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A vast literature has considered the proactive use of law as a tool by progressive social movements, but far less attention has been paid to the way activists respond to involuntary engagement with law as a result of repression and criminalization. This dissertation explores the legal support infrastructure of grassroots protest movements in Canada and the US by tracing the evolution of contemporary activist legal support through two periods. The tactic of jail solidarity and an emerging legal collective model are highlighted as the key features of the global justice organizing era (1999-2005) while in the second age of austerity era (2008-2018), I discuss evolving approaches to law collective work in various protest movements and highlight a renewed focus on anti-repression as a framing praxis of both organizing and legal support. Grounded in my own activist legal support work over more than two decades, this research rests on data arising from detailed interviews and analysis of more than 125 archival documents. I develop two areas of inquiry. First, I trace critiques of movement lawyering in the legal literature to demonstrate that those critiques are often shared by legal support organizers. Divergent opinions on the appropriate role of lawyers and norms of professional ethics in law collective practice reflect long-standing contradictions in progressive lawyering practice. Accordingly, I argue that the legal work of non-lawyer activists ought to be understood as a complementary if also sometimes disruptive model of movement lawyering. Second, I demonstrate that an analysis of radical legal support speaks to the post-arrest experiences of protesters and the impact of such repression on mobilization phenomena largely absent from the literature on state repression of social movements. I consider this dynamic through the lens of legal mobilization, arguing that the pedagogical work of law collectives, understood as a site of social movement knowledge production, plays a significant role in mediating the complex relationship between repression and mobilization. I conclude by exploring the legal consciousness of activist legal support organizers and argue that the education and organizing praxes of law collectives are evidence of a form of prefigurative, counter-hegemonic legality.

The jurisprudential borders of the Canadian state appeared to shift in the aftermath of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of the security certificate provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in early 2007. Yet Charkaoui v. Canada ultimately maintained the contingency of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, re-drawing long-standing divisions along lines of alleged risk, allegiance and origin, despite the emergence of tentative shifts in jurisprudential conceptions of state sovereignty and extra-territoriality. Where previous national security cases involving constitutional rights claims by non-citizens were predicated on a conceptualization of state sovereignty as the right to exclude from territory, reading Charkaoui in the context of four subsequent cases involving the role of Canadian state actors abroad gives rise to the prospect of the Charter operating to delineate and maintain the limits of state sovereignty within and beyond national borders. While the Charter may accompany the extended reach of the Canadian state in some of its guises, it provides only a minimal constraint on the actions of its agents, reinscribing rather than challenging sovereignty. Accordingly, this article argues that the ‘sovereign Charter’ represents a key moment in the evolution of the Canadian state’s national security, immigration and foreign policy strategies, serving to harden the boundaries of the nation, from within and without. By theorizing the doctrinal rules related to the extra-territorial application of the Charter, this article concludes that rights, as reflected in Charkaoui and subsequent caselaw, continue to offer only a limited mode of resistance against sovereign power. Beyond both immigration law’s historical preoccupation with race and the contemporary focus on the ‘war on terror,’ the very notion of rights functions as a discursive and aspirational marker of sovereignty.

This personal narrative reflects on the author’s engagement with Patricia Williams’ The Alchemy of Race and Rights over a period of 15 years encompassing law school, private practice and activist and academic work. In charting the trajectory of the author’s development as a critical legal scholar, the piece highlights the enduring contribution of Williams’ work for those working and writing at the intersections of rights, contentious politics and the law.

Claiming that the criminal justice system fails to effectively prohibit protest and civil disobedience, corporate lawyers embrace the pervasive use of injunctions and contempt of court charges in struggles over resource extraction in British Columbia, dubbing this approach the “new normal.” Yet even a cursory review of protest policing in Canada reveals that state intervention in resistance movements is alive and well and that Indigenous peoples and allied social movements are made subject to repression, surveillance, and criminalization through the mechanism of injunctions and contempt, among other legal tools. Based on my direct experience with injunctions and contempt in BC as an activist legal support organizer and a settler ally, this article argues that the reliance on injunctions by extractive industries embroils the courts and police in struggles over public and/or collectively held lands and resources that are nonetheless constructed by the law as private disputes, largely insulated from the reach of constitutionally-derived Aboriginal rights. After tracing the long history of BC’s “injunction habit,” I examine the judicial and policy practices that make the “new normal” claim possible—and show how it is ultimately not accurate. As crucial tools in the legal arsenal of settler-colonial states, injunctions and the subsequent use of contempt charges carve out a distinctly colonial space within Canadian law for the criminalization of Indigenous resistance, facilitating access to resources and lands and easing the operation of extractive capitalism.

