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As much attention is turned to regulating AI systems to minimize the risk of harm, including the one caused by discriminatory biased outputs, a better understanding of commercial practices that may or may not violate anti-discrimination law is critical. This article investigates the instances in which algorithmic price personalization, i.e., setting prices based on consumers’ personal information with the objective of getting as closely as possible to their maximum willingness to pay (APP), may contravene anti-discrimination law. It analyses cases whereby APP could constitute prima facie discrimination, while acknowledging the difficulty to detect this commercial practice. We discuss why certain commercial practice differentiations, even on prohibited grounds, do not necessarily lead to prima facie discrimination, offering a more nuanced account of the application of anti-discrimination law to APP. However once prima facie discrimination is established, we argue that APP will not be easily exempted under a bona fide requirement, given APP’s lack of a legitimate business purpose under the stringent test of anti-discrimination law and given its quasi-constitutional status. An additional contribution of this article is to bridge traditional anti-discrimination law with emerging AI governance regulation, resorting to the gaps identified in anti-discrimination law to show how AI governance regulation could enhance anti-discrimination law and improve compliance.

Price is often the single most important term in consumer transactions. As the personalization of e-commerce continues to intensify, the law and policy implications of algorithmic personalized pricing i.e., to set prices based on consumers’ personal data with the objective of getting as closely as possible to their maximum willingness to pay (APP), should be top of mind for regulators. This article looks at the legality of APP from a personal data protection law perspective, by first presenting the general legal framework applicable to this commercial practice under competition and consumer law. There is value in analysing the legality of APP through how these bodies of law interact with one and the other. This article questions the legality of APP under personal data protection law, by its inability to effectively meet the substantive requirements of valid consent and reasonable purpose. Findings of illegality of APP under personal data protection law may in turn further inform the lawfulness of APP under competition and consumer law.

Price is often the single most important term in consumer transactions. As the personalization of e-commerce continues to intensify, the law and policy implications of algorithmic personalized pricing i.e., to set prices based on consumers’ personal data with the objective of getting as closely as possible to their maximum willingness to pay (APP), should be top of mind for regulators. This article looks at the legality of APP from a personal data protection law perspective, by first presenting the general legal framework applicable to this commercial practice under competition and consumer law. There is value in analysing the legality of APP through how these bodies of law interact with one and the other. This article questions the legality of APP under personal data protection law, by its inability to effectively meet the substantive requirements of valid consent and reasonable purpose. Findings of illegality of APP under personal data protection law may in turn further inform the lawfulness of APP under competition and consumer law.

The number of lawyers who practice law in-house has significantly increased over the last thirty years in North America. While in this part of the world, in-house counsel are regulated in the same manner as outside counsel by their professional bars, the recent decision by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. European Communities, reminds us that other parts of the world treat in-house counsel very differently. This paper analyses the justifications for a similar treatment of in-house counsel and outside counsel by the legal profession. While a detailed contextual analysis of in-house counsel’s functions reveals a likelihood of greater vulnerability in their ability to balance them with various ethical and professional duties, it also shows that outside counsel face similar ethical dilemmas that may vary in degree or in nature. The similar regulation of in-house and outside counsel is consistent with a poor articulation by the legal profession of the scope of the duty of professional independence from the client. And yet such duty exists. As it can conflict with paramount professional obligations, including the duty of loyalty to the client, its scope is controversial. Leaving the duty of professional independence from the client largely undefined is harmful to in-house and also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public interest. In-house counsel are in a privileged position to provide legal services in accordance with fundamental values of the legal profession. As such, their contribution needs to be better recognized and promoted. Generally, regulatory reform is necessary to nurture in-house counsel’s ability to provide legal services as integral members of the bar, while minimizing the risks that the privileged proximity to their clients present. Such reform will inevitably benefit outside counsel who face comparable issues. A clearer articulation of the meaning and scope of the duty of professional independence from the client, together with tangible mechanisms to actualize it, will provide greater support to in-house and outside counsel to better understand and integrate their various ethical and professional duties within their role. It will also benefit all interested parties.

