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"In The Life and Death of Freedom of Expression, Richard Moon argues that freedom of expression is valuable because human agency and identity emerge in discourse--in the joint activity of creating meaning. Moon recognizes that the social character of individual agency and identity is crucial to understanding not only the value of expression but also its potential for harm. The book considers a range of issues, including the regulation of advertising, hate speech, pornography, blasphemy, and public protest. The book also considers the shift to social media as the principal platform for public engagement, which has added to the ways in which speech can be harmful, while undermining the effectiveness of traditional legal responses to harmful speech. The Life and Death of Freedom of Expression makes the case that the principal threat to public discourse may no longer be censorship, but rather the spread of disinformation, which undermines public trust in traditional sources of information and makes engagement between different positions and groups increasingly difficult."-- Provided by publisher

The regulations in Alberta dealing with driver’s licenses were amended in 2003 to require that all license holders be photographed. The license holder’s photo would appear on his or her license and be included in a facial recognition data bank maintained by the province. Prior to this change, the regulations had permitted the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to grant an exemption to an individual who, for religious reasons, objected to having her or his photo taken. Members of the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, who believe that the Second Commandment prohibits the making of photographic images, had been exempted from the photo requirement under old regulations, but were required under the new law to be photographed before a license would be issued.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees to all persons “freedom of conscience and religion.” The Charter, however, does not include any obvious equivalent to the Established Clause of the First amendment of the United States Bill of Rights. According to the Canadian courts, s. 2(a), the freedom of religion provision in the Charter, protects the individual from “coercion in matters of conscience.” It prohibits the state from either restricting or compelling religious practise. But it does not necessarily preclude state support for religion. State support for the practises of institutions of a particular religion will breach s.2(a) only if it coerces some members of the community, and interferes with their ability to practise their faith or compels them to practice the favoured religion.

The author argues that the apparent collapse or erosion of the Oakes test reflects the problem of fitting a right such as freedom of expression, which is social and relational in character, into a structure of constitutional adjudication, which is built on an individualist conception of rights. In the leading Canadian freedom of expression cases, the task for the courts under section 1 is not simply to strike the proper balance between competing interests, but rather to resolve the single but complex question of whether the expression contributes to, or undermines, human agency or autonomous judgment. In these cases, the “value” of expression and the “harm” of expression are not distinct issues, but rather two sides of the same basic issue. Whether expression is more likely to contribute to insight and judgment or to manipulate and lead to an unreflective response is a relative judgment that will depend significantly on the social and economic circumstances in which it occurs. This issue fits awkwardly within an adjudicative structure that is based on an individual liberty model of rights. The author argues that this awkwardness accounts for the “erosion” of the Oakes test in freedom of expression cases and more specifically for the court's increasing, and inadequately justified, deference to legislative judgment under section 1.

This paper examines the recent Supreme Court of Canada judgment in LSBC v. TWU, in which the court upheld the decision of the BC law society not to accredit a law program proposed by an Evangelical Christian university. The paper argues that the task for the courts in this and other religious freedom cases is not to balance competing civic and religious interests but is instead to mark the boundary between the spheres of civic and spiritual life. More particularly, in this case, the issue was whether TWU (in applying to operate an accredited law program) should be viewed as a private religious institution that is free to govern itself according to its own norms, or whether, because its actions directly impact outsiders to the religious group, it should be viewed as performing a public role and therefore subject to non-discrimination and other civic norms. The different judgments in the case begin with different assumptions about the public/private character of TWU (or at least its proposed law program) and so never really address the key issue and never really engage with each other. The paper argues that because admission to law school continues to be a significant barrier to entry into the legal profession in Canada, TWU’s admission decisions will have an impact on non-members. The law society, therefore, was justified in requiring TWU to conform to non-discrimination norms as a condition of accreditation.

