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Negotiating Feminism traces the reflection of the feminist “sex wars” in contemporary debates about campus sexual violence reform in Canada and the United States – what Emily Bazelon has called the “return of the sex wars” on college and university campuses. Negotiating Feminism focuses on one issue in the return of the sex wars – the role of interests-based, consensual dispute resolution processes, including mediation and restorative justice, in changing the conditions that foster campus sexual violence on the ground. The political polarization of the return of the sex wars has prevented some colleges and universities from engaging with policy models that challenge the primacy of campus adjudication and other rights-based options. Complainants of campus sexual violence should be empowered to access any form of dispute resolution under law, whether rights-based or interests-based, that accords with their personal conception of justice. Empowering complainants in this way does not mean that colleges and universities should be willfully blind to the reality of substantive inequality that campus adjudication is intended to address. Yet acknowledging this reality should not require colleges and universities to essentialize about the nature of women’s injury or overdetermine the role of gendered power imbalances in producing the content of women’s interests in resolving their complaints otherwise. Feminist law and policymakers should negotiate between these competing imperatives and come together by instituting what Negotiating Feminism calls the “plural process” model of campus sexual violence reform. The plural process model recognizes that both rights-based and interests-based options can promote substantive equality for women and other historically marginalized groups – and it seeks to bring about that change.

The Canadian government has a long history of regulation, exploitation, and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, and two-spirit (LGBTQ2) people. One of the most painful chapters in this history is the “LGBT Purge,” a term that refers to the expulsion of LGBTQ2 service members and employees from the Canadian Armed Forces, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and federal public service between 1955 and 1992. The LGBT Purge was the subject of a class action lawsuit filed in 2017 that resulted in a settlement agreement in 2018. On a parallel track to the settlement, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued a formal apology for the government’s history of state-sponsored discrimination against LGBTQ2 people in 2017. In this article, I consider these events from a legal historical and queer theoretical perspective. I focus on the potential of the settlement to promote reconciliation with LGBTQ2 people, contextualizing the settlement in light of neoliberal and homonationalist pressures on the class members to settle the past and forgive legacies of homophobic violence that continue to be felt today. Praiseworthy as the settlement terms might be, I conclude by arguing that forgiving the government’s history of discrimination against LGBTQ2 people is an historical impossibility.

The Canadian legal landscape is changing. Data over the last three decades show a trend toward larger law firms. Many of the country’s most storied ‘big law’ corporate firms have exploded in size and reach. Almost all of these firms maintain offices across the country and satellite offices in key international markets. Other large firms have been subsumed into foreign conglomerates pursuing expansion into the Canadian legal market. These developments have led to an increase in revenues and business opportunities for senior partners at these firms. It has also led to unprecedented challenges for the management of big law firms in Canada. As one of the former managing partners of Heenan Blaikie LLP (Heenan Blaikie), Norman Bacal knows this better than most.

This article revisits long-standing debates about objective interpretation in the common law system by focusing on a crime novel by Agatha Christie and judicial opinion by the Ontario High Court. Conventions of the crime fiction and judicial opinion genres inform readers’ assumption that the two texts are objectively interpretable. This article challenges this assumption by demonstrating that unreliable narration is often, if not always, a feature of written communication. Judges, like crime fiction writers, are storytellers. While these authors might intend for their stories to be read in certain ways, the potential for interpretive disconnect between unreliable narrators and readers means there can be no essential quality that marks a literary or legal text’s meaning as objective. Taken to heart, this demands that judges try to narrate their decisions more reliably so that readers are able to interpret the texts correctly when it matters most.

Equality rights for LGBTQ+ peoples have a politically vexed relationship with substantive equality around the world. Critiques of the structural limitations and harmful, unintended consequences of rights claims have abounded in critical legal theory for decades. This chapter intervenes in these debates by mapping the structure and rhetoric of equality rights for LGBTQ+ peoples. Applying a legal analytical framework that originates in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s writing, the chapter focuses on the text of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, released in 2007 and supplemented in 2017. The rhetoric of the Yogyakarta Principles is trapped in what Sedgwick calls a “radical and irreducible incoherence” between conflicting conceptions of gender and sexuality that has constrained the mission of substantive equality worldwide, yet which may be fundamental to the praxis of rights claiming in the international human rights system. Equality rights talk is “queer” in this sense – irresolvable in theory, powerfully productive for LGBTQ+ peoples in certain legal contexts, and profoundly harmful to LGBTQ+ peoples and other equality-seeking groups in other legal contexts. Considering this fact, the chapter concludes by arguing that LGBTQ+ activists should think about how we might negotiate the conflicts of equality rights rhetoric more strategically and responsibly by operating, paradoxically, both within and without the constraints of international human rights system to promote gender and sexual diversity on the global stage.

This article traces the evolution of the feminist “sex wars” in contemporary debates about campus sexual violence reform in Canada and the United States – what Emily Bazelon calls the “return of the sex wars” at American colleges and universities. The "return of the sex wars" has been characterized by many of the same unproductive hostilities and painful acrimony as the original fight between feminist sex radicals and anti-pornography feminists over three decades ago. This article focuses on a particularly controversial issue in these debates: the role of consensual dispute resolution (i.e., negotiation, mediation, and restorative justice) in addressing campus sexual violence. Employing a two-person counter conversational methodology, the article stages a negotiation between two feminists with competing and representative views on this issue. Feminist concerns about consensual dispute resolution raise challenging questions about the rise of informal justice and its implications for the rule of law in campus sexual violence cases. The article concludes by arguing that the intense polarization and politicization of the "return of the sex wars" has led to a hollowing out of the feminist critical discourse in this area, which has prevented some feminists from engaging with consensual dispute resolution as a potentially viable and redemptive means of sexual regulation on campus.

