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In Anglo-American legal discourse, the juridical subject of dispute resolution has traditionally been conceived as a bearer of rights or a bearer of interests: rights, in the model of liberal legalism that regards adjudication (i.e. court and tribunal processes) to be the preferred means of resolving disputes in the adversarial tradition; or interests, in an alternative or complementary model that regards consensual dispute resolution (i.e. negotiated and mediated settlement processes) to be the preferred means of resolving disputes in the non-adversarial tradition. This article explores the ethical implications of reframing the bearer of interests as a bearer of desires. This is more than just semantics. Reconceiving the juridical subject in this way invokes the contemporary tradition of progressive social theory that has centered the concept of desire in its critique of the liberal humanist subject. This critique has yet to be fully explored in the legal scholarship. One of the most productive lines of argument in this tradition is derived from queer theory – in particular, a strand of post-identitarian thinking in queer theory that regards sexual desire as something that is disruptive of ontology regardless of gender or sexual identity. This strand of thinking raises important questions in this context. Is it possible to theorize juridical subjectivity as a form of sexual subjectivity? What follows from such an effort to “queer” the constitution of the juridical subject, independent from its politicized identity as a bearer of rights in liberal legalism? Could this theory teach us something about the ethics of rights and interests-based dispute resolution processes?This paper argues that theorizing about the juridical subject of dispute resolution through the lens of sexual desire encourages us to think about the practice of settlement non-instrumentally, not unlike sexuality itself, which reveals the practice to be immune to the liberal legal imperatives of politicized identity. This is what makes it a fitting analogue for the trope of sexual freedom in queer theory, which opens up a pressing line of criticism about legal policy initiatives that have sought to limit, and in some cases categorically ban the use of consensual dispute resolution altogether. At the same time, however, this theory raises difficult questions about the ethics of sexual desire given the risk that consent to sex and settlement may be induced by coercive force. This helps us to understand the proper role of law – and specifically, the legal doctrine of consent – in regulating the conduct of these practices, or at least to understand it as something deeply fraught with uncertainty.
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14 — Notes and Comments
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Legal scholars have long discussed the Supreme Court of Canada’s (”the Court”) erasure of race in its Charter jurisprudence. The lack of recognition is particularly noticeable in the Court’s jurisprudence on policing. It is well-established that African-Canadians and Indigenous people are disproportionately detained, arrested and charged by police, and thereby overrepresented in the criminal process. Criminologists and legal scholars largely agree that biased policing is one of the primary conduits through which Black, Indigenous and other racialized bodies are funnelled into the criminal justice system. Despite this fact, the Court has only ever marginally engaged in a race-based analysis of the Charter rights that are engaged by police encounters. In R. v. Le, the Court may have potentially lifted the judicial embargo on the discussion of race and biased policing; and, in so doing made a significant and much needed, contribution to critical race Charter litigation. The precedential impact of Le is challenging to predict, but there is reason to hope that Le will provide a veritable roadmap for lawyers who are seeking to mobilize race in the detention analysis under s. 9 of the Charter.
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Beverley McLachlin is the architect of a flexible, socially conscious and principled approach to evidence admissibility in Canada. Her jurisprudence has infused the law of evidence with tools that enable it to adapt to new situations, to be aware of and reflect concerns for systemic issues all with an eye to ensuring it can fulfill its regulatory purpose of facilitating justice. I call this the McLachlin principle. This chapter explores the foundations of that approach in two early McLachlin decisions: R v Khan; R v Seaboyer; and then, as Chief Justice, in Mitchell v MNR where she set out, for the first time in a Supreme Court decision, a theory of evidence admissibility. After examining this evidence trilogy, the chapter will consider the application of the McLachlin principle in the context of defence applications to limit cross-examination of an accused on their prior criminal record under R v Corbett. Section 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act permits all witnesses, including an accused, to be cross-examined on their criminal record and our common law has, for the most part uncritically, accepted that a criminal record is relevant to a witness’s credibility and whether they are prepared to abide by their oath or affirmation. In Corbett, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of section 12(1) by reading into the provision a judicial discretion to prohibit or limit cross-examination on a prior record. Corbett was decided in 1988 and since then we have become more aware of the existence and manifestations of systemic racism, particularly as it relates to Indigenous and Black communities and the criminal justice system. Chief Justice McLachlin recognized this social reality in both Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) and R v Williams. Despite this consciousness, little, if any, attention has been given in our trial and appellate courts to how social conditions and bias are relevant in thinking about admissibility under Corbett. Enter the McLachlin principle.The chapter examines how it can be used to impact Corbett applications and stimulate future consideration of how evidence law can adapt to better facilitate justice in cases involving Indigenous and racialized participants.
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