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This Article identifies and explores the justifications or rationales offered by national court judges in support of their references to international human rights law. It does not analyze the extent to which judges invoke international law; rather, it examines the reasons offered by judges to explain their references to international law. The focus is on leading decisions rendered by higher courts in the United States and Commonwealth jurisdictions where the international norms do not bind decision-makers because they have not been made part of domestic law through an act of incorporation, the relevant treaty has not been ratified, or the ratifying state has filed a reservation limiting a treaty's domestic effect.

Women’s pain and death blurs the distinction between war and peace. Women are disproportionately starved, attacked physically, emotionally and psychologically, and killed during both war and peace. This paper focuses on the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations Security Council (“Se- curity Council”) in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the on-going purported threat posed to international peace and security by the Iraqi regime. Intended as a humane alternative to war, the sanctions have nonetheless lead to such high levels of death and suffering, particularly among women and children, that commentators have labeled them “genocide,” a “medieval military siege,” and “a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst catastrophes of the past decades.”

This paper presents a particular reading of Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer's landmark text, as a lens through which to consider the meaning of international texts in domestic contexts. Gadamer's thoughts have been the subject of inquiry and controversy across legal lines; yet, they remain virtually unknown within international human rights law. His absence within this circle is unfortunate because Gadamer takes up questions concerning culture, perspective, difference, and authority - issues that no international human rights scholar can hope to ignore. More importantly, however, Gadamer addresses these issues within a theory of language that proves relevant to the very structure of international human rights law itself, given that it lacks a third party arbitrator authorized to pronounce on meaning. The judicial use of international law within domestic courts brings this feature of the international regime into stark relief because the rising judicial reliance on international law has the potential to generate as many meanings of international texts as there are courts willing to engage those texts. Truth and Method expounds a theory of language that recognizes the authority of international texts and international law's governance ambitions while still accommodating variations in interpretation between national jurisdictions.

The author argues that the apparent collapse or erosion of the Oakes test reflects the problem of fitting a right such as freedom of expression, which is social and relational in character, into a structure of constitutional adjudication, which is built on an individualist conception of rights. In the leading Canadian freedom of expression cases, the task for the courts under section 1 is not simply to strike the proper balance between competing interests, but rather to resolve the single but complex question of whether the expression contributes to, or undermines, human agency or autonomous judgment. In these cases, the “value” of expression and the “harm” of expression are not distinct issues, but rather two sides of the same basic issue. Whether expression is more likely to contribute to insight and judgment or to manipulate and lead to an unreflective response is a relative judgment that will depend significantly on the social and economic circumstances in which it occurs. This issue fits awkwardly within an adjudicative structure that is based on an individual liberty model of rights. The author argues that this awkwardness accounts for the “erosion” of the Oakes test in freedom of expression cases and more specifically for the court's increasing, and inadequately justified, deference to legislative judgment under section 1.

When poverty activist resort to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, things cannot be going very well. The Charter of Rights will not eliminate poverty or gross disparities in wealth. It will not ensure that affordable housing is provided to those in need. All it may be able to do is to protect the individual’s right to ask others for help, to beg in the streets.

This is one of the first articles written in Canada on racial profiling and policing. While dated, the piece set out standards that can be used to prove racial profiling and recommended enhanced Charter standards to facilitate adjudication. As noted in the Introduction:

The worker who receives compensation through the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CSST) for an injury resulting from the sexual harassment finds herself with no recourse to the Quebec Charter for moral, material or exemplary damages. This principle has become entrenched in the law since the decision of Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345.The matter is further complicated by the fact that the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases compensates only for loss of integrity, providing a completely inappropriate compensation for sexual harassment – an incident through which the person’s dignity is first and foremost put under attack. In this paper, the author explores the possibility of reforming the Act in order to provide a more appropriate compensation for victims of workplace sexual harassment, one that addresses the very real affront to dignity that sexual harassment poses. As the Act is grounded in a particular social and legal history, this exploration involves a review of its history and evolution as well as an examination of recent decisions by the CSST’s reviewing bodies. Consideration of the place of the person in Quebec Civil Law and the definition of certain personality rights (integrity and dignity) also form an integral part of this article.

The mass rapes of Bosnian women by Serb soldiers were a tool of war specifically used to systematically drive away women and their communities. This paper examines that phenomenon in light of representations of rape in current literature and the effort to develop a feminist understanding of rape. It considers the feminist debate over whether the mass rapes in Bosnia should be seen as a crime perpetrated against the women as female individuals or against the Bosnian community. The foundation for this examination is a discussion of three normative conceptions which affect international treatment of rape as a war crime - rape as part of the game of war, as an attack on community, and as terrorization and retaliation. The author then documents the exclusion of any conclusive mention of rape from the Hague Conventions (1907) and discusses the repercussions of its eventual definition in the later Geneva Conventions (1949). Finally, the author calls for gender-sensitive approaches to humanitarian assistance, for sensitive treatment of rape survivors, and for the injection of a female voice into humanitarian law.

A discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's freedom of expression decisions which move between a discourse of freedom and rationality when defining of the freedom to a causal or behavioural discourse when determining justified limits.

This Memorial seeks to present a framework of legal arguments with respect to the validity and and legal effects of an arms embargo emposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 in September 1991 on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), before its dissolution, and since treated as being in force with respect to the new states that have succeeded Yugoslavia. More particularly, the Memorial addresses the legality of maintaining (or at least, having maintained during the crucial time period) the arms embargo in force, either de jure or de facto, against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in light of evdience that the arm's embargo's maintenance vis-a-vis Bosnia has contributed to the inability of the Government of Bosnia to prevent the perpetration on Bosnia's territory of acts of genocide by Bosnian Serb forces as well as combined acts of genocide and aggression by the neighboring state of Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia). [Co-authored with Craig Scott, Abid Qureshi, Paul Michell, Peter Copeland and Francis Chang]

In Andrews v. The Law Society of B.C., the Supreme Court of Canada makes its first significant statement concerning the right to equality in subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights. The Court holds, by a margin of 4 to 2, that the provision in the B.C. Barristers and Solicitors Act, which made citizenship a requirement for membership in the Law Society, violates subsection 15(1) of the Charter and cannot be justified under the terms of section 1. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopts a broad approach to subsection 15(1), which focusses on the effect or impact of particular laws on disadvantaged groups within the community. In taking this view of the right to equality, the Court has set itself a difficult task - because while the focus of review is on a state act that disadvantages a particular group, the foundation of the wrong is the disadvantaged or unequal position of the group in the community. The court’s pursuit of systemic equality, though, is constrained by the adjudicative process and perhaps also by the court’s reluctance to recognize the full implications of the conception of equality underlying the prohibition of effects discrimination. The Court is caught between two views of equality and state obligation: one view emphasizes the correction of harmful state action through the adjudicative process; the other emphasizes distributive justice and places an obligation on the state to address or take account of socio-economic inequality in the community. The focus in future cases will be on the standards used for determining whether a group is "disadvantaged", whether a law's impact is "disparate" and whether the "limit" on the right under section 1 is "reasonable". The standards adopted by the Court will determine the depth of judicial intervention into the socio-economic organization of society. Future cases may give greater substance and clarity to these tests. However, inasmuch as they represent a compromise between two visions of equality and state obligation, these standards are likely to remain unstable. The scope of the right to equality will remain open, flexible and controversial, with no clear lines or easy tests for fixing the limits of judicial intervention into the social and economic order.