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Forthcoming, Dalhousie Law Journal.A lawyer should be a loyal ally for each client, and should never exploit a client for personal gain. Legal services regulation should prevent such exploitation. It should also create certainty, and foster trust in every lawyer-client alliance.When it comes to time-based legal fees, Canadian legal services regulation is not yet doing its job. Throughout Canada, rules say that legal fees must be “fair and reasonable,” and “disclosed in a timely fashion.”1 These fine sentiments are supported by long lists of factors to be considered when a legal fee is called into question and then assessed retrospectively. That is, more or less, all that the codes of conduct have to say about time-based legal fees.What we lack are clear rules and efficient procedures to determine what specific billing and disclosure practices are -- and are not -- “fair,” “reasonable,” and “timely.” The status quo gives unethical lawyers room to take advantage of inexperienced clients in niches such as family law, estate law, and employment law, in which time-based billing is common.2 It also subjects ethical lawyers, and their clients, to unnecessary distrust and disputes regarding fees. Reconciling the obvious need to charge and collect fees with the ethical obligation to practice “honourably and with integrity” raises complicated ethical issues,3 for which regulators should offer more concrete guidance. Without fixing prices or curtailing flexibility in billing arrangements, regulatory reform can create a much fairer field for agreements between lawyers and clients about time-based fees.Part 1 of this article considers first the beginning, then the middle, and finally the end of a typical retainer involving time-based billing and an inexperienced client. At each of these three junctures, we find ethical ambiguity creating both opportunities for exploitation and conflicts of interest. The vagueness of the rules requires a lawyer to unilaterally make decisions that increase or decrease the client’s bill. This creates a conflict between the lawyer’s financial self-interest, and their fiduciary obligation to put the client’s interest first. Part 2 argues for more detailed regulation of time-based legal fees, in order to prevent exploitation, create certainty, and eliminate fee-related conflicts of interest that undermine trust in the lawyer-client relationship. Wherever possible, the best practices for time-based billing already used by ethical and conscientious lawyers should be enshrined in regulation. Drawing on regulatory theory, I argue that a move from the current vague standard to more precise rules would create certainty, without significantly constraining flexibility. Part 3 turns from the rules to the procedure that is meant to enforce them. I argue that the court-based process for identifying and remedying unethical billing is inaccessible, inconsistent, and vulnerable to strategic abuse by both lawyers and clients. Making law societies fully responsible for regulating legal fees would make the system more holistic, accessible, and consistent.

This article is about two ideologies. Welfare-consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximise aggregate welfare. Populism holds that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and asserts that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human wellbeing. The article argues that welfare-consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism’s claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare-consequentialist government. Finally, welfare-consequentialism’s sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism’s dark story has proven to be.

Forthcoming, The Political Quarterly.This article is about two ideologies. Welfare-consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximize aggregate welfare. Populism states that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and holds that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human well-being.I argue that welfare-consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism’s claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare-consequentialist government. Finally, welfare-consequentialism’s sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism’s dark story has proven to be.

This article asks which individuals should count in welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy. Possible answers to this question fall along a spectrum between parochial and inclusive. The most parochial impartial answer is that only welfare effects experienced by the living human subjects of a government should be considered in analysis of its policy options. At the other end of the spectrum, the most inclusive answer would be that welfare impacts on all individuals who are capable of having welfare should be weighed equally. A two-level response to the “who counts” question is proposed. A specification of welfare-consequentialism serving as an ethical ideal might give equal weight to non-human individuals, to foreigners, and to the unborn. However, a welfare-consequentialist decision procedure must take into account the error-proneness of human analysts’ welfare predictions. Predictions of a policy’s welfare impacts on individuals who are more dissimilar from the predicting government are more likely to be wrong, compared to predictions regarding living human subjects. The paper concludes by considering alternative answers to the “who counts” questions that might minimize the combined rate of exclusion and misprediction errors.

“Personal plight” is the sector of the legal services industry in which the clients are individuals, and the legal needs arise from disputes. This article proposes that competition among personal plight law firms is suppressed by three demand-side phenomena. First, consumers confront high search costs. Identifying competing law firms willing and able to provide the needed services often requires significant expenditure of temporal and psychological resources. Second, comparable price and quality information about firms is scarce for consumers. Both of these factors impede comparison shopping and reduce competitive pressure on firms. A third competition-suppressing factor is observed in tort legal service markets, where offerings are typically priced on a contingency basis. Contingency fees have relatively low salience to consumers, and this reduces consumers’ willingness to negotiate and comparison-shop on the basis of price. This analysis is supported by the author’s empirical research with Ontario personal plight lawyers as well as the existing literature. The article concludes by suggesting possible consequences of this analysis for regulatory policy.