In contemporary copyright law, there is an ongoing debate around the nature and scope of the rights users should have to copyright works, exacerbated by ongoing technological developments. Within that debate, this article queries the value of looking at the remedies users may have against copyright holders restricting their legitimate uses of works, as a means to further elucidate the nature and scope of user rights. While there is some value in looking at remedies to situate copyright user rights, an access to justice perspective to rights and remedies suggests that such approach may be too limiting with respect to the position of potential claimants in a legal system. On that basis, this paper identifies structural deficiencies of copyright user rights and proposes an analytical framework towards achieving greater “justice for users” both in the realm of public law and private law.

In her book Copyright and Collective Authorship — Locating the Authors of Collaborative Work, Dr. Daniela Simone identifies root causes of the deficiencies in the law’s treatment of (joint) authorship, and provides an admirable roadmap and analytical framework to orient the judiciary and all others concerned about ascertaining who should be the authors of collective works. Simone’s analytical framework and prescriptions rely on four case studies that involve large amounts of collaboration: Wikipedia, Australian indigenous art, scientific collaborations and film. Throughout the book, I was struck by Simone’s commitment to integrity, ethics and fairness in her treatment of contributors of creative processes, pointing to power imbalances, misguided practicality and efficiency rationales, and how those factors may have the law turn its back away from otherwise deserving authorial contributions.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. Part One of this paper lays the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. Part Two applies the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted works as well as its justifications. It explores the ramifications of copyright acting as a property-limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

In York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (2020), the Federal Court of Appeal was confronted with two issues at the heart of ongoing debates in Canadian copyright law. First, whether tariffs of copyright collective societies are mandatory. Second, and the main focus of this case comment, how should the fair dealing doctrine be interpreted with respect to the purpose of education. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Federal Court decision that York University Fair dealing Guidelines did not meet the fair dealing requirements in copyright law. This case comment highlights how the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal failed to consider important contextual elements of York University Guidelines that might have led to different conclusions. It provides some guidance on how fair dealing for the purpose of education should be interpreted. While fair dealing has been characterized as a “user right” by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (2004) and subsequent decisions, this case comment points to some of the shortcomings of fair dealing as a vehicle to promote greater access to educational materials. It concludes by highlighting the challenges that lie ahead on the application of fair dealing to educational institutions, and by broadening the debate of access to educational materials beyond the fair dealing doctrine.

The presence of a physical object (a book, DVD, CD) plays a determinant role in how information products (e.g., commercial copies of computer programs, books, musical recordings, video games, and virtual worlds) are regulated, in contrast with copies of similar information products with no physical embodiment. The presence of a physical object influences how law makers distinguish goods from services, to define a contract of sale or license, to apply the first sale doctrine in copyright law, and to determine which acts reserved to copyright holders are involved in a commercial transaction. In this article, I argue that the emphasis on a physical object is to a large extent arbitrary, leads to double standards, legal and normative incoherence, and ultimately that it is detrimental to recipients of information products and copyright user rights.

One of the greatest controversies in contemporary copyright law is the introduction of technological protection measures (TPMs) at the international and national level. By creating a separate parallel regime for digital copyright works, TPMs shifted the paradigm by redefining the rules of engagement of how users would increasingly access and experience digital copyright works.

In this article, I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or users' rights. Are exceptions to copyright infringement rights or privileges? Are they mandatory? While copyright users' rights and interests have triggered interest and debate amongst scholars, relatively less attention has been given to defining their precise nature, and on the consequences of the main characteristics of exceptions to copyright infringement on copyright law and policy. I examine the interplay between the users' rights set out in the Copyright Act and how they can be altered or overridden by non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and TPMs. To this end, I refer to a sample of non-negotiated standard terms of use for the online distribution of books, musical recordings and films. I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, including through Hohfeld's theory of jural correlatives. I look at the policy considerations behind these questions and conclude by reflecting on the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users' rights on the coherence and, ultimately, the legitimacy of copyright law.

