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The law of entrapment has received very little scholarly attention in Canada despite the fact that its reliance on branding neighbourhoods and other locations as "high crime areas" and its low visibility encounters serve to engender discriminatory policing. This article relies on recent Charter decisions in other contexts to argue that an anti-racist lens is now required as part of the assessment of the bona fides of the investigation branch of the entrapment test from R v Barnes.

This article examines the judicial treatment of complaints of discrimination from workers with mental health issues. Equality protections promise full inclusion in social, work and community life. The principle of inclusion is understood in three inter-related parts: inclusion in the workforce, inclusion in decision-making and, in the most broad and prospective sense, inclusion in Canadian society. The current framework of equality protections has not effectively addressed these core values of inclusion for workers with mental health issues. The workplace continues to be a site of discrimination and harassment. Barriers prevent workers with mental health issues from getting or keeping employment, discourage their participation in decision-making, and entrench the devaluation, isolation and exclusion of persons with mental health issues. Accommodative measures must be alive to the concrete and attitudinal barriers experienced by workers with mental health issues.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. In Part One of this paper ((2010) 23 I.P.J. 83) I lay out the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. In this Part Two, I apply the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted work, as well as its justifications. I also explore the ramifications of copyright acting as a property limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

One of the main obstacles in criminal and civil proceedings involving intelligence and executive officials is the objection to disclosure of information and evidence on the basis of national security privilege. Known as the "state secrets privilege" in the United States and “public interest immunity” in England, this evidentiary rule has been invoked successfully in an increasing number of cases in the US and England. Indeed, the privilege has been identified as one of the most serious obstacles to effective human rights remedies. In this essay, I discuss the use of national security privilege in civil litigation in the three jurisdictions, focusing specifically on the role the privilege has played in blocking claims by purported torture survivors and other victims of anti-terrorism activities in the US and England. I also evaluate the potential impact of the privilege on a torture survivor’s civil claim, when such a case ultimately goes to trial in Canada. My conclusion, based on the approach courts have taken to the public interest balancing exercise, is that it will be very difficult for private litigants to obtain disclosure of information over which a claim of privilege has been made.

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In the ubiquitous Hollick decision, the Supreme Court of Canada offered what has become the definitive articulation of the evidentiary burden to be met for an action to be certified as a class proceeding: The plaintiff must show, “some basis in fact,” for each of the certification criteria, other than the criterion that the pleadings disclose a cause of action. Several 2010 certification decisions from three different provinces illustrate the continuing judicial tinkering with the standard of proof to be met on certification. In this brief article, I analyze these three recent decisions, reconcile them with established principles of the law of evidence, and highlight the rapidly widening difference in approaches between Canadian and U.S. certification jurisprudence, including the pending Wal-Mart decision.

In recent years, the Canadian courts have been confronted with a number of cases in which freedom of religion and sexual orientation equality appeared to clash. Specifically, the courts have had to decide whether religiously motivated anti-gay expression violated a provincial human rights code restriction on hateful expression (Owens v. Saskatchewan 2006). They have also had to rule on whether a human rights code ban on discrimination in the provision of services to the public was breached when a business owner refused to provide services to a gay advocacy group (Ontario v. Brillinger 2002). And, in two judgements, Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers (2001) and Chamberlain v. Surrey School district No. 36 (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the competing claims of sexual orientation equality and religious freedom in the public schools.

Is litigating the best interests of a child a contradiction in terms? This portfolio dissertation asks this question with regard to child custody and access disputes, in which separated parents contest for the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. It is axiomatic that children's interests are doctrinally supreme when their parents litigate about them, but do civil procedure and settlement practices in these cases also put children first? The dissertation responds to this research query using quantitative and qualitative empirical methodology. It draws both on a statistical analysis of reported cases and on the author's interviews of family law professionals in Toronto and New York City. The empirical findings are contextualized in a review of the relevant doctrine and scholarship from the legal and mental health disciplines. The first two articles make positive and normative claims about custody and access litigation in developed common-law jurisdictions; the remaining three focus on the settlement-seeking procedures which family courts apply to these cases. The Conclusion to the Portfolio draws from the articles to argue that, while litigating the best interest of a child is not a contradiction in terms in every custody or access case, the contours of the existing system are more reflective of adult interests and resource constraints than they are of children's interests. A family court is necessarily a civil justice system in the common law tradition, and can therefore only ever be a weak and inefficient servant of children's interests. However, the Portfolio does call for a cost-neutral procedural reform in the shape of a "grand bargain" between judges and parents. If parents yield power to judges within the adjudicative courtroom, and if judges in turn yield power to parents within the settlement-seeking conference room, the system will be brought more in line with its noble aspiration to pursue the best interests of the children involved.