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Third party litigation funding (TPLF) has emerged as one of the most important developments in civil litigation. Courts and policymakers in several countries are looking to each other as they debate the costs and benefits of this growing industry, and the need for regulatory oversight. Such cross-pollination in the public and jurisprudential debates on TPLF can be enormously helpful, but must be approached with caution. The TPLF industry operates in very different procedural environments, and any comparative analysis must take into account the various jurisdictions’ unique litigation culture and architecture. In this paper, the authors explore TPLF in the U.S., Australia and Canada, with a focus on class action litigation in the latter two jurisdictions. They examine the historical development of TPLF, current practices, the legal and procedural context within which such funding takes place, and how each jurisdiction is addressing regulation of this form of finance. In the final part of the paper, they engage in a comparative analysis of TPLF in the three countries, and highlight important differences that may ultimately result in unique approaches to regulatory oversight of the industry.

We synthesize knowledge about the policy and practices and infrastructure available for technology transfer of student inventions. Our joint consideration of intellectual property protection and business and legal support services has tried to overcome some of the traditional functional and knowledge silos.

I have been asked to provide an update on equitable remedies for breach of contract. Obviously, the dominant equitable remedy concerning breach of contract is specific performance; and in what follows I have focused upon that remedy. In addition, I have provided commentary on two related topics; one, the enforcement of keep open clauses; and two, the treatment of remedy stipulation clauses. I have not covered the enforcement of contracts by injunction. This presentation has come at an opportune time; as I am currently writing the second edition of my text on Equitable Remedies (Irwin Law) some of this material is drawn from those labours.

This paper addresses the history of the legality of the aerial bombardment of civilians, from the earliest attempts at legalization, through the inter-war period and into the actual bombing campaigns of the Second World War. We then chart the paucity of discussion of the legality of said bombing both during the war and throughout the Cold War, and finish with the occasional interruptions to the legal silence since 1992 in Canada and elsewhere.

According to the Canadian courts s. 2(a) of the Charter requires that the state remain neutral in religious matters. The state must not support the religious practices of one religious group over those of another and it must not restrict the practices of a religious group, unless this is necessary to protect a compelling public interest. Yet the neutrality requirement has not been consistently enforced by the courts. The fundamental difficulty with the neutrality requirement is that religious beliefs often have public implications. Despite the courts’ formal commitment to “neutrality” they have required the state to remain neutral only towards the “private” or spiritual dimensions of religious practice. The “public” elements of belief, which address civic concerns, remain subject to the give and take of ordinary politics. This distinction, although not expressly made by the courts, underlies the different treatment the courts have given to religious “practices”, which the state is precluded from favouring, and religious “values”, which the courts have said may play a role in political decision-making. This distinction between public and private religion, may also play a role in the courts’ accommodation decisions and account for its weak or selective protection of religious practices from state interference. Where the line is drawn between civic and spiritual spheres will reflect the courts’ assumptions about ordinary religious practice and appropriate state action. Because the line is not drawn explicitly but is instead framed as a distinction between practice and value in state support cases and is buried within the formal s. 1 balancing of interests in religious accommodation cases, the courts’ assumptions about the nature of religious practice and state action are concealed from scrutiny.

Professor Ladeur argues that administrative law's postmodernism (and by extension Global Administrative Law) necessitates that we move beyond relying on ideas of delegation, accountability and legitimacy. Global Governance, particularly Global Administrative Law and Global Constitutionalism, should try to adapt and experiment with the changing nature of the postmodern legality and support the creation of norms that will adapt to the complexities of globalisation. Ladeur's contestation, similar to GAL's propositions, can be challenged. By taking the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a significant contributor to the field of international criminal law, as an example, it is suggested that the creation of networks that Ladeur makes visible may not account for ‘regulatory capture’. This paper will argue that from the outside, the proliferation of networks may suggest that spontaneous accountability is possible. A closer look, however, drawing on anthropological insights from the ICTR, reveals that international institutions are susceptible to capture by special interests. Furthermore, there are two central themes that animate the response to Professor Ladeur: the political nature of international institutions and the history of international law, and the role of institutions in this history.

In Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), the Ontario Court of Appeal entered onto the most recent battleground in the world of statutory human rights law: a challenge to the content of a statutorily-created government program under the auspices of the Human Rights Code instead of under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In recent years government services claims under the Codes have gained increasing visibility. In such cases a challenge is brought under the Human Rights Codes to the substantive content of a statute that creates a government program, or discretionary decision-making under the statute’s terms.

In Pro Swing v Elta Golf Inc the Supreme Court of Canada made passing reference to the functions of equity’s maxims. Other courts have made similar references; indeed, judicial mention of equity’s maxims occurs quite frequently. This is surprising given the dearth of academic commentary on equity’s maxims, and that little mention of the maxims now takes place in Canadian law school curricula. In contrast, open any of the equity texts of the 1800s and significant attention is accorded to equitable maxims. This article seeks to explore whether the concept of equity’s maxims, as against the content of the individual maxims themselves, serves any real purpose today. It starts by providing an historical evolution of the notion of equity’s maxims, noting in particular that they are now largely ignored in the United States of America but still have topicality, to widely varying degrees, in Commonwealth jurisdictions. It then explores three divergent functions that have historically been served by equity’s maxims. Next, it turns to three roles that may be fulfilled by equity’s maxims today. It concludes that equity’s maxims serve a minimal function today. They do, however, preserve the distinctness of equity’s methodology from the common law and do allow some explicit dialogue on morality and ethics in those areas of private law where equity still plays a significant, determinative role.