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Custody and access disputes occur when parents separate without agreeing about how to divide the on-going rights and responsibilities of parenthood. This article reports on empirical research with child custody evaluators who deal with these cases on a regular basis. On paper, the role of these professionals is to gather information and then make decisions about what parenting arrangements would be in the best interests of the children. However, the central finding of this research is that, in practice, their primary goal is to bring about voluntary settlement of the disputes. This article proposes an explanation for this phenomenon which is based on the evolution of custody and access law, procedure, and ideology over the past 30 years. The rise of the "logic of durability" is proposed as an explanation for the concerted pursuit of settlement among both child custody evaluators and family court judges.

The jurisprudential borders of the Canadian state appeared to shift in the aftermath of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of the security certificate provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in early 2007. Yet Charkaoui v. Canada ultimately maintained the contingency of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, re-drawing long-standing divisions along lines of alleged risk, allegiance and origin, despite the emergence of tentative shifts in jurisprudential conceptions of state sovereignty and extra-territoriality. Where previous national security cases involving constitutional rights claims by non-citizens were predicated on a conceptualization of state sovereignty as the right to exclude from territory, reading Charkaoui in the context of four subsequent cases involving the role of Canadian state actors abroad gives rise to the prospect of the Charter operating to delineate and maintain the limits of state sovereignty within and beyond national borders. While the Charter may accompany the extended reach of the Canadian state in some of its guises, it provides only a minimal constraint on the actions of its agents, reinscribing rather than challenging sovereignty. Accordingly, this article argues that the ‘sovereign Charter’ represents a key moment in the evolution of the Canadian state’s national security, immigration and foreign policy strategies, serving to harden the boundaries of the nation, from within and without. By theorizing the doctrinal rules related to the extra-territorial application of the Charter, this article concludes that rights, as reflected in Charkaoui and subsequent caselaw, continue to offer only a limited mode of resistance against sovereign power. Beyond both immigration law’s historical preoccupation with race and the contemporary focus on the ‘war on terror,’ the very notion of rights functions as a discursive and aspirational marker of sovereignty.

Third party litigation funding (TPLF) has emerged as one of the most important developments in civil litigation. Courts and policymakers in several countries are looking to each other as they debate the costs and benefits of this growing industry, and the need for regulatory oversight. Such cross-pollination in the public and jurisprudential debates on TPLF can be enormously helpful, but must be approached with caution. The TPLF industry operates in very different procedural environments, and any comparative analysis must take into account the various jurisdictions’ unique litigation culture and architecture. In this paper, the authors explore TPLF in the U.S., Australia and Canada, with a focus on class action litigation in the latter two jurisdictions. They examine the historical development of TPLF, current practices, the legal and procedural context within which such funding takes place, and how each jurisdiction is addressing regulation of this form of finance. In the final part of the paper, they engage in a comparative analysis of TPLF in the three countries, and highlight important differences that may ultimately result in unique approaches to regulatory oversight of the industry.

We synthesize knowledge about the policy and practices and infrastructure available for technology transfer of student inventions. Our joint consideration of intellectual property protection and business and legal support services has tried to overcome some of the traditional functional and knowledge silos.

I have been asked to provide an update on equitable remedies for breach of contract. Obviously, the dominant equitable remedy concerning breach of contract is specific performance; and in what follows I have focused upon that remedy. In addition, I have provided commentary on two related topics; one, the enforcement of keep open clauses; and two, the treatment of remedy stipulation clauses. I have not covered the enforcement of contracts by injunction. This presentation has come at an opportune time; as I am currently writing the second edition of my text on Equitable Remedies (Irwin Law) some of this material is drawn from those labours.

This paper addresses the history of the legality of the aerial bombardment of civilians, from the earliest attempts at legalization, through the inter-war period and into the actual bombing campaigns of the Second World War. We then chart the paucity of discussion of the legality of said bombing both during the war and throughout the Cold War, and finish with the occasional interruptions to the legal silence since 1992 in Canada and elsewhere.

