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This paper emphasizes the importance of cultural competence for tort law by analyzing the Federal Court’s decision in Haj Khalil v. Canada. Given that this symposium in honour of Rose Voyvodic’s life and work is entitled “Re-Imagining Access to Justice,” this paper asks “how do the principles of cultural competence allow us to think about the facts of the Haj Khalil differently. In particular, what would a cause in fact analysis look like if it were informed by the principles of cultural competence?” My analysis proceeds by “reading the silences” or focusing on the unstated assumptions and unexplored elements of Haj Khalil’s story to bring into focus factors relevant to factual causation which remain largely unexplored or undervalued by the Federal Court. An examination of the facts that framed Haj Khalil`s claim against immigration officials through a culturally competent lens would open the possibility of a different understanding of causation as it arises on the facts of the case. While Canadian courts have emphasized the importance of social context for fair judgment, they have not fully come to grips with the implications of social context for judicial decision-making. This is particularly the case within negligence law which remains vexed by the need to maintain an objective standard while simultaneously recognizing the importance of context and circumstance to particular claims.Cet article souligne l’importance de la compétence culturelle pour le droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle en analysant le jugement Haj Khalil c. Canada de la Cour Fédérale. Vu que ce symposium en honneur de la vie et de l’oeuvre de Rose Voyvodic est intitulé « Re-Imagining Access to Justice», cet article pose la question «comment les principes de compétence culturelle nous permettent-ils de concevoir différemment les faits de Haj Khalil. En particulier, comment se présenterait la causalité si l’analyse des faits était éclairée par les principes de compétence culturelle?» Mon analyse s’effectue en «interprétant les silences» ou en portant l’attention sur les suppositions inexprimées et les éléments inexplorés du récit de Haj Khalil afin de mettre au point des facteurs pertinents à la causalité factuelle qui restent en grande partie inexplorés ou sous-évalués par la Cour Fédérale. Un examen des faits sur la base desquels était formulée la réclamation de Haj Khalil contre les officiers de l’immigration dans une optique faisant preuve de compétence culturelle ouvrirait la possibilité d’une compréhension différente de la causalité telle qu’elle se présente basée sur les faits en l’espèce. Quoique les cours canadiennes aient souligné l’importance du contexte social pour des jugements équitables, elles ne sont pas complètement venues aux prises avec les implications du contexte social pour la prise de décision juridique. C’est particulièrement le cas pour le droit de la négligence qui demeure embêté par le besoin de maintenir une norme objective tout en reconnaissant l’importance du contexte et des circonstances d’une réclamation particulière.

This paper presents a particular reading of Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s landmark text, as a lens through which to consider the meaning of international texts in domestic contexts. His thoughts have remained virtually unknown within international human rights law but is highly relevant to accommodating variations in interpretation between national jurisdiction.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for a more active role for women in the prevention and reconciliation of conflicts. Focusing on the Palestinian Right of Return and the work of a feminist organization called the Jerusalem Link, this paper examines Resolution 1325’s premise that women can make a unique contribution to peace building. As “transfer” or the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza looms on the horizon, scholars, advocates, and policy-makers must pay more attention to the work of women peace-builders because they might be able to help chart a path towards a real and just solution on seemingly intractable issues such as the Right of Return.

Almost seventy years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the birth of Israel, and the beginning of the Palestinian naqba (all in 1948) it is now clear that international law has fallen short of its promise to alleviate suffering, hold transgressors to account, and to encourage peace in the Middle East. Even John Humphrey, a drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, came to despair the efficacy of international law in Israel and Palestine. “He went there thinking that the proper application of the rule of law and respect for human rights could resolve the situation and came back thinking nothing could (since the debate was not a rational one)” (Hobbins 2006). Taking Humphrey’s despair over international law’s ability to guide behaviour in Israel and Palestine as its starting point and drawing on Stanley Cohen’s landmark book, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, this chapter argues that international law has fed into a process of denial maintenance in Israel, creating the backdrop against which Israeli leaders deny Palestinian suffering.

This chapter identifies the intersecting ways in which Israeli approaches to international law are structured around Cohen's three main modes of denial-factual, interpretive, and implicatory-to silence or deflect responsibility for Palestinian suffering. It argues that international law has fed into a process of denial maintenance in Israel, creating the backdrop against which Israeli leaders deny Palestinian suffering. Israel's attitude towards the use of phosphorus as a military weapon compared with its attitude towards stone throwing is striking. The military court's response appears sincere when it emphasises the great risks posed by Palestinian children and youth with stones. The chapter suggests that international law, with its emphasis on domestic implementation, self-reporting, and shaming proves largely ineffective in states of denial. Cohen observes that interpretive denial, in part because it requires familiarity with law and legal concepts and in part because it suggests concern for human rights, can prove more difficult to counter than literal or factual denial.

This paper analyzes the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center). Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif’s ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Bombardier had discriminated against him. While there is much to celebrate in the Court’s reasons, the decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this paper seeks to excavate Latif’s fuller story largely through a reading of silences. The Tribunal advanced two discrete but intersecting theories in its finding of discrimination. The Court focused, artificially, on one and found “no evidence” of discrimination. The Supreme Court not only ended Captain Latif’s quest for a remedy, it re-wrote his narrative by moving attention away from key facts involving his interactions with Bombardier. The Court’s chosen narrative also regulated the collective fears and aspirations of Muslim communities in Canada to the realm of the unsaid. At a time when Muslims are struggling to counter popular and official stereotypes that construct them as incorrigible barbarians and outsiders who are prone to terrorism and violence, it is important to create spaces for counter-narratives to be heard and lived experiences to be validated. Moreover, litigants who dedicate years of their lives to advancing social justice causes deserve the dignity of recognizing their own stories when relayed back to them by the legal process. The comparison of the Court’s reasons with that of the Tribunal thus represents a political act of hearing counter-narratives while also critically analyzing the Supreme Court’s claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination.

Law serves as the site through which Canada expresses its commitment to the global war effort, showing its willingness to suspend the rights of citizens and non-citizens alike in the name of national and international security. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, for example, Canada legislated for the internment of individuals with Japanese ancestry, confiscated their property, stripped them of citizenship and deported them to Japan, even if they did not have concrete ties to that country. Canadian history has demonstrated that one cannot understand the demarcation between those who are imagined to belong to the community and those who are constructed as ‘foreigners’ simply on the basis of citizenship. Rather, the demarcation has also historically been constructed along racial lines. In times of war, the law speaks loudly and clearly against those who are regarded as undesirable, untrustworthy and foreign.

Tort law can only deliver justice if decision-makers exercise cultural competence; one cannot see the true suffering of the other by looking through a uni-cultural lens. A uni-cultural lens blurs the differences between people’s lived experiences and obscures the decision-maker’s capacity to understand the suffering of others, thereby silencing that suffering. This silencing in turn undermines the aims of tort law. This paper emphasizes the importance of cultural competence for tort law by analyzing the Federal Court’s 2007 decision in Haj Khalil v. Canada. The Federal Court held that immigration officials did not owe a duty of care to Haj Khalil and could not be held accountable for the unreasonable delay in processing her application for permanent residency. It also ruled that the delay could not have caused her losses. I conclude that an examination of the facts that framed Haj Khalil`s claim against immigration officials through a culturally competent lens would open the possibility of a different understanding of causation as it arises on the facts of the case.

Even if they did not procure or otherwise contribute to the torture of nationals abroad, Canadian officials owe Canadian nationals a positive duty to prevent torture overseas. This duty is non-delegable in nature.