Your search

In what follows I make five points that are potential ‘hot spots’, or are implications that flow from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 [hereafter Bhasin]. They are presented in no particular order, but, in making these comments I am reminded of the comment: “He who lives by the crystal ball soon learns to eat ground glass” (Edgar R. Fiedler in The Three Rs of Economic Forecasting-Irrational, Irrelevant and Irreverent).

Criminalization of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships must form a central part of the human rights agenda for achieving gender equality. According to a study by the United Nations Secretary-General, “[t]he most common form of violence experienced by women globally is intimate partner violence” including “a range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts.” The World Health Organization reports that nearly one in four women in some countries may experience sexual violence perpetrated against them by an intimate partner. Other research suggests that approximately 40% of all assaulted women are forced into sex at one time or another by their male partners.

Ending the marital rape exemption in criminal law is a demand for legal equality and autonomy for women, rights that are enshrined in international human rights law. Drawing on international human rights law as a source of authority for challenging the marital rape exception in criminal law allows feminist and other social justice organizations, within their specific national and local contexts, to seek greater state action and accountability toward ending this form of violence against women and this violation of women’s human rights. In this reply, we challenge the arguments in the symposium that oppose or caution against criminalizing sexual violence in intimate relationships as a necessary legal strategy, and that refute our view that ending the marital rape exemption is required by international human rights law.

This volume of the Oñati Socio-legal Series consists of revised versions of 15 of the 20 papers presented at a workshop hosted by the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law (IISL) in May 2013. The workshop took its theme from Stéphane Hessel’s cri de coeur, Indignez-vous! and the protest movements it inspired, which we saw as protests against the social inequality that necessarily follows from economic inequality and other power imbalances. This message continues to resonate. In 2015, for example, Oxfam International’s research paper entitled “Wealth: Having it all and wanting more” concludes that by 2016, the world’s richest 1% will have more of the world’s wealth than all of the remaining 99% of people. And a Canadian observer decries the effect of this – which he labels “trickle-down meanness” – on the socio-political fabric of a country.Because of the breadth of the workshop theme and the diversity of its participants – which included a critical mass of doctrinal legal scholars in the mix – participants were asked to choose topics which 1) raised their indignation, 2) reflected economic inequality, 3) led to a violation of socio-economic rights, and 4) involved a possible role for the law (or public policy) either in causing the violation or in providing a solution to it (or both). The papers in this volume show that the participants responded enthusiastically to this request. Este número de la revista Oñati Socio-legal Series recoge las versiones revisadas de 15 de las 20 ponencias que se presentaron en el workshop celebrado en el Instituto Internacional de Sociología Jurídica de Oñati (IISJ), en mayo de 2013. El tema del workshop giró alrededor del lema de Stéphane Hessel, Indignez-vous! y los movimientos de protesta que inspiró, que percibimos como protestas contra la desigualdad social que resulta inevitablemente de la desigualdad económica y otros desequilibrios de poder. Este mensaje sigue resonando. En 2015, por ejemplo, una investigación de Oxfam Internacional titulada “Wealth: Having it all and wanting more” (Riqueza: Tenerlo todo y querer más), concluye que en 2016, el 1% de la población mundial poseerá más riqueza que el 99% restante. Y un observador canadiense condena sus consecuencias -que él denomina “goteo de mezquindad”- en el tejido socio-político de un país. Debido a la amplitud del tema del workshop y la diversidad de sus participantes -que incluía una masa crítica de expertos en doctrinas legales- se pidió a los participantes que eligieran temas que 1) les indignaran, 2) reflejasen desigualdad económica, 3), diesen lugar a una violación de los derechos socioeconómicos, y 4) que implicasen un posible papel del derecho (o políticas públicas) tanto por causar el daño u ofrecer una solución al problema (o ambos). Los artículos de este volumen demuestran que los participantes respondieron con entusiasmo a esta solicitud. DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572253

Sylvia McAdam, 2015 20-1 Justice as Healing, 2015 CanLIIDocs 257

As has long been recognized, the contract of employment depends on the commodification of labour power. Notwithstanding debates amongst political theorists and trade union activists about whether individuals should be viewed as self-owners, and whether it is possible to sell one’s capabilities without selling one’s self, the law does treat labour power as a commodity. There has been little research on the ways in which the law does so, however, for the simple reason that self-ownership of one’s laboring capacities is often taken as fact, as the starting premise for analysis, and treated as a necessary pre-condition for individual self-realization through contract. Moreover, proprietary and contractual forms of regulating work are often presented as diametrically opposed: a proprietary method of labour regulation is said to create a relationship of slavery, while contract is presented as an institution of choice. This paper argues that an analysis of labour power as property, and its relationship to contract, emphasizes that both contract and property are enmeshed in the legal regulation of waged employment. Examining the ways in which the courts have given shape to individuals' proprietary rights over their labour power, and have set the terms for its exchange, demonstrates that the limitations on employer's rights of control are not inherent to the contractual form. Instead, they often depend on wider social processes, such as production and labour processes, collective bargaining, and statutory regulation. Examining proprietary rights over labour power provides another window onto the malleability of the contractual form, and the degree to which political choices are made by courts and legislators in determining the terms of the employment contract. This paper therefore investigates the relationship between contract, and labour power as property. To do so the historical evolution of contractual limitations on employers’ rights of control will be canvassed, and the ways in which these limitations are now fraying. In particular, the development of the managerial prerogative from a property to a contract-based interest is described, and the ways in which concepts of working-time have operated, in theory, to separate in law the commodification of labour power from the commodification of self. Finally, the paper concludes by examining the ways in which these limiting mechanisms are beginning to disappear, as collective bargaining protections dissipate and the statutory protections are rolled back.