Moments of protest and rebellion have always challenged systems of power and authority, but particularly since the rise of the liberal democratic state, laws and legal institutions have mediated the tensions and contradictions between individuals, social movements, and the existing order. In the Canadian context, the ongoing history of law and social protest has been shaped by the evolution of a legal framework inherited from England but continually altered by the demands of settlement and nation building, and more recently, by constitutional rights guarantees. While criminalization of dissent, particularly of street demonstrations and other forms of collective action, remains a key issue in studies of the relationship between law and protest, law has also become a tool of resistance in itself, either in conjunction with or instead of other forms of mobilization.

In the summer of 1993, Clayoquot Sound, a mostly wilderness area of ancient temperate rainforest on Vancouver Island in British Columbia (BC), became the site of the largest civil disobedience campaign in Canadian history. Almost 900 people were arrested during four months of protests over the fate of Clayoquot Sound's rare ecology, resulting in a series of mass trials unique in Canadian law (Hatch 1994). Although there had been intermittent protests over logging and other resource development in the area for over two decades, particularly by the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation and local environmentalists, a decision by the government of BC in April 1993 to allow clearcut logging in 62 percent of Clayoquot Sound catalyzed the rapid emergence of a preservation movement with both domestic and international dimensions.

Canadian universities’ requests for court orders and police enforcement to clear Palestine solidarity encampments raise questions about the legal status of encampments and the use of injunctions.

There have been 12 injunctions spawned by Coastal GasLink's original injunction on Wet'suwet'en territory, all of them granted over the past 2 ½ weeks in response to solidarity actions across the country in support of the Wet'suwet'en hereditary leadership.

This article centers on the profound discrepancy between efforts by First Nations to obtain injunctions against industry and the state versus the far more successful record of corporations and governments seeking to obtain injunctions against First Nations. We examine how the common law test for injunctions in struggles over lands and resources leads to these results. We begin with the history of injunctions in the Aboriginal law context, especially the development of s. 35(1) jurisprudence which ironically deprived First Nations of access to injunctions, despite an earlier period of successful defence of Indigenous land rights using this legal tool. We then focus on the doctrinal and political function of the “public interest” consideration in injunction cases, locating this concept within a broader political economy framework. Finally, we turn to the origins of the injunction as an equitable remedy and argue that the current imbalance in injunction success rates ought to be understood though a re-examination of equity within a broader historical trajectory of settler-colonial legality. We conclude that the heavy lifting done by notions of ‘public interest’ both relies on and obscures the circumvention and exclusion of Aboriginal treaty and constitutional rights from the law of injunctions and constitutes a de facto resolution of Aboriginal land rights in Canada. Finally, we ask what place, if any, exists in injunction jurisprudence for Indigenous law and governance.

This article centers on the profound discrepancy between efforts by First Nations to obtain injunctions against industry and the state versus the far more successful record of corporations and governments seeking to obtain injunctions against First Nations. We examine how the common law test for injunctions in struggles over lands and resources leads to these results. We begin by tracking the history of injunctions in the Aboriginal law context, especially the development of s 35(1) jurisprudence, which ironically deprived First Nations of access to injunctions, despite an earlier period of successful defence of Indigenous land rights using this legal tool. We then focus on the doctrinal and political function of the “public interest” consideration in injunction cases, positioning this concept within a broader political economy framework. Finally, we turn to the origins of the injunction as an equitable remedy and argue that the current imbalance in injunction success rates ought to be understood through a re-examination of equity within a broader historical trajectory of settler-colonial legality. We conclude that the heavy lifting done by notions of ‘public interest’ both relies on and obscures the circumvention and exclusion of Aboriginal treaty and constitutional rights from the law of injunctions and constitutes a de facto resolution of Aboriginal land rights in Canada. Finally, we ask what place, if any, exists in injunction jurisprudence for Indigenous law and governance.