This paper considers the different types of challenges that technological innovation poses to the Legal Services Act 2007’s regulatory framework, and whether the framework is capable of supporting technological innovation that benefits consumers while also addressing the risks it poses to them.The paper makes some recommendations about how the current regime could be adapted to better address these challenges, but its overall conclusion is that the LSA regime remains capable, for the time being, of responding to them.

Populist candidates and causes have scored a series of remarkable victories in Europe and the Americas since 2015. It is too soon to say whether we are living in a populist “moment,” or at the dawn of a new populist age. It is not, however, too soon to think carefully about the consequences of populism for public policy. Nor is it too soon to consider policy decisions by non-populist governments today that might affect the likelihood that this will be only a moment and not an age.This paper considers the relationship between two ideologies: welfare-consequentialism and populism. Welfare-consequentialism, reviewed in Part 1, holds that governments should always try to adopt the policies that are most likely to make individuals’ lives go best. Part 2 juxtaposes it with populism, defined as the view that (i) society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and (ii) public policy should give effect to the general will of the pure people (Mudde 2004). The paper then argues that welfare-consequentialism and populism are diametrically opposed ideologies. They are fundamentally incompatible in their representations of “the people,” and in the weight they give to public opinion. Populism’s anti-elitism may sometimes be reconciled with welfare-consequentialism, but not in the many cases where it takes the form of anti-intellectualism. Part 3 concludes by asking whether, in the long-term, welfare-consequentialism makes a polity more or less vulnerable to populism.

A life-evaluation question asks a person to quantify his or her overall satisfaction with life, at the time when the question is asked. If the goal of public policy is to make individuals’ lives better, does it follow that maximizing aggregate life-evaluations constitutes policy success? This paper argues that life-evaluation data provides a solid basis for welfare-consequentialist policy-making. This is illustrated by the successful argument for expanding state-funded mental health services in the United Kingdom.However, life-evaluations do not always provide a complete account of individual welfare. Policy-makers therefore must sometimes inquire into the extent to which individuals’ preferences would be fulfilled, if different policies were to be adopted. This article proposes synthesizing life-evaluationist and preferentist data about individual welfare, as a basis for rational policy-making.

How can we preserve and extend what's good about contingency fees, while minimizing the bad and the ugly? In order to identify the regulatory tools best suited to this challenging task, this Chapter proposes a consumer welfare analysis. The consumers of contingency fee legal services are the individual clients, and the members of classes, represented by law firms working on this basis. These consumers, like other consumers, have interests in:(i) quality, (ii) price, (iii) fairness, and (iv) choice. Part 2 of this Chapter will analyze these four sets of consumer interests, all of which are affected by the regulation of contingent fees. Part 3 scrutinizes various regulatory approaches to contingency fees against the consumer welfare criterion. I argue that heavy-handed interventions, such as fee caps and retrospective price review, can do as much harm as good for consumers. "Light touch" alternatives such as disclosure and standardized contracts, and fostering the "invisible hand" of the market, are preferable approaches for a regulators interested in maximizing consumer welfare.

This article proposes a theoretical foundation for measuring legal service value. It aims to support efforts to compare the value of offerings from different law firms, as well as alternative legal service providers. The value of any legal service depends on (i) its effectiveness, (ii) its affordability, (iii) the experience it creates for its clients, and (iv) third party effects (the impact the service-provider has on people other than the client). These four elements of value can be quantified through various metrics applied to firms or entities that provide a given service. Output metrics evaluate either the actual real-world impact of a legal service service, or the written and oral work products of the firm. Internal metrics check for processes or structures within a firm that demonstrably support high value outputs. Input metrics focus on the attributes and credentials of the individuals who provide the service.This article concludes that measuring legal service value is challenging, and may be dangerous if done poorly. Nevertheless, the rewards justify the challenge. Higher quality legal professionalism, more effective and less burdensome regulation, and consumer empowerment are among the payoffs if we can find better ways to measure legal service value.

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"Personal plight" is the sector of the legal services industry in which the clients are individuals, and the legal needs arise from disputes. This article proposes that competition among personal plight law firms is suppressed by three demand-side phenomena. First, consumers confront high search costs. Identifying competing law firms willing and able to provide the needed services often requires significant expenditure of temporal and psychological resources. Second, comparable price and quality information about firms is scarce for consumers. Both of these factors impede comparison shopping and reduce competitive pressure on firms. A third competition-suppressing factor is observed in tort legal service markets, where offerings are typically priced on a contingency basis. Contingency fees have relatively low salience to consumers, and this reduces consumers' willingness to negotiate and comparison-shop on the basis of price. This analysis is supported by the author's empirical research with Ontario personal plight lawyers as well as the existing literature. The article concludes by suggesting possible consequences of this analysis for regulatory policy.