According to the Canadian courts s. 2(a) of the Charter requires that the state remain neutral in religious matters. The state must not support the religious practices of one religious group over those of another and it must not restrict the practices of a religious group, unless this is necessary to protect a compelling public interest. Yet the neutrality requirement has not been consistently enforced by the courts. The fundamental difficulty with the neutrality requirement is that religious beliefs often have public implications. Despite the courts’ formal commitment to “neutrality” they have required the state to remain neutral only towards the “private” or spiritual dimensions of religious practice. The “public” elements of belief, which address civic concerns, remain subject to the give and take of ordinary politics. This distinction, although not expressly made by the courts, underlies the different treatment the courts have given to religious “practices”, which the state is precluded from favouring, and religious “values”, which the courts have said may play a role in political decision-making. This distinction between public and private religion, may also play a role in the courts’ accommodation decisions and account for its weak or selective protection of religious practices from state interference. Where the line is drawn between civic and spiritual spheres will reflect the courts’ assumptions about ordinary religious practice and appropriate state action. Because the line is not drawn explicitly but is instead framed as a distinction between practice and value in state support cases and is buried within the formal s. 1 balancing of interests in religious accommodation cases, the courts’ assumptions about the nature of religious practice and state action are concealed from scrutiny.

In Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), the Ontario Court of Appeal entered onto the most recent battleground in the world of statutory human rights law: a challenge to the content of a statutorily-created government program under the auspices of the Human Rights Code instead of under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In recent years government services claims under the Codes have gained increasing visibility. In such cases a challenge is brought under the Human Rights Codes to the substantive content of a statute that creates a government program, or discretionary decision-making under the statute’s terms.

In Pro Swing v Elta Golf Inc the Supreme Court of Canada made passing reference to the functions of equity’s maxims. Other courts have made similar references; indeed, judicial mention of equity’s maxims occurs quite frequently. This is surprising given the dearth of academic commentary on equity’s maxims, and that little mention of the maxims now takes place in Canadian law school curricula. In contrast, open any of the equity texts of the 1800s and significant attention is accorded to equitable maxims. This article seeks to explore whether the concept of equity’s maxims, as against the content of the individual maxims themselves, serves any real purpose today. It starts by providing an historical evolution of the notion of equity’s maxims, noting in particular that they are now largely ignored in the United States of America but still have topicality, to widely varying degrees, in Commonwealth jurisdictions. It then explores three divergent functions that have historically been served by equity’s maxims. Next, it turns to three roles that may be fulfilled by equity’s maxims today. It concludes that equity’s maxims serve a minimal function today. They do, however, preserve the distinctness of equity’s methodology from the common law and do allow some explicit dialogue on morality and ethics in those areas of private law where equity still plays a significant, determinative role.

The Lautsi decision reflects the deep ambivalence in Western liberal democracies about religion and its relationship to politics. Like the Canadian courts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems to recognize that religion and politics should be separated but that this separation can never be total. While the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of Canada rely at least formally on a similar test for determining a breach of religious freedom (a test that emphasizes the state’s obligation to remain neutral in spiritual matters) their application of the test is guided by different understandings of the public/political significance of religion and more particularly the relationship between religion, civic values, and national identity. The Court in Lautsi seems to accept, or at least acquiesce in, two claims made by the Italian government about the meaning of the crucifix: that it symbolizes the Italian national identity, which is tied to its history as a Christian or Roman Catholic nation, and that it symbolizes the Christian foundation of the civic/secular values of the Italian political community – the values of democracy and tolerance. Behind the claim that the crucifix is not simply a religious symbol but also a symbol of the Italian identity and political culture, is the draw of a thicker or richer form of national identity than that offered by civic nationalism. The assumption is that Italians are held together in a political community not simply by their shared commitment to liberal values or democratic institutions but by a common culture rooted in a religious tradition. Religion and politics are joined at the core of national identity and the root of political obligation. This link between religion and politics, though, rests on the problematic claim that the values of democracy and tolerance emerged directly from Christianity (and are the logical, even necessary, outcome of Christian doctrine) and the disturbing claim that Christianity is uniquely tied to these values. While religion does sometimes intersect with politics in Canada, it no longer plays a role in the definition of the country’s national identity. Canada, sometime ago, embraced multiculturalism as the defining feature of its national identity and liberal-democratic values as its political bond. There is no doubt that Canada’s moral/social culture has been shaped in different ways by the Christian faith of earlier generations, nevertheless any attempt to formally link Canadian national identity to a particular religious tradition would run against the country’s self-conception as a multicultural (multi-faith) society.