This is an introduction to selected articles published in vol. 35 of The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice (2018) further to the Symposium: "Copyright User Rights and Access to Justice" hosted by Windsor Law on May 18-19 2017. It gives a brief overview of the concept of copyright user rights and access to justice, as well as of the main themes discussed in the articles and at the Symposium, including access to knowledge and human rights.

Copyright laws throughout the world are copyright holder centric and present a very fragmented source to comprehend the rights of users, and in particular of consumers owning copies of copyrighted works. Although in recent years, a growing number of commentators have worked towards defining the place of users in copyright law, little attention has been devoted to the nature and justifications of copy ownership of copyrighted works. This paper applies property and copyright theory to define and justify the existence of copy ownership of copyrighted works. It seeks to carve out in clearer terms the place of copy ownership legally and normatively, to offer a counterbalance to a predominant copyright holder centric approach to copyright law. In Part One of this paper ((2010) 23 I.P.J. 83) I lay out the theoretical framework of property and copyright theory. In this Part Two, I apply the theoretical framework to define the nature of the copy of a copyrighted work, as well as its justifications. I also explore the ramifications of copyright acting as a property limitation rule to copy ownership, and how copy ownership can also act as a property-limitation rule of copyright.

Graffiti is vilified, and at the same time is increasingly revered and celebrated. This ambivalence is reflected in the general legal landscape that surrounds graffiti and other forms of street art at the criminal, civil and municipal levels. Within this general legal framework, the application of copyright law to graffiti and street art reveals a complex web of interwoven issues about the protection of the graffiti artist’s economic and moral rights and questions of illegality and public policy, and about the rights of the property owner of the “wall” on which the art resides, and the public. This book chapter explores how the law mediates between the rights of graffiti and street artists, the rights of the property owner on which the art resides, and members of the public. The application of copyright law to graffiti and street art offers an opportunity to investigate where the balance should lie between various competing rights and interests relating to these types of works.

The primary goal of this article is to look at the property attributes of copyright to inform a more nuanced understanding of the nature of copyright that emphasizes its distinct character. I resort primarily to James W. Harris' theory in Property and Justice, and in particular, on the insights that his characterization of property as the twin manifestation of trespassory rules and of an ownership spectrum, bring to the understanding of copyright. While copyright holders' right to exclude has been a focal point in copyright theory, looking at copyright through trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum allows me to discern two distinct yet interrelated property interests that bring a more refined understanding of the property attributes of copyright.

Price is an essential term at the heart of supplier-consumer transactions and relationships increasingly taking place in “micro-marketplace chambers,” where points of comparison with similar relevant products may be difficult to discern and time-consuming to make. This article critically reviews recent legal and economic academic literature, policy reports on algorithmic personalized pricing (i.e. setting prices according to consumers’ personal characteristics to target their willingness to pay), as well as recent developments in privacy regulation, competition law, and policy discourse, to derive the guiding norms that should inform the regulation of this practice, predominantly from a consumer protection perspective. Looking more closely at algorithmic personalized pricing through prevailing and conflicting norms of supplier freedom, competition, market efficiency, innovation, as well as equality, fairness, privacy, autonomy, and transparency, raises important concerns about certain forms of algorithmic personalized pricing. This article provides parameters to delineate when algorithmic personalized pricing should be banned as a form of unfair commercial practice. This ban would address the substantive issues that algorithmic personalized pricing raises. Resorting to mandatory disclosure requirements of algorithmic personalized pricing would address some of the concerns at a procedural level only, and for this reason is not the preferred regulatory approach. As such, our judgment on the (un)acceptability of algorithmic personalized pricing as a commercial practice is a litmus test for how we should regulate the indiscriminate extraction and use of consumer personal data in the future.