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Is litigating the best interests of a child a contradiction in terms? This portfolio dissertation asks this question with regard to child custody and access disputes, in which separated parents contest for the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. It is axiomatic that children's interests are doctrinally supreme when their parents litigate about them, but do civil procedure and settlement practices in these cases also put children first? The dissertation responds to this research query using quantitative and qualitative empirical methodology. It draws both on a statistical analysis of reported cases and on the author's interviews of family law professionals in Toronto and New York City. The empirical findings are contextualized in a review of the relevant doctrine and scholarship from the legal and mental health disciplines. The first two articles make positive and normative claims about custody and access litigation in developed common-law jurisdictions; the remaining three focus on the settlement-seeking procedures which family courts apply to these cases. The Conclusion to the Portfolio draws from the articles to argue that, while litigating the best interest of a child is not a contradiction in terms in every custody or access case, the contours of the existing system are more reflective of adult interests and resource constraints than they are of children's interests. A family court is necessarily a civil justice system in the common law tradition, and can therefore only ever be a weak and inefficient servant of children's interests. However, the Portfolio does call for a cost-neutral procedural reform in the shape of a "grand bargain" between judges and parents. If parents yield power to judges within the adjudicative courtroom, and if judges in turn yield power to parents within the settlement-seeking conference room, the system will be brought more in line with its noble aspiration to pursue the best interests of the children involved.

How much does it cost individual Canadians to seek civil justice? This article compiles empirical data about the monetary, temporal, and psychological costs confronting individual justice-seekers in this country. The article suggests that analysis of private costs can improve access to justice in two ways. First, it can help public sector policy-makers to reduce these costs. Second, it can help lawyers and entrepreneurs to identify new, affordable ways to reduce the costs that are most onerous to individuals with different types of civil legal need.

‘Abysmal’ was the word used to describe the accessibility of Canadian civil justice in a recent major report. Access to justice is simultaneously a social problem, a professional obligation for the legal profession, and a market opportunity for law firms. Are there any signs of significant progress on any of these fronts? This short Correspondent's report will review recent Canadian efforts to connect people of modest means with the expert legal services they urgently need.

In common law Northern Europe and in Australasia, a wave of reform has been transforming legal services regulation since roughly 1980. Old structures and approaches, based on the principles of professionalism and lawyer independence, are being replaced in these jurisdictions by new ones that prioritize competition and consumer interests. In the United States this has conspicuously not happened, leaving intact a regulatory approach whose broad outlines have changed little in the past 100 years.

High prices and lack of innovation have placed expert legal services beyond the reach of too many Americans and Canadians. Is legal services regulation exacerbating common law North America’s access to justice problem? Does regulatory maintenance of a unified legal profession, and insulation of that profession from non-lawyer influence, make it more difficult for people here to meet their legal needs? This article argues that, although regulatory liberalization is not a magic bullet for the accessibility of justice, there is strong evidence of a link between regulation and access. North American lawyer regulators need to understand, and work to reduce, the effects of their policies on the accessibility of justice.

This paper considers the different types of challenges that technological innovation poses to the Legal Services Act 2007’s regulatory framework, and whether the framework is capable of supporting technological innovation that benefits consumers while also addressing the risks it poses to them.The paper makes some recommendations about how the current regime could be adapted to better address these challenges, but its overall conclusion is that the LSA regime remains capable, for the time being, of responding to them.

Research paper prepared for the Law Commission of Ontario.

When lawyers elect the leaders of their self-regulatory organizations, what sort of people do they vote for? How do the selection processes for elite lawyer sub-groups affect the diversity and efficacy of those groups? This article quantitatively assesses the demographic and professional diversity of leadership in the Law Society of Upper Canada.

This article proposes a theoretical foundation for measuring legal service value. It aims to support efforts to compare the value of offerings from different law firms, as well as alternative legal service providers. The value of any legal service depends on (i) its effectiveness, (ii) its affordability, (iii) the experience it creates for its clients, and (iv) third party effects (the impact the service-provider has on people other than the client). These four elements of value can be quantified through various metrics applied to firms or entities that provide a given service. Output metrics evaluate either the actual real-world impact of a legal service service, or the written and oral work products of the firm. Internal metrics check for processes or structures within a firm that demonstrably support high value outputs. Input metrics focus on the attributes and credentials of the individuals who provide the service.This article concludes that measuring legal service value is challenging, and may be dangerous if done poorly. Nevertheless, the rewards justify the challenge. Higher quality legal professionalism, more effective and less burdensome regulation, and consumer empowerment are among the payoffs if we can find better ways to measure legal service value.

A life-evaluation question asks a person to quantify his or her overall satisfaction with life, at the time when the question is asked. If the goal of public policy is to make individuals’ lives better, does it follow that maximizing aggregate life-evaluations constitutes policy success? This paper argues that life-evaluation data provides a solid basis for welfare-consequentialist policy-making. This is illustrated by the successful argument for expanding state-funded mental health services in the United Kingdom.However, life-evaluations do not always provide a complete account of individual welfare. Policy-makers therefore must sometimes inquire into the extent to which individuals’ preferences would be fulfilled, if different policies were to be adopted. This article proposes synthesizing life-evaluationist and preferentist data about individual welfare, as a basis for rational policy-making.

"Personal plight" is the sector of the legal services industry in which the clients are individuals, and the legal needs arise from disputes. This article proposes that competition among personal plight law firms is suppressed by three demand-side phenomena. First, consumers confront high search costs. Identifying competing law firms willing and able to provide the needed services often requires significant expenditure of temporal and psychological resources. Second, comparable price and quality information about firms is scarce for consumers. Both of these factors impede comparison shopping and reduce competitive pressure on firms. A third competition-suppressing factor is observed in tort legal service markets, where offerings are typically priced on a contingency basis. Contingency fees have relatively low salience to consumers, and this reduces consumers' willingness to negotiate and comparison-shop on the basis of price. This analysis is supported by the author's empirical research with Ontario personal plight lawyers as well as the existing literature. The article concludes by suggesting possible consequences of this analysis for regulatory policy.