Vaillancourt's book is reviewed in the context of the Social Assistance Review in Ontario.

In the past decade or so, one has seen an increase in the use of the term “inquisitorial” with it becoming de rigueur for many instances of non-adversarial decision-making in the administrative state. The phenomenon of terming non-adversarial administrative process as inquisitorial, is not peculiar to Canada. In other Commonwealth jurisdictions where the adversarial tradition prevails, such as Australia and the UK, a similar phenomenon has occurred. Similarly, in the United States, the Supreme Court has labeled the federal Social Security adjudicatory scheme an inquisitorial procedure, owing in part to the investigatory nature of the Administrative Law Judge. Despite the classification, in most jurisdictions around the world, the meaning of the term “inquisitorial” refers to many different concepts and processes that often do not replicate the pure inquisitorial model that originated in the Civil Law tradition. This article reports on an international research workshop that brought together academics, policy-makers, and judges who have served as Commissioners of public inquiries, to discuss polyjural decision-making in the administrative state. Participants stemmed from traditionally adversarial and inquisitorial jurisdictions, generating innovative comparative insights on hybridized administrative process and institutional design, in relation to hearing processes, legislative oversight, ombudsman, public inquiries and administrative investigations. The conference website can be found at: http://www.uwindsor.ca/law/inquisitorial-processes/ .

Judicial dispute resolution is common in family courts, where it usually consists of informal efforts to bring about settlement in pre-trial conferences. Many judges are especially eager to promote settlement in child custody and visitation cases. This paper will critically evaluate informal JDR in parenting disputes, by asking whether and to what extent it is in the best interests of the children involved. It begins by identifying several features which distinguish custody and access disputes from other types of civil litigation, and which are relevant to the normative analysis of JDR in this context.

Victor Kattan’s “From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949” is an archival excavation of the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab-Israeli) conflict and its origins. This review will examine the contours of Kattan’s book followed by a brief examination of objectivity in academic scholarship often enunciated through the concept of ‘balance’ as it relates to those scholars (like Kattan) working on the conflict. Finally, this review will explore some of the weakness of the arguments that Kattan advances.

North American family law conflicts are very often brought to mediation, in which a neutral third party attempts to bring about a voluntary resolution of the spouses’ dispute. Family mediation has many enthusiastic supporters, and has in many jurisdictions been made a mandatory precursor to traditional litigation. However, it has also given rise to a potent feminist critique, which identifies power imbalance and domestic violence as sources of exploitation and unjust mediated outcomes. This article summarizes the feminist critique of family mediation, and assesses the efforts of contemporary mediation practice to respond to it. Even in the absence of formal family mediation, litigating spouses are likely to be subjected to substantial informal pressure to settle from judges and other family justice system workers. The article argues that the feminist critique might be more relevant to this “settlement mission” than it is to formal family mediation as it is practiced today.

Client interviewing is a cornerstone of lawyer-client relationships, particularly in often high-conflict child protection matters. This practical article focuses on the initial interview of adult clients involved in child protection matters. Part I sets out the social context of interviewing caregivers. Part II describes the theories of client-centred and engaged client-centred lawyering employed throughout the paper. Given the context and theory, Part III sets out four key stages of interviewing that may prove difficult for new lawyers: rapport-building, fact gathering, reality checking and concluding.

