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Freedom of expression protects the individual's freedom to communicate with others. The right of the individual is to participate in an activity that is deeply social in character. The value of freedom of expression rests on the social nature of individuals and the constitutive character of public discourse. This understanding of the freedom, however, has been inhibited by the individualism that dominates contemporary thinking about rights its assumptions about the pre-social individual and the instrumental value of community life. While the social character of human agency is seldom mentioned in the different accounts of the freedom value, it is the unstated premise of each. Once we recognize that individual agency and identity emerge in the social relationship of communication, the traditional split between intrinsic and instrumental accounts (and between speaker and listener -based accounts) of the value of freedom of expression dissolves.

When parents separate and cannot agree about parenting arrangements for their children, a state-authorized neutral party must resolve the dispute. Two groups of neutral professionals perform this function in many western jurisdictions. The first group is judges, who are entrusted with the ultimate decision-making authority. The second group is custody and access assessors, who are generally psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers. This thesis compares the processes by which these two groups of professionals make the decisions, and analyzes the interface between them. It then presents the results of empirical research about the extent to which Ontario judges accept custody and access recommendations from social worker assessors employed by Ontario's Office of the Children's Lawyer. The central finding was that the judges and assessors agreed only about half of the time. Possible explanations for this finding are explored, and its significance is analyzed in the context of the existing literature.

Professor Voyvodic’s call for cultural competence as an ethical requirement challenges perceptions of the legal profession as inherently and necessarily morally neutral. While lawyers wrestle with the boundaries of ethical mandates, alternative dispute resolution practitioners have adopted their own codes of ethics following very much in the path of the law. Although expanding dispute resolution options for disputants, many theorists have warned of the potential of informalism to undermine natural justice principals. I will argue that the choice to omit any explicit commitment to a "social justice ethic" leaves the practice of ADR vulnerable to these decades-old arguments that informalism erodes protections for marginalized populations. As such, I will argue that mediators must call for an explicit social justice mandate in their codes of conduct, training and practices to cement the place of informal processes as equitable – not just efficient – options for settlement. In doing so, informal processes, particularly mediation, may increase discourse in civil society about human rights, thus strengthening their congruence with lived realities of citizens.

When an intimate relationship breaks down and one of the people involved seeks money from the other, should it make any difference to the law whether or not they were formally married? This article argues that it should make a difference, at least when spousal support is being sought and the parties were never parents together. Winner of the 2008 Falconer Memorial Student Essay Competition in Family Law.

The 2007-2008 term was a landmark year in Canadian administrative law. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (2008 SCC 9) affected dramatically the approach to determining the applicable standard of review in administrative law. The Dunsmuir decision caused a fervour of discussion among practitioners, judges, academics and all those involved in the administrative justice community. It essentially eclipsed all other administrative law cases decided in the 2007-2008 Supreme Court term. This article discusses findings from an examination of cases that have been decided by lower courts, between the decision date and the end of 2007-2008 Supreme Court term, as a measure of Dunsmuir's impact with respect to the standard of review jurisprudence.

"Chapter 11: When Intellectual Property Rights Converge – Tracing the Contours and Mapping the Fault Lines ‘Case by Case’ and ‘Law by Law’" published on 28 Nov 2008 by Edward Elgar Publishing.

In February 2006, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) ‘nationalized’ the Kosovo ombudsperson's institution. This entailed making the ombudsperson a Kosovar and removing oversight of UNMIK from his/her jurisdiction. Based on legal and political analysis, and fresh survey results on the views of Kosovars themselves, this article considers the prospects of the ombudsperson as a human rights accountability mechanism. It also considers the implications of the nationalization experience for peace operations generally, arguing that UNMIK has established a poor precedent in isolating itself from the ombudsperson's jurisdiction and in failing to put anything comparable in its place.

In June of this year I was asked by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) to consider, and to make recommendations concerning, “the most appropriate mechanisms to address hate messages and more particularly those on the Internet, with specific emphasis on the role of section 13 of the CHRA [Canadian Human Rights Act] and the role of the Commission.”I was asked to “take into consideration: existing statutory/regulatory mechanisms; whether they are appropriate and/or in any manner, require further precision; the mandates of human rights commissions and tribunals, as well as other government institutions presently engaged in addressing hate messages on the Internet; whether other governmental or non-governmental organizations might have a role to play and if so, what that role might be; Canadian human rights principles, including but not limited to, those contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Canada’s international human rights obligations; and comparable international mechanisms.” I was asked to provide a final report to the Commission on or before October 17, 2008.

In this article, the administrative law decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada during the 2004-2005 term are reviewed. These decisions addressed four major issues: i) exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction between competing adjudicative bodies; ii) the right to independent adjudication; iii) standard of review; and iv) expertise and deference. Questions relating to exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction occupied the most significant part of the Supreme Court's administrative law energy during the 2004-2005 term. The author analyzes these decisions on jurisdiction, paying particular attention to the many divides between the members of the Court. She argues that the decisions on jurisdiction ratione material between competing tribunals reflect a contest of two administrative law values that have become central to the Canadian administrative state: expertise and expediency. The Supreme Court's approach, which tends to privilege expediency, may have the effect of denying litigants the opportunity to obtain the most appropriate resolutions to their disputes - resolutions that benefit from the expertise and experience of the tribunals themselves. She also highlights the value of including the individual litigant's view of the dispute in the search for its essential character and possible parameters to the essential character test. Finally, the author discusses the issues related to interpreting legislative intent that arise in the cases concerning the right to independent adjudication and core expertise.

The 2005 Supreme Court decision of Chaoulli v. Quebec (A.G.) is the most significant Canadian case vis-a-vis health care rights in the last decade. The two litigants were Dr. Chaoulli, a physician originally from France who was frustrated with governmental limits on his ability to practice privately, and George Zeliotis, a sixty-seven-year-old patient with hip and heart conditions who had to wait nine months for a hip operation. Mr. Zeliotis thought that if he were able to purchase private insurance then he could have financed his hip operation in the private sector. Chaoulli and Zeliotis were unsuccessful at both the trial and appeal levels but struck controversial success before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Through this paper we attempt to define the concept of the expert tribunal both as a juridical notion and a tribunal reality. The first part is devoted to a brief overview of the movement of expertise from political theory to legal concept. Following this, we discuss the use of expertise within the tribunal and on judicial review, in an era in which legislators do not always stipulate the qualifications necessary for tribunal appointment.

One consistent and disturbing trend since the birth of the Charter in 1982 is that race has been and continues to be, with a few notable exceptions, erased from the factual narratives presented to the Supreme Court of Canada and from the constitutional legal rules established by the Court in criminal procedure cases. Understanding the etiology of this erasing is not easy. In earlier pieces, the author has explored the role of trial and appellate lawyers. This paper focuses on principles of judicial review and the failure of the Supreme Court to consistently consider the impact of the constitutional rules it creates or interprets on Aboriginal and racialized communities. What makes the silence so problematic is that the Supreme Court gave itself the tool in 2001 to address part of the identified problem when it established an anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation in R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 369. This paper seeks to address a number of questions focused on the legacy of Golden. What is the origin and content of the Golden principle of judicial review? What is the evidence from subsequent cases and academic commentary that this is indeed an accepted principle of constitutional interpretation? What cases from the 2007 Supreme Court term would have benefited from a critical race analysis? And, in particular, how would factoring in Golden have impacted the Court's analysis in R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32? And finally, how should the Golden principle be applied in future cases?