006, the NWAC heard ideas, opinions and solutions from aboriginal women who have been directly impacted by the lack of legal recourse to the equal division of their matrimonial home on reserve. I was encouraged to learn about the resilience of the women we heard from. NWAC totally supports her report and, in fact, supports the fact that First Nations have a continued inherent right to their lands and territories. The aboriginal women with whom we consulted reiterated this as well.