Pierre Trudeau’s deep personal commitment to Catholicism was largely unknown to Canadians during his tenure as Prime Minister. Indeed, his religious commitment did not play an obvious role in his political life. Trudeau’s version of Catholicism, ‘personalism’, emphasized the personal – interior – spiritual commitment of the individual and the necessity of the separation of religion and politics. He stressed the importance of individual liberty in matters of faith but also the personal responsibility of the individual to serve others and work towards a more just society. Trudeau was opposed to the recognition of an official religion, and indeed to any form of state promotion of a particular religious belief system. He rejected the assumption that political community or social solidarity required a shared (and public) commitment to a particular faith or culture. His promotion of multiculturalism stemmed from his belief that national identity or political membership should not be based on a shared ethnicity that would necessarily include some and exclude others. His championing of the Charter of Rights rested on the view that citizenship should be grounded instead on a shared commitment to the protection of individual and democratic rights. Trudeau was a committed believer and a secular politician, who sought to separate his public action and private conscience. In a sense then he embodied the separation of religion and politics – of church and state – that is central to the contemporary conception of religious freedom. In this chapter, I want to explore the challenge of separating personal or communal spiritual life from civic life which Trudeau had to navigate, throughout his political career.

There is a debate at the moment about whether the law societies (which regulate the legal profession in the various provinces) must accredit a law program to be offered by Trinity Western University [TWU], a private Evangelical Christian college. The Law Society of Upper Canada [LSUC], along with the law societies of British Columbia and Nova Scotia, refused to the accredit the proposed program because of the school’s discriminatory admissions policy and in particular the covenant that all students are required to sign, in which they agree, among other things, not to engage in sex outside of marriage and sex with a same-sex partner. The issue in the TWU accreditation case is whether the covenant is simply an internal matter (a rule that applies simply to the internal operations of a voluntary religious association) or whether it impacts outsiders to the religious community or the public interest, more generally. As I understand it, the law societies are not claiming that the members of a religious community need to be protected from oppressive or discriminatory internal rules. There are two ways in which it may be argued that the TWU program (and the covenant in particular) will have an impact on the public interest. The first argument is that a school that teaches its students that homosexuality is wrongful or immoral will not properly prepare lawyers for practice in the general community. Lawyers have duties to their clients, to the law, and to the institutions of justice. An accredited school must be willing to affirm basic equality rights. Second, admission to Canadian law schools is competitive. If its program is accredited, TWU will select students from a large number of applicants. Following graduation (as well as articling, and bar exams), TWU students will be eligible to practice law in a particular province. The accredited law schools are a gateway to the legal profession. The concern then is that TWU’s admissions policy will have a discriminatory impact on gays and lesbians who wish to enter the legal profession.

A discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's freedom of expression decisions which move between a discourse of freedom and rationality when defining of the freedom to a causal or behavioural discourse when determining justified limits.

When poverty activist resort to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, things cannot be going very well. The Charter of Rights will not eliminate poverty or gross disparities in wealth. It will not ensure that affordable housing is provided to those in need. All it may be able to do is to protect the individual’s right to ask others for help, to beg in the streets.

An introduction to a general discussion of the Canadian courts' approach to religious freedom, which argues among other things that despite their formal commitment to state neutrality in religious matters, the courts have applied this requirement selectively - sometimes treating religion as a cultural identity towards which the state should remain neutral and other times (when it touches upon or addresses civic matters) as a political or moral judgment by the individual that should be subject to the give-and-take of politics. Behind the courts' uneven application of the neutrality requirement lies a complex conception of religious commitment in which religion is viewed as both an aspect of the individual's identity and as a set of judgments made by the individual about truth and right. The challenge for the courts is to find a way to fit this complex conception of religious commitment into a constitutional framework that that relies on a distinction between individual choices or commitments that should be protected as a matter of individual liberty, and individual attributes or traits that that should be respected as a matter of equality.

