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This in an introduction to the special Issue "Media and Communication Theory and the Regulation of the Networked Society" published by the international peer-review journal LAWS. The collection of articles builds on the interdisciplinary dialogue that took place at the University of Windsor (Canada) symposium on the regulation of digital platforms, new media and technologies in the fall of 2019. The articles of the collection explore the various effects of media and borders, networks, amidst pandemics and environmental crises, different understandings of regulation, and the particular challenges of interdisciplinarity as it connects to law and regulation. The collection gathers the works of several academics worldwide who reflect on some of the biggest questions and challenges of our time: how do transnational digital media platforms, algorithms and big data shape commerce, politics, speech and mobilization or resistance on pressing issues such as climate change, the pandemic, elections, racial discrimination or social justice? How do transnational digital platforms redefine the role of our governments, our everyday lives, the citizenry? How do governments, private undertakings, institutions and citizens resort to, or respond to, this ultra-mediatized networked environment? To what extent have national borders become obsolete in this networked global village? Building on the scholarship of Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan and others, as a point of departure to explore the regulation of new media, this Special Issue tackles several of these pressing questions in a post-colonialist, posttruth environment. Various theories about media, networks and borders at the intersection of law and regulation may better inform the goals that law and policy makers should pursue (or not). This is particularly timely as governments, private corporations and citizens around the world face unprecedented challenges with flows of (dis)information about the global pandemic, hate speech and environmental crises.

In response to the Canadian government consultation process on the modernization of the copyright framework launched in the summer 2021, we hereby present our analysis and recommendations concerning the interaction between copyright and the Internet of Things (IoT). The recommendations herein reflect the shared opinion of the intellectual property scholars who are signatories to this brief. They are informed by many combined decades of study, teaching, and practice in Canadian, US, and international intellectual property law.In what follows, we explain:•The importance of approaching the questions raised in the consultation with a firm commitment to maintaining the appropriate balance of rights and interests in Canada’s copyright system, within the broader framework of the Constitution;•That the modernization of the Copyright Act requires a careful examination of the copyright framework within larger observable trends of dominant positions in the marketplace and anti-competitive practices, of the extraction of big (personal) data, and of market and legal infrastructures’ heavy reliance on non-negotiated standard form contracts;-That the growing prevalence of the IoT shows more clearly than ever before why Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) need to be recalibrated in keeping with the objectives of copyright, the Constitution, property rights, and of promoting competitive markets.As such, we recommend: -To narrow the scope of the TPM prohibitions under the Copyright Act, whereby the circumvention of access controls or copy controls for non-copyright-infringing purposes would be lawful, with a non-exhaustive list of such purposes to provide greater legal certainty. The same treatment would apply to the dealing in TPM circumvention technology enabling the exercise of non-copyright-infringing purposes.In the alternative, the Copyright Act should be amended to:-Introduce a new exception that would confirm that the TPM provisions (and other relevant exclusive rights in the Copyright Act) do not apply to the right to repair, including for maintenance and diagnostics purposes. -Introduce a new exception to encourage follow-on innovation. -Additionally, just as copyright holders should not be allowed to contract out of exceptions to copyright infringement through non-negotiated standard form agreements, neither should they be allowed to opt out of exceptions to TPM prohibitions by contract.

In response to the Canadian government consultation process on the modernization of the copyright framework launched in the summer 2021, we hereby present our analysis and recommendations concerning the interaction between copyright and artificial intelligence (AI). The recommendations herein reflect the shared opinion of the intellectual property scholars who are signatories to this brief. They are informed by many combined decades of study, teaching, and practice in Canadian and international intellectual property law. In what follows, we explain:- The importance of approaching the questions raised in the consultation with a firm commitment to maintaining the appropriate balance of rights and interests in Canada’s copyright system, consistent with a robust principle of technological neutrality.- The importance of ensuring that text and data mining (TDM) activity can be undertaken in Canada without the threat of potential copyright liability. We therefore propose both an opening up of Canada’s fair dealing doctrine to better accommodate TDM activities, and the enactment of a specific statutory provision to confirm that uses of copyright works and other subject matter for TDM (whether commercial or non-commercial) do not infringe copyright. - The importance of resisting calls to extend copyright protection to AI-generated outputs. We therefore propose maintaining and confirming the existing principled requirements of human authorship and original expression as preconditions of copyright protection, and we caution against any move to establish new neighbouring or sui generis rights in respect of AI outputs. Works generated by AI should remain in the public domain. As such, we recommend:- Enacting a broad statutory provision confirming that use of a work or other subject matter for TDM does not infringe copyright. This specific exception should be available to all users, apply to commercial and noncommercial uses, permit the retention and sharing of copies, and be protected from contractual override. - Amending section 29 of the Copyright Act to make the list of purposes an illustrative list (“for purposes such as”) and adding TDM or data/informational analysis as an enumerated purpose therein.- Confirming in section 2 of the Copyright Act that “author” means a human being/natural person; and confirming in section 5 of the Copyright Act that copyright shall not subsist in a work created without a human author.

Based on an empirical review of post-RDS caselaw, I argue that there is a demonstrable colour blindness within the existing jurisprudence on judicial impartiality. I illustrate this colour blind approach through two arguments. The first argument is based on the evidence needed to pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. A large number of the cases surveyed illustrate the propensity of decision makers to deny recusal arguments based on the cogency of the evidence. In these cases of colour blind decision making, the presented evidence was deemed insufficient to warrant piercing the veil of judicial impartiality. The second argument focuses on judges that adopt an antiracist perspective. When judges have relied on social science evidence to engage in contextual and antiracist judging, they have been policed and their decisions overturned by supervisory and appellate courts.