This article challenges traditional approaches to gender difference in prescriptive negotiation analysis. Historically, dispute resolution scholars and practitioners analyzing the determinants of gender have either assumed or concluded that women and men negotiate differently, with so-called “women’s ways” being seen as less effective than “men’s ways” at achieving principled negotiation results. This position has led scholars to offer prescriptive negotiation advice that maps onto two forms of difference feminism: liberal feminist negotiation (translatable as “fix the woman”) and cultural feminist negotiation (translatable as “fix the system around the woman”). This article critiques difference feminist theory for its practical and political implications in principled negotiation. These criticisms suggest that difference feminist theory limits the range of negotiation tools accessible to everyone by reinscribing sex and gender stereotypes, and only allows room for feminist interventions based in minoritizing discourses of female/feminine bargaining identity at the expense of universalizing discourses of human activity. The article then offers an alternative based in postmodern feminism, “protean negotiation,” that aspires to dissolve fixed gender identities for the practical and political benefit of both women and men. This article concludes by suggesting that a form of the classic Negotiator’s Dilemma is reflected in the progressive politics of gender in negotiation where cultural feminism and postmodern feminism suggest a tension between ideological commitments to “identity” and “activity” respectively. These intuitions give rise to a struggle called the “Feminist Negotiator’s Dilemma,” and there may be no way to resolve it. The task for progressive politics should be to accept these competing imperatives and to negotiate their contradictions if feminists are to effectively understand, let alone resist, the limitations of gender difference in negotiation theory and practice.

The Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s Model Code of Professional Conduct recognizes the commitment of the legal profession to protect the public interest and respect the requirements of human rights laws. Following in the wake of the Statement of Principles controversy at the Law Society of Ontario, this article argues that the standard conception of lawyers’ professional role morality in Canada—the neutral partisan—takes a thin and “bleached out” view of legal ethics. In making this case, the article reads the limited body of professional discipline caselaw through the lens of critical theory to show that current practices of lawyer regulation pertaining to human rights and equality are underinclusive. Next, the article argues that lawyers have a positive obligation to promote substantive equality in their professional life and work. This obligation should be reflected by revisions to the Model Code and other professional regulatory measures to ensure that law societies take a comprehensive and systematic approach to promoting substantive equality within their mandate. As such, the purpose of the article is to shift the terms of professional debate about what protecting the public interest and respecting the requirements of human rights laws mean.

In Anglo-American legal discourse, the juridical subject of dispute resolution has traditionally been conceived as a bearer of rights or a bearer of interests: rights, in the model of liberal legalism that regards adjudication (i.e. court and tribunal processes) to be the preferred means of resolving disputes in the adversarial tradition; or interests, in an alternative or complementary model that regards consensual dispute resolution (i.e. negotiated and mediated settlement processes) to be the preferred means of resolving disputes in the non-adversarial tradition. This article explores the ethical implications of reframing the bearer of interests as a bearer of desires. This is more than just semantics. Reconceiving the juridical subject in this way invokes the contemporary tradition of progressive social theory that has centered the concept of desire in its critique of the liberal humanist subject. This critique has yet to be fully explored in the legal scholarship. One of the most productive lines of argument in this tradition is derived from queer theory – in particular, a strand of post-identitarian thinking in queer theory that regards sexual desire as something that is disruptive of ontology regardless of gender or sexual identity. This strand of thinking raises important questions in this context. Is it possible to theorize juridical subjectivity as a form of sexual subjectivity? What follows from such an effort to “queer” the constitution of the juridical subject, independent from its politicized identity as a bearer of rights in liberal legalism? Could this theory teach us something about the ethics of rights and interests-based dispute resolution processes?This paper argues that theorizing about the juridical subject of dispute resolution through the lens of sexual desire encourages us to think about the practice of settlement non-instrumentally, not unlike sexuality itself, which reveals the practice to be immune to the liberal legal imperatives of politicized identity. This is what makes it a fitting analogue for the trope of sexual freedom in queer theory, which opens up a pressing line of criticism about legal policy initiatives that have sought to limit, and in some cases categorically ban the use of consensual dispute resolution altogether. At the same time, however, this theory raises difficult questions about the ethics of sexual desire given the risk that consent to sex and settlement may be induced by coercive force. This helps us to understand the proper role of law – and specifically, the legal doctrine of consent – in regulating the conduct of these practices, or at least to understand it as something deeply fraught with uncertainty.

Feminist law and policymakers have been inspired by collectively generated experiences of emotion that help to shape what counts as justice and injustice in campus sexual violence cases. Focusing on events surrounding the Dalhousie University Faculty of Dentistry in 2014–2015, this article explains how emotional incitements in the case contributed to an infrastructure that supported formal and specifically carceral responses to campus sexual violence. Correspondingly, this article explains why alternative modes of legal and political formation that challenged the premises of the formal law, including restorative justice, were misread by some commentators as a form of “weak justice” and therefore outside the bounds of feminist action. The central claim of the article is not that particular emotional reactions are right or wrong, but that feminist law and policymakers should reflect on and assess their political force. Considering the ways that emotions are mobilized reveals the benefits and drawbacks of engaging with law in ways that feel emotionally gratifying and therefore politically necessary, but which can lead to harmful consequences that contradict feminist goals.