In the recent case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a condominium association’s refusal to permit Orthodox Jewish unit-owners (the appellants) to construct succahs on their balconies, as part of the Jewish festival of Succot, breached their freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Because the restriction of religious practice was imposed by a non-state actor, the Canadian Charter of Rights was not applicable. However, the majority judgment of Iaccobucci J. was clear that “the principles … applicable in cases where an individual alleges that his or her freedom of religion is infringed under the Quebec Charter” are also applicable to a claim under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Religious beliefs/practices are excluded and insulated from political contest not because they are intrinsically valuable but instead because they are aspects of a collective or cultural identity and markers of membership in the collective. If the state’s duty to accommodate religious practices is about the status of religious groups rather than the liberty of individuals (a matter of equality rather than liberty) then it may not extend to practices that are idiosyncratic and have no link to a religious or cultural group/tradition. The requirement that the state should accommodate religious beliefs or practices (and sometimes compromise its policies) is most often justified as necessary to ensure that the individual’s deepest values and commitments and more generally his/her autonomy in decision- making are respected. I argue, however, that reasonable accommodation is better understood as a form of equality right that is based on the importance of community or group membership to the individual. Understood in this way, the accommodation requirement may not extend to an individual’s deeply held non-religious practices, if they are not part of a shared belief system. The willingness of the courts to protect certain non- religious practices (to require their accommodation by the state) may rest simply on their formal similarity to familiar religious practices such as pacifism or vegetarianism – that are specific in content, peremptory in force and that diverge from mainstream practices. Yet, as a practical matter, practices of this kind are seldom sustained outside a religious or cultural community. It is not an accident then that the very few instances of non-religious, ‘conscientious’, practices that have been accommodated are similar in content and structure to familiar religious practices, and indeed may have arisen from these religious practices.

In most religious accommodation cases, an individual or group seeks to be exempted from a law that restricts their religious practice. The accommodation claim, though, has a slightly different form in conscientious objection cases. In these cases, an individual asks to be exempted not from a law that restricts his/her religious practice, but instead from a law that requires him/her to perform an act that he/she regards as immoral. In many of these cases the claimant asks to be excused from performing an act that is not itself “immoral” but that supports or facilitates (what she/he sees as) the immoral action of others, and so makes him/her complicit in this immorality.

Many recent hate speech cases in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere involve religion either as the source of views that are alleged to be hateful or as the target of such views and sometimes, of course, as both the source and target of these views. This chapter explores the difference religion makes to the application of hate speech laws – when it is the target of this speech. The ‘religious’ hate speech cases are difficult for the same reason that all hate speech cases are difficult. There is significant disagreement in the community about whether, or to what extent, the restriction of hate speech can be reconciled with the public commitment to freedom of expression. There is, however, another reason why hate speech cases involving religion are so difficult, which stems from our complex conception of religious adherence or membership – as both a personal commitment and a cultural identity. The chapter focuses on anti-Muslim speech in Canada.

The Lautsi decision reflects the deep ambivalence in Western liberal democracies about religion and its relationship to politics. Like the Canadian courts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems to recognize that religion and politics should be separated but that this separation can never be total. While the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of Canada rely at least formally on a similar test for determining a breach of religious freedom (a test that emphasizes the state’s obligation to remain neutral in spiritual matters) their application of the test is guided by different understandings of the public/political significance of religion and more particularly the relationship between religion, civic values, and national identity. The Court in Lautsi seems to accept, or at least acquiesce in, two claims made by the Italian government about the meaning of the crucifix: that it symbolizes the Italian national identity, which is tied to its history as a Christian or Roman Catholic nation, and that it symbolizes the Christian foundation of the civic/secular values of the Italian political community – the values of democracy and tolerance. Behind the claim that the crucifix is not simply a religious symbol but also a symbol of the Italian identity and political culture, is the draw of a thicker or richer form of national identity than that offered by civic nationalism. The assumption is that Italians are held together in a political community not simply by their shared commitment to liberal values or democratic institutions but by a common culture rooted in a religious tradition. Religion and politics are joined at the core of national identity and the root of political obligation. This link between religion and politics, though, rests on the problematic claim that the values of democracy and tolerance emerged directly from Christianity (and are the logical, even necessary, outcome of Christian doctrine) and the disturbing claim that Christianity is uniquely tied to these values. While religion does sometimes intersect with politics in Canada, it no longer plays a role in the definition of the country’s national identity. Canada, sometime ago, embraced multiculturalism as the defining feature of its national identity and liberal-democratic values as its political bond. There is no doubt that Canada’s moral/social culture has been shaped in different ways by the Christian faith of earlier generations, nevertheless any attempt to formally link Canadian national identity to a particular religious tradition would run against the country’s self-conception as a multicultural (multi-faith) society.

