Your search

One of the greatest controversies in contemporary copyright law is the introduction of technological protection measures (TPMs) at the international and national level. By creating a separate parallel regime for digital copyright works, TPMs shifted the paradigm by redefining the rules of engagement of how users would increasingly access and experience digital copyright works.

The presence of a physical object (a book, DVD, CD) plays a determinant role in how information products (e.g., commercial copies of computer programs, books, musical recordings, video games, and virtual worlds) are regulated, in contrast with copies of similar information products with no physical embodiment. The presence of a physical object influences how law makers distinguish goods from services, to define a contract of sale or license, to apply the first sale doctrine in copyright law, and to determine which acts reserved to copyright holders are involved in a commercial transaction. In this article, I argue that the emphasis on a physical object is to a large extent arbitrary, leads to double standards, legal and normative incoherence, and ultimately that it is detrimental to recipients of information products and copyright user rights.

The primary goal of this article is to look at the property attributes of copyright to inform a more nuanced understanding of the nature of copyright that emphasizes its distinct character. I resort primarily to James W. Harris' theory in Property and Justice, and in particular, on the insights that his characterization of property as the twin manifestation of trespassory rules and of an ownership spectrum, bring to the understanding of copyright. While copyright holders' right to exclude has been a focal point in copyright theory, looking at copyright through trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum allows me to discern two distinct yet interrelated property interests that bring a more refined understanding of the property attributes of copyright.

In this article, I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or users' rights. Are exceptions to copyright infringement rights or privileges? Are they mandatory? While copyright users' rights and interests have triggered interest and debate amongst scholars, relatively less attention has been given to defining their precise nature, and on the consequences of the main characteristics of exceptions to copyright infringement on copyright law and policy. I examine the interplay between the users' rights set out in the Copyright Act and how they can be altered or overridden by non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and TPMs. To this end, I refer to a sample of non-negotiated standard terms of use for the online distribution of books, musical recordings and films. I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, including through Hohfeld's theory of jural correlatives. I look at the policy considerations behind these questions and conclude by reflecting on the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users' rights on the coherence and, ultimately, the legitimacy of copyright law.

In this article, the author investigates the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or users' rights as they are laid out in Canada's Copyright Act and in copyright jurisprudence, as well as through their interaction with contracts and technological protection measures. The author begins his analysis with four exceptions to copyright infringement that were added to the Copyright Act in 2012 (i.e., the non-commercial user-generated content, the reproduction for private purposes, the later listening or viewing, and the backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement) with a particular focus on their relevance for consumers and their relation to pre-existing users' rights. The author investigates the nature of these exceptions, including through Hohfeld's theory of jural correlatives. He looks at the policy considerations behind these questions and conclude his article by reflecting on the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users' rights on the coherence and, ultimately, the legitimacy of copyright law.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. Part One of this paper laid out the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. Part Two applies the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted work, as well as its justifications. It explores the ramifications of copyright acting as a property-limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

The number of lawyers who practice law in-house has significantly increased over the last thirty years in North America. While in this part of the world, in-house counsel are regulated in the same manner as outside counsel by their professional bars, the recent decision by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. European Communities, reminds us that other parts of the world treat in-house counsel very differently. This paper analyses the justifications for a similar treatment of in-house counsel and outside counsel by the legal profession. While a detailed contextual analysis of in-house counsel’s functions reveals a likelihood of greater vulnerability in their ability to balance them with various ethical and professional duties, it also shows that outside counsel face similar ethical dilemmas that may vary in degree or in nature. The similar regulation of in-house and outside counsel is consistent with a poor articulation by the legal profession of the scope of the duty of professional independence from the client. And yet such duty exists. As it can conflict with paramount professional obligations, including the duty of loyalty to the client, its scope is controversial. Leaving the duty of professional independence from the client largely undefined is harmful to in-house and also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public interest. In-house counsel are in a privileged position to provide legal services in accordance with fundamental values of the legal profession. As such, their contribution needs to be better recognized and promoted. Generally, regulatory reform is necessary to nurture in-house counsel’s ability to provide legal services as integral members of the bar, while minimizing the risks that the privileged proximity to their clients present. Such reform will inevitably benefit outside counsel who face comparable issues. A clearer articulation of the meaning and scope of the duty of professional independence from the client, together with tangible mechanisms to actualize it, will provide greater support to in-house and outside counsel to better understand and integrate their various ethical and professional duties within their role. It will also benefit all interested parties.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. In Part One of this paper ((2010) 23 I.P.J. 83) I lay out the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. In this Part Two, I apply the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted work, as well as its justifications. I also explore the ramifications of copyright acting as a property limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. Part One of this paper lays the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. Part Two applies the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted works as well as its justifications. It explores the ramifications of copyright acting as a property-limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. Part One of this paper lays the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. Part Two applies the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted works, as well as its justifications. It explores the ramifications of copyright acting as a property limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

THE issue of retroactive application of the ‘New York Convention of 1958 on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards'’1 has already been raised in a number of cases and articles. While the latter tend to agree that the Convention was meant to apply retroactively2 the former show somewhat less homogeneity on that question.3 Nevertheless, this issue remains very much alive with respect to the ever increasing number of states acceding to the Convention. In the last five years, 50 new states have become parties to the Convention, raising the total number to 83 member states.4The Convention contains no explicit reference to its retroactive application nor is its history conclusive on this issue.5 Some implementing statutes of the Convention deal expressly with its temporal application. Indeed, at least five of them state expressly a date from which the Convention is applicable.6 On the other hand, at least two others state expressly that the Convention applies without any restriction in time.7