Mediation in the case of elder abuse and mistreatment is increasingly employed in North America to resolve conflicts that disproportionately affect older adults. The attendant dangers of mediation in these cases require awareness of and sensitivity to issues facing older adults and their families, including elder abuse, ageism, and consent and capacity. This article charts the introductory stages of an elder mistreatment mediation project started through a law school-based mediation clinic. Responding to expressed local need, the project developed an Intake Guide that attempts to balance the autonomy of the older adult with safety screening. The model employs an interdisciplinary approach, with specialist social workers acting as advocates throughout the process. Lessons learned from the project include: the importance of training; the need for flexible and responsive approaches to mediation; the importance of a specialized intake and screening tool; the benefits of interdisciplinary, strengths-based approaches and the centrality of collaborative community relationships to ensure program sustainability.

The judicial role in child custody and visitation disputes has traditionally been understood as one of authoritative decision-making. However this new empirical research suggests that many family court judges prioritize the pursuit of voluntary settlement in pre-trial conferences, using evaluative and facilitative mediation techniques. Drawing on qualitative interviews with judges and other family law professionals in Toronto and New York City, this article identifies points of consensus and controversy among settlement-seeking family judges. Despite the general support for settlement-seeking, there are substantial differences of opinion regarding coercion, due process, and the meaning of the best interests of the child standard.

The number of lawyers who practice law in-house has significantly increased over the last thirty years in North America. While in this part of the world, in-house counsel are regulated in the same manner as outside counsel by their professional bars, the recent decision by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. European Communities, reminds us that other parts of the world treat in-house counsel very differently. This paper analyses the justifications for a similar treatment of in-house counsel and outside counsel by the legal profession. While a detailed contextual analysis of in-house counsel’s functions reveals a likelihood of greater vulnerability in their ability to balance them with various ethical and professional duties, it also shows that outside counsel face similar ethical dilemmas that may vary in degree or in nature. The similar regulation of in-house and outside counsel is consistent with a poor articulation by the legal profession of the scope of the duty of professional independence from the client. And yet such duty exists. As it can conflict with paramount professional obligations, including the duty of loyalty to the client, its scope is controversial. Leaving the duty of professional independence from the client largely undefined is harmful to in-house and also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public interest. In-house counsel are in a privileged position to provide legal services in accordance with fundamental values of the legal profession. As such, their contribution needs to be better recognized and promoted. Generally, regulatory reform is necessary to nurture in-house counsel’s ability to provide legal services as integral members of the bar, while minimizing the risks that the privileged proximity to their clients present. Such reform will inevitably benefit outside counsel who face comparable issues. A clearer articulation of the meaning and scope of the duty of professional independence from the client, together with tangible mechanisms to actualize it, will provide greater support to in-house and outside counsel to better understand and integrate their various ethical and professional duties within their role. It will also benefit all interested parties.

Are existing ethical norms adequate to address the realities of class proceedings? In this paper, I explore the premise that existing ethical rules are effective when applied to the conduct of class action litigation. To do so, I draw upon extensive American literature on the subject, as well as Canadian jurisprudence and original research involving the interview of seven class action judges on questions of class action legal ethics. In Part I, I discuss the peculiar features of class proceedings and how they create unique – or exacerbate existing – challenges to the ethical conduct of litigation. In Part II, I confront the fundamental (and often overlooked) question: who is the client in a class proceeding, to whom ethical duties are owed? Having identified the range of judicial and academic views on the unique dimensions of class actions, I then turn, in Part III, to a discussion of the development of ethical rules that seek to respond to them. In the absence of amendments to formal rules of conduct, what are the sources of class counsel’s role morality? I discuss two: the strictures of class proceedings legislation, and judicial development of rules and guidelines. Throughout the paper, but especially in part III, I rely upon information and frank opinions conveyed to me by the seven judges interviewed for this project in the summer and fall of 2010, and in early 2011. I conclude with proposals for amendment to Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct that would more accurately address the realities of this model of litigation, and thereby provide clearer guidance to lawyers, the clients they serve, and the judges who play such a significant role in the cases that those lawyers prosecute.