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Legal scholars have long discussed the Supreme Court of Canada’s (”the Court”) erasure of race in its Charter jurisprudence. The lack of recognition is particularly noticeable in the Court’s jurisprudence on policing. It is well-established that African-Canadians and Indigenous people are disproportionately detained, arrested and charged by police, and thereby overrepresented in the criminal process. Criminologists and legal scholars largely agree that biased policing is one of the primary conduits through which Black, Indigenous and other racialized bodies are funnelled into the criminal justice system. Despite this fact, the Court has only ever marginally engaged in a race-based analysis of the Charter rights that are engaged by police encounters. In R. v. Le, the Court may have potentially lifted the judicial embargo on the discussion of race and biased policing; and, in so doing made a significant and much needed, contribution to critical race Charter litigation. The precedential impact of Le is challenging to predict, but there is reason to hope that Le will provide a veritable roadmap for lawyers who are seeking to mobilize race in the detention analysis under s. 9 of the Charter.
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"The Comprehensive Guide to Legal Research, Writing & Analysis focuses on developing the required competencies emphasized by the Federation of Law Societies in legal research, writing, and analysis and using those skills in both law school and professional environments."-- Provided by publisher
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The overarching objective of this paper is to shine a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) torchlight on the ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis to find out what can be seen, or seen in a new light, or seen in a different way, when the TWAIL approach is adopted, and to comment on the significance of our findings, if any. To this end, the paper pursues two specific and intertwined goals, namely: (i) to analytically tease out the similarities and differences between TWAIL’s avowedly (global) social justice discourse and praxis and its ILO counterpart; and (ii) to, in the light of the findings of the preceding exercise, reflect on what (if anything) the ILO’s and TWAIL’s social justice discourses and praxis can learn from each other. In the light of these goals, the paper will necessarily begin with a brief explanation of what TWAIL stands for as an intellectual social justice movement and as a ‘networked’ school of thought in international legal studies. This exercise will be followed by an examination of what we see as the ‘commanding heights’ of the ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis (workers’ rights, other economic and social rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples). Thereafter, a number of preliminary insights from an engagement between the TWAIL and ILO social justice discourses and praxis will be offered. The paper ends with some brief concluding comments.
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Beverley McLachlin is the architect of a flexible, socially conscious and principled approach to evidence admissibility in Canada. Her jurisprudence has infused the law of evidence with tools that enable it to adapt to new situations, to be aware of and reflect concerns for systemic issues all with an eye to ensuring it can fulfill its regulatory purpose of facilitating justice. I call this the McLachlin principle. This chapter explores the foundations of that approach in two early McLachlin decisions: R v Khan; R v Seaboyer; and then, as Chief Justice, in Mitchell v MNR where she set out, for the first time in a Supreme Court decision, a theory of evidence admissibility. After examining this evidence trilogy, the chapter will consider the application of the McLachlin principle in the context of defence applications to limit cross-examination of an accused on their prior criminal record under R v Corbett. Section 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act permits all witnesses, including an accused, to be cross-examined on their criminal record and our common law has, for the most part uncritically, accepted that a criminal record is relevant to a witness’s credibility and whether they are prepared to abide by their oath or affirmation. In Corbett, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of section 12(1) by reading into the provision a judicial discretion to prohibit or limit cross-examination on a prior record. Corbett was decided in 1988 and since then we have become more aware of the existence and manifestations of systemic racism, particularly as it relates to Indigenous and Black communities and the criminal justice system. Chief Justice McLachlin recognized this social reality in both Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) and R v Williams. Despite this consciousness, little, if any, attention has been given in our trial and appellate courts to how social conditions and bias are relevant in thinking about admissibility under Corbett. Enter the McLachlin principle.The chapter examines how it can be used to impact Corbett applications and stimulate future consideration of how evidence law can adapt to better facilitate justice in cases involving Indigenous and racialized participants.
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The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the ‘Malabo Protocol’) does not include a provision defining which defences will be applicable before the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (‘the African Court’). This chapter has the task of examining the existing body of international criminal law to see what guidance the African Court may take with respect to which defences have been recognized and which have been explicitly rejected, how recognized defences have been defined, and what questions have arisen or may arise with respect to these defences.
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The statutes that govern the legal profession across the country reserve the practice of law for lawyers, giving rise to lawyers’ claim to a monopoly over legal services. However, those same statutes, and many others, also allow non-lawyers to engage in practice-of-law activities. Non-lawyers provide legal assistance, advice, and representation across Canada in a range of settings. The privilege of self-regulation imposes on law societies a duty to govern in the public interest. The public interest is often cited to support lawyers’ monopoly, which is a useless fiction. Arguments by lawyers to restrict or limit non-lawyers’ provision of legal services are essentially quality arguments. This article asserts that lawyers’ claims for a monopoly are inconsistent with both the extent and quality of non-lawyer legal service provision in Canada.
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