Innovation in family law firms can tangibly improve access to justice in Canada. This article develops that claim by drawing on empirical data and scholarship about Canadian family law. Part 1 explains how and why legal needs arising from the dissolution of intimate relationships are so difficult for the parties to meet. This Part draws on civil legal needs surveys, surveys with lawyers, and data from interviews with litigants. The focus shifts to family law firms (including sole practitioners) in Part 2, using new empirical data about the Canadian lawyers who do this work. Three promising opportunities to innovate for accessibility in family law practice are identified: (i) innovative fee structure; (ii) innovative service variety; and (iii) innovative division of labour. A "third revolution" in Canadian family law is proposed in Part 3. Our family law doctrine was revolutionized beginning in the 1960s, and family law alternative dispute resolution was similarly transfigured beginning in the 1980s. It is now time to foment a third revolution, in family law practice accessibility, to bring the benefits of family justice to all Canadians who need them.

Forthcoming, The Political Quarterly.This article is about two ideologies. Welfare-consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximize aggregate welfare. Populism states that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and holds that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human well-being.I argue that welfare-consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism’s claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare-consequentialist government. Finally, welfare-consequentialism’s sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism’s dark story has proven to be.

This article asks which individuals should count in welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy. Possible answers to this question fall along a spectrum between parochial and inclusive. The most parochial impartial answer is that only welfare effects experienced by the living human subjects of a government should be considered in analysis of its policy options. At the other end of the spectrum, the most inclusive answer would be that welfare impacts on all individuals who are capable of having welfare should be weighed equally. A two-level response to the “who counts” question is proposed. A specification of welfare-consequentialism serving as an ethical ideal might give equal weight to non-human individuals, to foreigners, and to the unborn. However, a welfare-consequentialist decision procedure must take into account the error-proneness of human analysts’ welfare predictions. Predictions of a policy’s welfare impacts on individuals who are more dissimilar from the predicting government are more likely to be wrong, compared to predictions regarding living human subjects. The paper concludes by considering alternative answers to the “who counts” questions that might minimize the combined rate of exclusion and misprediction errors.

What does access to justice have to do with legal services regulation? Can we make it easier for people to defend their legal rights and pursue social justice by liberalizing rules about the provision of legal services? This brief paper will begin by reviewing the economic argument that legal services regulation impedes access to justice. Although this argument has strong appeal in theory, deregulatory reforms have not always delivered their accessibility benefits which the economic critique promises. Moreover, economic criticism of legal services regulation tends to assume that lawyers are simply market actors, as opposed to members of an independent profession whose maintenance has value to clients and to the public. The paper will therefore conclude by suggesting that empirical inquiry using a new legal realist (NLR) methodology can make a constructive contribution to this debate.

Populist candidates and causes have scored a series of remarkable victories in Europe and the Americas since 2015. It is too soon to say whether we are living in a populist “moment,” or at the dawn of a new populist age. It is not, however, too soon to think carefully about the consequences of populism for public policy. Nor is it too soon to consider policy decisions by non-populist governments today that might affect the likelihood that this will be only a moment and not an age.This paper considers the relationship between two ideologies: welfare-consequentialism and populism. Welfare-consequentialism, reviewed in Part 1, holds that governments should always try to adopt the policies that are most likely to make individuals’ lives go best. Part 2 juxtaposes it with populism, defined as the view that (i) society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and (ii) public policy should give effect to the general will of the pure people (Mudde 2004). The paper then argues that welfare-consequentialism and populism are diametrically opposed ideologies. They are fundamentally incompatible in their representations of “the people,” and in the weight they give to public opinion. Populism’s anti-elitism may sometimes be reconciled with welfare-consequentialism, but not in the many cases where it takes the form of anti-intellectualism. Part 3 concludes by asking whether, in the long-term, welfare-consequentialism makes a polity more or less vulnerable to populism.

If custody and access disputes are a deck of cards, the trump suit is the best interests of the child. When separating parents litigate about how and with whom their child should live, findings about what’s best for the child are meant to sweep away the parents’ interests and rights-claims. This principle is uncontroversial, but applying it is difficult. What parenting arrangements are best for children, and how successful is the legal system in putting these arrangements in place?

North American family law conflicts are very often brought to mediation, in which a neutral third party attempts to bring about a voluntary resolution of the spouses’ dispute. Family mediation has many enthusiastic supporters, and has in many jurisdictions been made a mandatory precursor to traditional litigation. However, it has also given rise to a potent feminist critique, which identifies power imbalance and domestic violence as sources of exploitation and unjust mediated outcomes. This article summarizes the feminist critique of family mediation, and assesses the efforts of contemporary mediation practice to respond to it. Even in the absence of formal family mediation, litigating spouses are likely to be subjected to substantial informal pressure to settle from judges and other family justice system workers. The article argues that the feminist critique might be more relevant to this “settlement mission” than it is to formal family mediation as it is practiced today.

Commentators have predicted that machine intelligence and off-shoring will steadily undermine demand for lawyers in North America and Europe. This essay argues that this prediction is not equally valid for all types of legal practice. Personal plight practice — in which lawyers help individuals and small businesses involved in legal disputes — is largely sheltered from computerization and off-shoring. The article calls for the profession and legal educators to open doors between tomorrow’s lawyers and personal plight legal practice. Doing so will not only address the economic insecurity confronting tomorrow’s lawyers, but also enhance access to justice.