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This paper analyzes the constitutionality of the Law Society of Ontario’s (now repealed) Statement of Principles requirement. First, this paper conducts a statutory analysis of the requirement. It explains how the requirement merely obligated that licensees acknowledge extant professional and human rights obligations, rather than creating novel obligations. Second, this paper conducts a theoretical analysis of the requirement. It applies a critical race theory lens to unveil the ways in which liberty claims relating to free speech obscured how significant resistance to the requirement’s modest obligation was galvanized by opposition to diversity and denial of systemic racism. Third, this paper conducts a constitutional analysis of the requirement. It explains why the requirement did not violate freedom of conscience or freedom of expression. In contrast with prior scholarship, this paper argues that the Statement of Principles requirement failed every stage of the legal test that designates state activity as compelled speech. Specifically, the requirement failed to compel an expression with non-trivial meaning (Step 1) and failed to control free expression in Canada, when such control is properly construed through a purposive rather than colloquial lens (Step 2). This paper concludes by noting how the requirement’s self-drafted structure provided an innovative opportunity for licensees to reflect on their perhaps unwitting participation in systemic racism.
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington PDF Version: (Dis)Proving Racism: A Rebuttal to Klippenstein’s Critical Review of the Law Society of Ontario’s Report on Challenges Facing Racialized Licensees Document …
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Volume 51, Issue 1
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington PDF Version: Confusing Equality with Tyranny: Repealing the Statement of Principles Matter Commented on: Law Society of Ontario Statement of Principles Tomorrow, the Law…
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Colour, as a ground of discrimination, is usually equated with or subsumed under the ground of race. We argue that colour does and should have a discrete role in human rights and equality cases because it highlights certain hierarchies and forms of marginalization unaddressed by the ground of race. To support this argument, we first explore the concepts of “race” and “colour” and their relationship to one another, as well as the harms done by discrimination based on colour. Then, after a brief review of the use of race and colour in international and domestic instruments, we examine American anti-discrimination employment cases to learn from that country’s experience with separating the race and colour grounds of discrimination. We then turn to the emerging Canadian jurisprudence recognizing a distinct role for the colour ground and examine the possible consequences of that recognition.
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Joshua Sealy-Harrington, Jonnette Watson Hamilton, 2018 7-1 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 1, 2018 CanLIIDocs 106
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and David Rennie PDF Version: Making Sense of Aboriginal and Racialized Sentencing Cases Commented On: R v Laboucane, 2016 ABCA 176 (CanLII); R v Kreko, 2016 ONCA 367 (C…
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Marita Zouravlioff PDF Version: Trinity Western Decision Fails to Clarify Approach to Balancing Conflicting Charter Rights Case Commented On: Trinity Western Univers…
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In R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22 the Supreme Court of Canada split on whether the criminal offence of bestiality requires “penetration.” The majority judgment held that bestiality requires penetration and, on that basis, held that a dog licking a vagina is not bestiality. In contrast, the dissenting judgment held that bestiality does not require penetration and, accordingly, held that a dog licking a vagina is bestiality. In this post, we first summarize the factual and legislative background in DLW and the reasons of the majority and dissenting judgments. Second, we critique the majority judgment for: (1) its unpersuasive reliance on judicial deference; and (2) its overstated claim that “buggery” (the precursor to bestiality) had a clear meaning. Lastly, we critique both the majority and dissenting judgments for their reliance on: (1) imprecise sexual terms which fail to bring clarity to bestiality law; and (2) an unimaginative privileging of cisgender, procreative heterosexuality that perpetuates harmfully conservative understandings of human sexuality.
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Joe McGrade PDF Version: Good Kid, M.A.D.D. City: Seeking Proportionality in Drunk Driving Sentencing Cases Commented On: R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R v Sargent, 2016…
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington PDF Version: Mastery or Misogyny? The Ghomeshi Judgment and Sexual Assault Reform Case Commented On: R v Ghomeshi, 2016 ONCJ 155 On March 24, 2016, Justice Horkins of th…
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Tara Russell PDF Version: Parks and Tribulation: Chartering the Territory of Homeless Camping Rights Case Commented On: Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909 In…
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Ashton Menuz PDF Version: Keep It To Yourself: The Private Use Exception for Child Pornography Offences Case Commented On: R v Barabash, 2015 SCC 29 Last month, the …
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By: Joshua-Sealy Harrington PDF Version: Can the Homeless Find Shelter in the Courts? Case Commented On: Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852 Late in 2014, the Ontario Court of Appe…
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The inventive concept in patent law, central to the Supreme Court’s test for whether a patent is invalid because of obviousness, lacks clarity. This article discusses that lack of clarity with reference to the vague and inconsistent treatment of the inventive concept in the jurisprudence of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada. In particular, this article discusses two unanswered questions: whether the inventive concept is a necessary part of the obviousness inquiry and what the inventive concept actually means. In answering the second question, this article explores three discrete stages in the evolution of the inventive concept: (1) the genesis of the inventive concept in Canadian jurisprudence in Apotex Plavix; (2) a notable dialogue regarding the interpretation of the inventive concept between the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex Combigan; and (3) the persisting confusion surrounding the current meaning of the inventive concept. This article concludes by urging appellate courts to provide clearer guidance with respect to the significance and meaning of the inventive concept.
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By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington PDF Version: Jiangho Unchained: A Discussion of the Narrative and Commentary Surrounding the Jian Ghomeshi Scandal The recent scandal surrounding Jian Ghomeshi’s dismiss…
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