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The experience of many university students studying public international law is, ""This is fascinating, but what can I do with it?"" While this book in no way detracts from the more intangible reasons to study international law, it is practically focused and explores the options available to law graduates beyond traditional or domestic law career paths. The range of possible careers is vast - from human rights to investment law and from the courtroom or boardroom to the refugee camp - and the book offers a step-by-step approach to considering whether and how to pursue a career in one of these

For self-defence actions to be lawful, they must be directed at military targets. The absolute prohibition on non-military targeting under the jus in bello is well known, but the jus ad bellum also limits the target selection of states conducting defensive operations. Restrictions on targeting form a key aspect of the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. In most situations, the jus in bello will be the starting point for the definition of a military targeting rule. Yet it has been argued that there may be circumstances when the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello do not temporally or substantively overlap in situations of self-defence. In order to address any possible gaps in civilian protection, and to bring conceptual clarity to one particular dimension of the relationship between the two regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between the two ‘war law’ regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed, but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war.

"Adjudicating International Human Rights" published on 01 Jan 2015 by Brill | Nijhoff.

English Abstract: The purpose of this article is to contribute to the continuing debate over the relevance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to cyberwar. It does so by taking what is often said to be a particularly archaic aspect of IHL, the French Revolutionary notion of levée en masse, and asking whether the concept could have relevance in the cyber context. The article treats levée en masse as a litmus test for the law’s relevance; if this IHL “relic” could have relevance in the cyber context, then the continued relevance of the larger body of rules should also be less doubtful.

This chapter provides a historical sketch of the events leading to the Georgia-Russia conflict of 2008, including South Ossetia’s de facto independence and gradual absorption by Russia. It then considers the legal status of South Ossetia under Soviet, Georgian and international law, and analyses the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. While the chapter concludes that South Ossetia’s right to self-determination does not, at this stage, include a right to secession, it argues that the emphasis now should be on restoring confidence between the parties and addressing humanitarian issues. This is a precondition for genuine negotiations over status within the international law framework on self-determination.

This article sketches the “law of wheelmen” as it developed in the late 19th century and suggests that, with the renaissance of cycling in North America, it is time to renew focus on the legal issues of cyclists. A comprehensive analysis of cycling’s legal needs across a range of issues – from legislation to enforcement and infrastructure – is in order and this article suggests an agenda for undertaking this analysis. For health, environmental and cultural issues, cycling is growing and the law and legal actors need to grapple with this means of active transit in a way that has not been done since before the automobile era.

While the law of the sea is rightly viewed as the most suitable international legal regime for the settlement of disputes in the Arctic, the militarisation of this region in an era of climate change is also observable. Yet curiously, scant attention has been paid to the constraints International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would impose on armed conflict in the Arctic, as unlikely as such conflict may be. These include the specific prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; as well as the related obligation to have “due regard” for the natural environment, as referred to in, for example, the San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare. Similarly, environmental factors must play into military assessments of targets based on the general principles of IHL related to targeting. The authors explore how these various legal obligations could be applied in the Arctic context. Referring to the scientific literature, they suggest that, due to the particularly vulnerable nature of this regional environment, many traditional war-fighting techniques would lead to damage that is not legally permissible. This conclusion should provide an additional incentive to policy makers to demilitarize the Arctic and to solve peacefully any disputes which may arise over sovereignty, navigation or resources.

This paper addresses the history of the legality of the aerial bombardment of civilians, from the earliest attempts at legalization, through the inter-war period and into the actual bombing campaigns of the Second World War. We then chart the paucity of discussion of the legality of said bombing both during the war and throughout the Cold War, and finish with the occasional interruptions to the legal silence since 1992 in Canada and elsewhere.

This paper explores Canadian law societies’ involvement in human rights protection and promotion abroad. The authors identify strategies for provincial law societies to contribute overseas, and point out the challenges with adopting such an international focus.

This book addresses multiple aspects of the conflict between Georgia and Russia over the breakaway region of South Ossetia in August 2008, including the use of force, human rights, transnational litigation and international law 'rhetoric'. The particulars of the conflict are explored alongside their wider implications for international order.

On 7 August 2008, long-standing tensions in the Caucasus region came to a head when President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia ordered troops into the de facto independent region of South Ossetia with a view to reestablishing Georgian sovereignty. This intervention, which included the shelling and occupation of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was the culmination of a number of more minor military exchanges over the proceeding months. South Ossetia’s sponsor, the Russian Federation, responded swiftly to the Georgian action, with a large-scale military intervention into the state of Georgia. This use of force ultimately went beyond the boundaries of the South Ossetia region, both into the comparable breakaway region of Abkhazia and further into ‘Georgia proper’.

At the turn of this century, the editors of a special issue of the journal International Organization suggested that a greater ‘move to law’ was occurring and that a trend towards the ‘legalization of world politics’ was taking place.1 While this view was contemporaneously criticised as presenting a simplistic conception of law, one which failed to adequately account for the dynamic interaction between norms and policies and between legal and political actors,2 the basic insight that international law and politics intersected seemed undeniable. The 2003 Iraq invasion shook this view. Realists (and ‘neo-cons’ who thought of themselves as realists) were quick to point out that hard power was back – if indeed it had ever gone – and that any ‘liberal moment’ that had emerged in the 1990s (evidenced by robust collective action through the Security Council and the creation of the International Criminal Court, among other things) had ended.3 Many legal scholars perceived a ‘crisis in confidence’ for international law. Some responded to this ‘crisis’ by suggesting that international law reorient itself to new threats and new realities, chipping away for example at the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter framework that restricted the use of force to narrow exceptions.4