"Indigenous Justice in Oceania and North America" published on by Oxford University Press.

When proposals are made to reform legal procedure, improving access to justice is often identified as the goal. What does access to justice mean in this context? This article proposes that “better access” and “better justice” should be understood as two distinct goals. Access improves when procedural costs confronting litigants (and potential litigants) are reduced. Justice has three qualities – substantive justice, procedural justice, and public justice – which legal procedure can produce to a greater or lesser degree. Although access and justice are sometimes in tension as goals for procedural reform, they are also harmonious. Better access to better justice is a worthy goal for procedural reformers. Welfare-consequentialism is introduced in the final part of the article, as a way to focus access to justice reforms and make the necessary tradeoffs. This article’s argument is illustrated throughout by three procedural reform trends – mandatory mediation, small-dollar procedure, and inquisitoriality.

This article examines the legal and normative foundations of media content regulation in the borderless networked society. We explore the extent to which internet undertakings should be subject to state regulation, in light of Canada’s ongoing debates and legislative reform. We bring a cross-disciplinary perspective (from the subject fields of law; communications studies, in particular McLuhan’s now classic probes; international relations; and technology studies) to enable both policy and language analysis. We apply the concept of sovereignty to states (national cultural and digital sovereignty), media platforms (transnational sovereignty), and citizens (autonomy and personal data sovereignty) to examine the competing dynamics and interests that need to be considered and mediated. While there is growing awareness of the tensions between state and transnational media platform powers, the relationship between media content regulation and the collection of viewers’ personal data is relatively less explored. We analyse how future media content regulation needs to fully account for personal data extraction practices by transnational platforms and other media content undertakings. We posit national cultural sovereignty—a constant unfinished process and framework connecting the local to the global—as the enduring force and justification of media content regulation in Canada. The exercise of state sovereignty may be applied not so much to secure strict territorial borders and centralized power over citizens but to act as a mediating power to promote and protect citizens’ individual and collective interests, locally and globally.

Will recent acts of violence against Muslims in Canada lead us to see what we should have seen earlier — that anti-Muslim works are hate speech that encourage violence against Muslims?

This qualitative study examines the complex interplay between the financial regulatory landscape and financial inclusion in a post-war jurisdiction. The global debates surrounding the deployment of financial inclusion initiatives virtually center on many legal and non-legal discourses, thereby making this a significant study. This study further identified specific thematic strands which highlight how financial inclusion is regulated and administered in a post-war jurisdiction by amplifying the lived experiences of individuals that are caught between the regulatory structure of financial inclusion. In particular, this doctoral research further examines how stakeholders engaged in financial inclusion have shaped the financial regulatory landscape. By applying a local level analysis of banking practices coupled with daily lived experiences, this research aimed to explore the strengths and limitations in the delivery of financial inclusion efforts. The study employed an interdisciplinary approach, which created narratives contextualized within the jurisdiction this study was conducted. This study seeks to present theoretical and legislative developments that uncover how banking law is interlaced in policy and cultural formation using financial inclusion as an illustrative vehicle. This study is further designed to showcase theoretical and legal influences, as well as a guide in navigating this legal research project by providing original contributions of the fieldwork conducted in a post-war jurisdiction.

An Indigenous lawyer makes the case that what happened to Indigenous children who went to residential schools is genocide and the case should be tried by the International Criminal Court.

Perpetrators of Technology-Facilitated gender-based violence are taking advantage of increasingly automated and sophisticated privacy-invasive tools to carry out their abuse. Whether this be monitoring movements through stalker-ware, using drones to non-consensually film or harass, or manipulating and distributing intimate images online such as deep-fakes and creepshots, invasions of privacy have become a significant form of gender-based violence. Accordingly, our normative and legal concepts of privacy must evolve to counter the harms arising from this misuse of new technology. Canada’s Supreme Court recently addressed Technology-Facilitated violations of privacy in the context of voyeurism in R v Jarvis (2019). The discussion of privacy in this decision appears to be a good first step toward a more equitable conceptualization of privacy protection. Building on existing privacy theories, this chapter examines what the reasoning in Jarvis might mean for “reasonable expectations of privacy” in other areas of law, and how this concept might be interpreted in response to gender-based Technology-Facilitated violence. The authors argue the courts in Canada and elsewhere must take the analysis in Jarvis further to fully realize a notion of privacy that protects the autonomy, dignity, and liberty of all.

Beyond the immediate compromised situation into which Canada stumbled over arms sales, Canada should also have been able to play a more constructive role in the security dynamics in the region over the last decades.

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.” Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics.

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].

This draft chapter is part of a larger research project exploring the question of patent quality from a human agency perspective. This chapter explores the changing relationship between agency, and specifically, 'professionalized' agency, and patent quality.

This paper explores from a Canadian perspective the awarding of damages for non-pecuniary losses that arise in commercial settings and asks the question whether there is any useful function performed by such awards. It is difficult to find cases that support such awards and thus if they are to be awarded, it will be advancing damages for non-pecuniary losses in a new direction. To justify such a movement, I suggest that the any development should be measured by two concepts: legitimacy - what is it that courts can legitimately do, and coherence - how does the award fit into a coherent and predictable legal system.I argue that from a purely compensation point of view, awarding compensation for a loss that is incommensurable does not make much sense. Only if the justification is vindication, deterrence or punishment is there merit in awarding more than compensation, but then, courts or legislatures should develop separate criteria to add quantification and to meet the standards of legitimacy and coherence.