Canada is often cited as one of the principal sources of proportionality analysis --- an approach to the determination of limits on constitutional rights that has been adopted in many jurisdictions. The two-step structure of constitutional rights adjudication is built on the idea that these rights are the basic conditions of individual autonomy or liberty that must be protected from the demands of collective welfare. At the first stage of the adjudication the court determines whether the restricted activity falls within the scope of the right. At the second stage, the court balances the right against the competing interest advanced by the restrictive law, to determine whether the restriction is justified. Yet few of these rights fit this individual liberty model and are better understood as social or relational in character – protecting different aspects of the individual’s interaction or connection with others in the community. If we recognize that most constitutional rights do not simply protect individual autonomy but instead protect different aspects of human flourishing or dignity within community then two things may follow. First there can be no single generic test for limits on rights. The form or character of “limitations” on these rights may differ in significant ways. Second, the two-steps of adjudication may often be difficult to separate or the separation may seem quite artificial. Many of the issues addressed by the courts will not fit easily into the two-step structure of analysis, because the “competing” interests are really different dimensions of a social relationship.

The question of whether a province can require civil marriage commissioners to perform same sex marriages, over their religious objections, has been addressed by the Canadian courts in a series of cases. In each of these cases the issue is framed by the courts as a contest between religious freedom and sexual orientation equality that must be resolved through the balancing of these competing interests. And in each of these cases the court strikes the balance in favour of sexual orientation equality, determining that the equality rights of same-sex couples outweighs the religious freedom of marriage commissioners. Despite what they say, the courts in these cases do not balance or trade-off religious freedom and sexual orientation equality, but instead give complete priority to the latter. A refusal by a marriage commissioner to perform a same-sex civil marriage ceremony is viewed by the courts as the cause of harm or injury to the couple (an act of discrimination) and not simply as a competing claim. I will argue that there is no balancing in these cases because there is no freedom of religion interest to be balanced against the right to sexual orientation equality. The marriage commissioner’s freedom of religion lacks substance not, or not simply, because the commissioner is a public official, or because the interference with his/her religious beliefs is indirect or partial. Rather the religious objection of the marriage commissioner falls outside the scope of freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [the Charter], because it involves a belief about how others in the community should behave and be treated. A marriage commissioner has no claim to be exempted from the duties of his or her position on the basis of such a belief.

Hate mongers have found it strategically useful to present themselves as defenders of free speech. The shift from advocate of hate to defender of free speech fits well with the hate monger's self-understanding as a victim of state oppression and a defender of Western values against multiculturalism. More often, though, the opposition to hate speech regulation has a principled basis. There are many committed civil libertarians who regard hate speech as odious but are nevertheless prepared to defend the right of others to engage in it. Their opposition to the restriction of hate speech rests on a commitment to individual liberty sand a concern about the reach of state power. While I think the "civil libertarian" position is mistaken, it is not without merit. What is perplexing though is the extraordinary energy that these advocates of free speech put into the fight against hate speech regulation. They seem convinced that the integrity of the free speech edifice depends on holding the line here. Yet they seem indifferent to the more significant ways in which freedom of expression is being eroded in Western democracies. Whether by design or not, the obsessive opposition to hate speech regulation diverts our attention away from more fundamental free speech issues concerning the character and structure of public disclosure, and more particularly the domination of public disclosure by commercial messages and the advertising form. But, of course, these are not issues that can be addressed by the courts, except in indirect ways, and that may partly explain the lack of attention they receive.

In Mouvement laique v Saguenay the Supreme Court of Canada held that the recitation of a prayer at the opening of a municipal council’s public meeting breached ‘the state’s duty of neutrality’ in matters of religion. The comment discusses some of the difficulties or challenges raised by the Court's commitment to religious neutrality.